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ABSTRACT

Party Capability Theory hypothesizes that parties with greater resources, usually
“repeat players,” fare better in the judicial system and are better able to influence legal
changes than “one shotters.” The theory also points out that “parties who have lawyers do
better.” The theory has become most influential since its publication and has been tested
by several studies. However, its importance has not been addressed in the accounting
academic arena.
The intent o f this inquiry is to generalize Party Capability Theory to federal tax
cases. The research sample consists o f 1,010 trial court cases, 744 federal appellate court
cases, and 29 U.S. Supreme Court cases rendered in 1992-2006. Summary statistics
indicate that around 34.5% o f trial court cases and 16.4% o f federal appellate court cases
involve pro se litigants.
Success rate analysis indicates that the presumed stronger party does win more
often in court than the presumed weaker party. However, logistic regression results show
the opposite direction. That is, the presumed weaker litigant is positively correlated with
case results and the presumed stronger litigant is negatively associated with case results.
Surprisingly, pro se representation is positively associated with case results and it reaches
a statistically significant level in trial courts. The findings o f this study have practical
implications for those subject to litigation.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background
“Who gets what?” has traditionally been viewed as one o f the central questions in
the study o f politics. In the United States, the courts are recognized as key institutions for
the legitimate settlement o f a wide spectrum o f conflicts between individuals and groups
that have important implications for the distribution o f material and symbolic goods.
Therefore, understanding who wins in court is an essential component o f a full
appreciation o f the authoritative allocation o f values in society (Easton 1953). Marc
Galanter’s Party Capability Theory (Galanter 1974) is exceptionally influential in the
legal literature for investigating the judicial allocation o f values in society. It formulates
the hypothesis that parties with greater resources, usually “repeat players,” fare better in
courts and are better able to influence legal changes than “one shotters.” The theory also
points out that “parties who have lawyers do better.” Strong evidence in support o f Party
Capability Theory is reported in several studies (Wheeler et al. 1987, Atkins 1991,
Songer and Sheehan 1992). However, no empirical research in the accounting/tax arena
has been attempted to date. Investigating the generalizability o f Party Capability Theory
to federal tax cases is important in understanding the judicial allocation in federal
taxation.

1
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2
The Judicial System in the US
Federal courts are located in every state o f the United States as are separate state
court systems. Except for the U.S. Tax Court, all of the subsequently mentioned federal
courts are established under Article III o f the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Tax Court is
formed under Article I.
Article III. Article III, Section 1, o f the Constitution provides that the judicial
power o f the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as the Congress may establish over time. The judges, both o f the Supreme and lower
courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for
their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office.
Thus, judges of federal courts established under Article III enjoy tenure and
unreduced salary protection. The tenure and salary provisions were inserted as
prophylactic measures to ensure the independence o f the judiciary from the executive and
legislative branches.
Article I. Article I, Section 1 o f the Constitution provides that all legislative
powers granted shall be vested in a Congress o f the United States which shall consist o f a
Senate and House o f Representatives.
Article I does not provide tenure and unreduced salary protection to officers o f the
institutions established under it.
The Structure of Federal Courts. The federal judiciary is a totally separate, selfgoverning branch o f the government. With certain exceptions, federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear a broad variety o f cases. The same federal judges handle both civil
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and criminal cases, public and private law disputes, cases involving individuals, and
cases involving corporations and government entities.
Trial Courts. In the United States, U.S. District Courts are the principal trial
courts in the federal court system. There are 94 federal judicial districts and U.S. District
Courts that have jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories o f federal cases.
The United States Court o f Federal Claims operates as a single court that resides
in Washington, D.C. It has jurisdiction over disputes involving federal contracts, the
taking o f private property by the federal government, and a variety o f other monetary
claims against the United States.
The United States Tax Court is another single court located in Washington, D.C.
It is a special court with jurisdiction limited almost exclusively to litigation under the
Internal Revenue Code. Its hearings are held in several cities throughout the nation,
usually with only a single judge present who submits his/her opinion to the chief judge. It
consists o f 19 judges appointed by the President for 15-year terms. Different from all
other federal courts discussed in this paper, it is established under Article I instead o f
Article III. Correspondingly, Tax Court judges do not have tenure or unreduced salary
protection. Tax Court judges may be removed by the President, after notice and
opportunity for public hearing, on grounds that are very broad: inefficiency, neglect o f
duty, or malfeasance in office.
Appellate Courts. If either party o f the litigants is not satisfied with a trial court
decision, the unsatisfied party can appeal to the appellate court. Currently there are 13
courts o f appeals. The 11 numbered regional circuits and the D.C. Circuit are
geographically defined. The United States Court o f Appeals for the Federal Circuit is not
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geographically defined and has nationwide jurisdiction over certain appeals based on
subject matter. Appeals from all the trial courts mentioned above, except the United
States Court o f Federal Claims, may be taken to the United States regional circuit court of
appeals. Jurisdiction is based upon the location o f the litigant’s residence. In addition, the
Court o f Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals from
the United States Court o f Federal Claims.
The United States Supreme Court. If either party o f the litigants is dissatisfied
with the appellate court decision, the unsatisfied party can then appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court is the highest court in the
country, and cases come before it via a discretionary review writ o f certiorari. It consists
o f a Chief Justice and eight associate justices. In general, the United States Supreme
Court only agrees to decide cases where there is a split o f opinion among the courts o f
appeals or where there is an important constitutional issue o f federal law that needs to be
clarified. As a result, tax cases find a very limited audience before the U.S. Supreme
Court.
The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts. In general, federal courts may decide cases
that involve the United States government or its officials, the United States Constitution
or federal laws, or controversies between states or between the United States and foreign
governments. A case can be filed in federal court even if no question arising under
federal law is involved if the litigants are citizens o f different states or the dispute arises
between citizens o f the United States and those o f another country or countries.
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The Structure of State Courts. The majority o f legal disputes in America are
addressed in separate state court systems established in each o f the 50 states. Most state
court systems have trial courts o f general jurisdiction, intermediate appellate courts, and a
state supreme court.
The Jurisdiction of State Courts. State courts have jurisdiction over a wider
variety o f disputes than the federal courts. State courts preside over virtually all divorce
and child custody matters, probate and inheritance issues, real estate questions, and other
issues.
Representation before Courts
The litigation process in United States Courts is referred to as an “adversary”
system because it relies on the litigants to present their dispute before a neutral fact
finder. The work o f collecting evidence and presenting it to the court is accomplished by
the litigants and their attorneys, normally without assistance from the court. Traditionally,
litigants will use professional representation (solo law practitioners or a law firm) to
represent them before the court. The decision to self-represent is evidence that such
litigants are pursuing an unsound legal strategy because it is assumed that legal
representation is required in order that the issues in a dispute can be effectively presented
to the court (Barclay 1996). Recently, pro se representation has become more frequent,
and Swank (2005) calls it “the Pro Se Phenomenon.”
United States Courts have seen an exponential growth rate in pro se
representation. For instance, in 1971, only one percent o f litigants in divorce cases in
California were pro se. By 1985, the rate had risen to 47% and in 2005 it was
approaching 75%. Federal courts as well as state courts have seen an increase in pro se
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litigants. Pro se litigants appeared in 37% o f all federal cases. The number o f pro se
litigants in Federal Appellate Courts increased by 49% in a two-year period (Swank
2005).
“A national conference held in November o f 1999 signals the rising importance o f
the pro se litigants, as forty-nine states sent teams of judges, bar leaders and
administrators to discuss ways o f making the court system more accessible to pro se
litigants (Buxton 2002).”
There are numerous reasons for the so called pro se phenomenon. The high cost
of attorneys and litigation is only one o f the reasons. Other popular reasons include
increased literacy rates,

increased

sense o f consumerism,

increased

sense

of

individualism, and belief in one’s own abilities. Sometimes litigants are advised to appear
pro se either because their case was uncontested or was simple enough to handle on their
own. Whatever the reason is, pro se representation is growing fast and demanding
attention.
Not having representation can negatively affect both the litigant and others. Pro
se litigants are more likely to neglect time limits and miss court deadlines. They are
believed to be unduly burdensome on judges, clerks, and court processes (Swank 2005).
When a pro se case succeeds in reaching court, the pro se litigant’s lack o f knowledge o f
legal terminologies and trial tactics typically results in the opposing attorney taking
control o f the process (Buxton 2002).
The Use of the Legal System
Individuals, organizations, and governments make demands on the civil courts to
settle their disputes, enforce the performance o f obligations, and direct the redistribution
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of resources. Only some individuals, some organizations, and some governments use the
court systems. Furthermore, not all types o f legal actions are demanded. The most
frequent plaintiffs are not necessarily the most frequent defendants. Some litigants
predominate as plaintiffs, while others appear most often as defendants.

Party Capability Theory
In 1974, Galanter formulated the ground-breaking hypothesis that repeat players
(RP) come out ahead in courts and are better able to influence legal change than oneshotters (OS) (Galanter 1974). RP is defined as “a unit which has had and anticipates
repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome o f any one case, and which has
the resources to pursue its long-run interests.” OS is defined as “a unit whose claims are
too large (relative to his size) or too small (relative to the cost o f remedies) to be
managed routinely and rationally.” RPs enjoy considerably more advantages in litigation
than do OSs. First o f all, RPs have the advantage o f “having done it before.” They have
the necessary experience and intelligence, have ready access to specialists, and enjoy the
economy o f scale, with lower start up costs for any case. Second, RPs have opportunities
to develop informal relations with courts and other relevant institutions. Third, RPs can
afford to play odds. They can adopt strategies to maximize gain over a long series o f
cases. Finally, RPs have the necessary resources to influence rules. It pays RPs to expend
resources, such as lobbying, to influence the making o f relevant rules. By choosing to
settle cases where they expect unfavorable rule outcomes and to adjudicate those cases

that they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules, RPs can establish favorable
precedent in litigation. The study also refers to RPs as “haves.” The word “haves”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8
nowadays is frequently used to refer to a stronger party who has relatively more
resources.
Galanter (1974) further points out that “parties who have lawyers do better.”
“ ...RPs who can buy legal services more steadily, in larger quantities, in bulk and at
higher rates, would get services o f better quality.” How much the legal services factor
accentuates the RP advantage relates to the way in which the profession is organized.
That is, the more members o f the profession are identified with their clients, the closer
and more enduring the lawyer-client relationship, then the more advantages become
cumulative in nature.
Since Galanter’s (1974) hypothesis, numerous studies have tested the hypothesis.
Some studies cite it as “Galanter hypothesis” or “Galanter’s analysis” (Songer and
Sheehan 1992, Wheeler et al. 1987, Sheehan et al. 1992, etc) while others cite it as “Party
Capability Theory” (Atkins 1991, McCormick 1993). Hereafter, this study will use the
term “Party Capability Theory.”
The general approach to test Party Capability Theory is to classify litigants into
groups and make general assumptions about the strength of the groups (Wheeler et al.
1987, Songer and Sheehan 1992, Haynie 1994, Songer et al. 1999, etc). Wheeler et al.
(1987) classify litigants into individual litigants, individual business proprietorships,
business corporations, and government parties. The assumption is that individual litigants
are the weakest litigants because they generally have less resources. When business and
government parties contend, the assumption is that governmental parties will generally be
stronger, for they are more likely to be repeat players in the system.
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Most o f the studies for testing the Party Capability Theory have ignored
Galanter’s assumption that “parties who have lawyers do better” and that the legal
services factor accentuates the RP advantage.

To date, only Wheeler et al. (1987)

consider the impact o f lawyers on different groups o f litigants’ chances o f winning. They
identify three legal representation types: pro se, solo practitioner, and law firm. They do
not compare pro se representation with the other two types o f representation (due to the
tiny amount o f pro se cases).

They conclude that “ ...the weaker appellant, when

represented by a law firm against the stronger respondent’s solo practitioner, did far
better than when the reverse occurred.”

Significance of the Problem
“Although Party Capability Theory has been ‘exceptionally influential’” (Epp
1999) and is “the most visible, widely cited, and influential article ever published in the
law and society field” (Grossman et al. 1999), Galanter’s (1974) work has not been
utilized in the academic accounting arena. Since federal taxation has undeniable
importance in the United States, understanding the judicial reallocation in the federal
taxation area will offer guidelines for tax reform to improve both horizontal and vertical
equity.
As mentioned earlier in this study, most prior Party Capability Theory studies
have ignored legal representation, especially pro se representation and its influence. The
omission of legal representation in testing Party Capability Theory makes the study
incomplete. One o f the reasons for its omission is the scarcity o f pro se representation in
the past. Pro se representation is growing exponentially, making the complete
investigation o f Party Capability Theory possible.
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The negative effect o f pro se representation on both litigant parties and judicial
systems has increasingly attracted more attention. However, virtually no empirical
research has been undertaken to investigate the negative effect o f pro se representation.
Because o f the growing importance o f pro se representation in federal tax cases,
empirical evidence is needed on this vital topic.

Objectives of the Study
The primary objective o f this study is to examine whether Party Capability
Theory applies to federal tax cases. No empirical research o f Party Capability Theory has
been attempted in the accounting/tax arena, and this study addresses this void.
In the investigation o f Party Capability Theory, this inquiry tries to gauge the
effect o f pro se representation and professional legal representation. As mentioned
earlier, only Wheeler et al. (1987) consider the effect o f representation when testing Party
Capability Theory. Yet, they are unable to test the pro se representation effect due to the
scarcity o f pro se representation. Furthermore, Wheeler et al. (1987) do not correct for
self-selection bias when investigating solo vs. firm representation. Lack o f correction for
self-selection bias makes the result o f Wheeler et al. (1987) questionable. By taking into
consideration representation effect, including pro se representation effect, and by using
Heckman’s correction to address self-selection bias, this study attempts to augment the
extant literature.
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Research Focus
Research Question One
The first research question for investigation is: Who litigates? Not everyone
exercises his or her right in court. Wanner (1974) uses court records o f 1965-1970 and
categorizes plaintiffs o f civil trial courts into individuals, organizations (including all
businesses and voluntary associations), and governments. Organizations make up almost
half o f the plaintiffs, individuals approximately 42%, and governments only constitute
about 9% o f the plaintiffs. To date, no other research has been attempted concerning who
litigates. The current study categorizes the litigants for federal tax issues into five groups:
individuals, businesses, the federal government, state and local governments, and other.
Unions; nonprofit organizations; private, nonprofit schools; social, charitable and
fraternal organizations; political parties; and litigants who could not be unambiguously
categorized are classified as other. The focus o f this inquiry is on the first three groups.
This study investigates the litigation activities o f the first three groups in trial courts,
Federal Appellate Courts, and the United States Supreme Court for federal tax issues.
State and local governments are rarely parties in federal tax cases. There is no generally
agreed standard to code the litigation strength o f the “other” group. Therefore, the fourth
and fifth groups are excluded from the analysis.
Research Question Two
What do parties litigate? This study investigates the kinds o f federal tax issues
upon which legal actions are taken by the first three groups o f litigants mentioned in
research question one.
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Research Question Three
Who is being sued or appealed? Wanner (1974) study concludes that, for civil
trial courts, the most often chosen defendants are individuals. Individuals make up about
67% of the defendants, organizations about 26%, and governments less than 6%. For the
three groups o f litigants mentioned in research question one (individuals, businesses, and
the federal government), this study attempts to answer which group(s) is(are) being sued
and/or appealed for federal tax issues.
Research Question Four
Why defendant/appellee is being sued/appealed? For the three groups o f
defendants/appellees (individuals, businesses, and the federal government), this study
investigates the major reasons the three groups o f defendants/appellees are being brought
to court.
Research Question Five
What are the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the United States
government in litigation for federal tax issues?

Following prior research, this study

investigates this issue by looking individually at federal trial courts, Federal Appellate
Courts, and the United States Supreme Court.
Research Question Six
Do different types o f representation before the judiciary (pro se, solo, and group
representation) affect success rates o f the three groups o f litigants (individuals,
businesses, and the federal government) in litigation? Wheeler et al. (1987) classify legal
representation into firm, solo, and pro se representation. They find that weaker parties,
when represented by a law firm against the stronger respondent represented by a solo
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practitioner, did far better than when the reverse occurred. However, they do not analyze
pro se representation’s influence on litigation successes of different parties due to the
scarcity o f pro se representation. Due to difficulties in distinguishing between a solo
practitioner and a law firm with the limited information provided in a case, this study
uses a different classification o f representation types than Wheeler et al. (1987). This
study classifies representation into pro se, solo, and group representation. If only one
attorney is mentioned in the head note, this study supposes the representation type is solo.
If two or more attorneys are mentioned in the head note, this study supposes the
representation type is group representation. With the high growth rate o f pro se
representation, this study is able to analyze solo and group representation’s influence as
well as pro se representation’s influence on the judicial success o f different litigation
parties.

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter One serves as an
introduction to the topic o f Party Capability Theory and includes a discussion o f the
importance o f the issue and associated problems. The purpose o f the study is also
presented.
Chapter Two reviews the prior analytical and empirical research in the area o f
Party Capability Theory and relevant topics. Chapter Three presents the research
questions and hypotheses to be investigated and discusses the data analyzed and the
research methodologies used in the study. Chapter Four reports the empirical findings o f
the experiment; results o f the tests o f hypotheses are provided and descriptive statistics
are reported.
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Chapter Five contains a discussion o f the research findings. Conclusions and ideas
for future research are presented. In addition, limitations of the study are noted.
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CHAPTER 2

SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW

Party Capability Theory Research
Since the formation o f Party Capability Theory, several scholars have provided
empirical insights into the extent to which stronger parties enjoy advantages in litigation.
Empirical Research Using
Trial Court Cases
Wanner (1974) analyzes the principal users o f the civil court system, and the
issues they sought to adjudicate. The sample is civil trial courts cases (Baltimore,
Cleveland, and Milwaukee) from 1965 to 1970 and are selected randomly without
replacement. According to the results, the most frequent users o f civil trial courts are
organizations (businesses, voluntary associations, and appearances o f individuals in their
occupational roles). They account for about half o f all plaintiffs. The trial courts used in
the sample resolve a relatively narrow range o f disputes. O f the vast number o f legal
actions and remedies available, only ten types o f action are litigated frequently by
plaintiffs. The burden o f defense is shown to fall unevenly on the litigants. The most
numerous defendants are individuals, composing about two-thirds o f the defendants.

Finally, all categories o f defendants most often appear in three types o f suits: liens,
contract actions, and summary debt proceedings.

15
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Wanner (1975) analyzes who wins and loses at litigation using the same data as
Wanner (1974). T-test results show that success and failure at litigation are unequally
distributed among the litigants. Government plaintiffs are more successful at litigation
than business plaintiffs. Business plaintiffs are more successful at litigation than
individual plaintiffs. Business and government plaintiffs enjoy complete victory in 65%
o f the cases they bring against individuals while individuals enjoy complete victory in
only 20% o f the cases they bring against business or government defendants. About twothirds o f the t-tests resulted in statistically significant differences among individual,
business, and government plaintiffs’ distribution o f success. The results also show that
business and government plaintiffs spend significantly less time in court than individual
plaintiffs. Time spent is defined as the average number o f months a court case takes from
filing to the last recorded docket entry.
Empirical Research Using State
Supreme Court Cases
Wheeler et al. Wheeler et al. (1987) is a classic study o f Party Capability Theory.
It uses cases from 16 state supreme courts over the period o f 1870-1970. Wheeler et al.
(1987) suggest a number of reasons why Party Capability Theory’s prediction might not
be sustained. Prominent in the discussion is the “rational actor hypothesis” that suggests
litigants would consider carefully whatever biases and advantages existed in the system
and choose to litigate only in cases in which both parties, as advised by counsel, feel that
there is a substantial possibility o f winning. The litigating parties are divided into five

categories: individuals, business proprietors, business organizations, small town
governments, and city or state governments. This represents the first time that a study
makes

assumptions

about

the

relative

strength

of

different

parties.
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acknowledgement that there could be exceptions, the study postulates that organizations
on average are stronger than individuals. When business and government parties contend,
the study assumes that bigger is stronger—that larger business organizations are stronger
than small town governments. Where business and government parties o f similar size
contend, the study assumes that government parties will generally be stronger, for they
are more likely to be repeat players in the system. Despite all the reasons listed in the
paper regarding why there might be no difference between the success rates o f stronger
and weaker parties, the result does imply that stronger parties enjoy statistically higher
success rates in litigation.
The study defines four types o f business parties (railroads, banks, manufacturing
companies, and insurance companies) that seem likely to be repeat players and have
substantial financial and legal resources as big interests. The analysis o f the four types o f
business parties’ litigation success shows that big interests did achieve a significant net
advantage over other kinds o f businesses, although it only holds a modest net advantage
over individual opponents. The results o f big interest versus government are mixed.
A combined success rate calculated by aggregating each party’s litigation results
as appellant and respondent is affected by the frequency with which a type o f party is
appellant rather than respondent. To offset this bias, Wheeler et al. (1987) for the first
time use net advantage. Net advantage is the difference between the success rate o f the
party at issue when the party is plaintiff/appellant and the success rate o f the opponent
party when the party at issue is defendant/respondent. The net disadvantage o f weaker
parties is less than 5% to

6%

on many measures in Wheeler et al. (1987), causing the

authors to conclude that the advantage o f the stronger parties is “rather small.”
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The study also tested the time effect on different parties’ success rates in
litigation. Three time periods are identified: 1870-1900, 1905-1935, and 1940-1970.
Results indicate that the trend is different between the private law arena and the public
law domain. In the private law arena, relatively stronger parties enjoy a slight advantage
over relatively weaker parties, although this advantage has diminished over time.
However, in the public law arena, government parties win far more often than their
adversaries, with great gains in the early twentieth century and more modest gains in the
latter period o f the study.
Wheeler et al. (1987) also address Galanter’s (1974) assumption about the role o f
legal counsel (“parties who have lawyers do better”). That is, the type o f legal counsel is
classified into three categories: pro se, solo, and firm representation. Due to the scarcity
o f pro se cases, the study is unable to investigate the pro se representation influence on
the success rate at litigation o f the party at issue. The study does conclude that, with few
exceptions, the weaker appellant, when represented by a law firm against the stronger
respondent’s solo practitioner, does far better than when the reverse occurs.
Farole. Farole (1999) examines litigant success in five states’ supreme courts
(Alabama, Kansas, New Jersey, South Dakota, and West Virginia) during the years 1975,
1980, 1985, and 1990. Each litigant is identified as either a state government, local
government, business group, or individual. Following Wheeler et al. (1987), a big
business category is also created. Besides railroads, banks, manufacturing companies, and
insurance companies, the study adds airlines and oil companies to this category. His
findings lend support for the thesis that advantaged litigants are more successful in state
supreme courts than other litigants.
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The success rates o f appellants show that individual appellants are less successful
than businesses appellants, which are less successful than local government appellants,
which in turn, are less successful than state government appellants. Farole ascribes the
success o f government appellants to the greater selectivity in choosing which cases to
appeal. According to his data, governments are appellants far less frequently than other
litigants. Big businesses enjoy substantial advantages over small, locally based businesses
or individual litigants. Comparison between big businesses and government litigants is
not available due to the scarcity o f the cases.
Following Wheeler et al. (1987), this study uses net advantage as well as
combined success rate as appellant and respondent. The two results are consistent with
the success rates o f appellants.
To provide further systematic analysis, Farole (1999) uses the logistic regression
model. After controlling for policy preferences o f the state supreme court, type o f legal
issue involved in the case, and the year the case is decided, stronger litigants’ advantages
remain.
Empirical Research Using Federal
Appellate Court Cases
Songer and Sheehan. Songer and Sheehan (1992) focus on the success of
appellants appearing before United States Courts o f Appeals. Their findings show
stronger parties are substantially more successful in U.S. Courts o f Appeals. The study
uses only one year o f data from three circuits. It uses all cases terminated by judicial
action in calendar year 1986 in the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits. This study
differs from most other studies in that the cases used in this study include both published
and unpublished decisions. Songer (1988) demonstrates that restricting analyses to the
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published opinions o f the courts can produce seriously distorted results. By using both
published and unpublished decisions, conclusions are more generalizable.
Four types o f litigants are identified in this study: individuals, businesses, state
and local governments, and the United States government. Following Wheeler et al.
(1987), a big business category is created. Besides the four types o f business included in
Wheeler et al. (1987), airlines and oil companies are also added to the big business
category. The final types o f businesses included in the big business category are, thus, the
same as in Farole (1999). This study creates a category of “underdog individuals” that
included the poor and racial minorities. These individuals are assumed to be weaker on
average than other individuals.
Appellant success rates and net advantage analysis show that the United States
government enjoys the highest success rate at litigation, followed by state and local
governments. Business litigants have a lower success rate than government litigants, but
have a higher success rate than individual litigants. Consistent with Wheeler et al. (1987),
big businesses held a decided advantage over other businesses but only a very modest
advantage over individuals. “Underdog individuals” appellant success rate is lower than
the total category o f individuals against the other three categories. The net advantage o f
“underdog individuals” is -50.2, which is much lower than the total category of
individuals’ net advantage o f -18.2.
Logistic regression is used for further analysis. After accounting for types o f legal
issues, party effect (whether majority o f judges are appointed by Democratic presidents
or Republican presidents), and region o f the cases (South/Midwestern),

stronger

litigants’ advantages remain. While the strength o f both the appellants and the
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respondents makes a contribution to the final case result, appellants’ strengths are more
important.
Songer et al. In order to improve generalizability, Songer et al. (1999) again
examine the success o f various types o f litigants appearing before U.S. Courts o f
Appeals. The data constitute a random sample o f published decisions from each circuit
for each year from 1925 through 1988.
As in Songer and Sheehan (1992), four types o f litigants are identified in this
study: individual litigants, businesses, state and local governments, and the United States
government.
To analyze changes over time, the 64 years o f data are divided into five periods.
Instead o f simply dividing the 64 years into five equal periods as in Wheeler et al. (1987),
Songer et al. (1999) divide the time period according to the legal and political history o f
the twentieth century. During the first period, 1925-1936, the legal system is dominated
by conservative, pro-business judges at all levels o f the judicial system. The second
period, 1937-1945, is dominated by the Roosevelt Court and its aggressive pro-New Deal
policies. It has a decidedly pro-underdog orientation. The third period, 1946-1960, is
characterized by economic prosperity and the selection of lower court judges without
much regard for their policy preferences. The fourth period, 1961-1969, is characterized
by the leadership o f a liberal Supreme Court (Warren Court) which advocated the welfare
o f poor people. During the final period, 1970-1988, the Supreme Court becomes steadily
more conservative.
The overall success rate as appellants and respondents and the net advantage show
that the “haves” win consistently throughout three o f the five periods examined. For these
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three periods, the U.S. government consistently has the highest success rate at litigation,
followed by state and local governments. Business litigants have a lower success rate at
litigation than governments but a higher success rate than individual litigants. For the
second period, 1937-1945, which is dominated by the Roosevelt Court and has a
decidedly pro-underdog orientation, individuals appear to fare about as well as
businesses, though both fare substantially worse than either level o f government. State
and local governments are more successful than the federal government at litigation. For
the third period, 1946-1960, characterized by economic prosperity and the selection of
lower court judges without much regard for their policy preferences, state and local
governments again are more successful than the federal government at litigation.
Logistic regression is employed in this study. After controlling for types o f legal
issues, and party effect (whether the majority o f judges are appointed by Democratic or
Republican presidents), stronger litigants’ advantages remain. Consistent with Songer
and Sheehan (1992), the strength o f both the appellants and the respondents make a
contribution to the final case result. However, appellants’ strengths are more important.
Empirical Research Using United
States Supreme Court Cases
Although support for Party Capability Theory is found in trial courts, state
supreme courts, and Federal Appellate Courts, no support has been found in the United
States Supreme Court.
Sheehan et al. (1992) examine the success rate o f 10 categories o f parties in the

United States Supreme Court over a 36-year period, from 1953 to 1988, and conclude
there is little evidence litigant resources have a major impact on success in that forum.
Instead, the success o f different classes o f litigants is closely related to the changing
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ideological composition o f the Court. Unions and poor individuals fare substantially
better in liberal courts, and state governments are most successful in conservative courts.
To test if court ideology affects litigation success rates o f different groups, the 36
year period tested is divided into three time periods: Warren Court (1953-1970), the early
Burger Court (1971-1980), and the later Burger and Rehnquist Courts (1981-1988). The
overall success rates show that individual litigant’s success rates at litigation against all
other parties decrease steadily throughout the three periods. The study ascribes the
decreasing success rates o f individual litigants at litigation to the growing conservatism
o f the court. However, the study does not provide the net advantages o f the litigating
parties during these three periods. Instead o f due to the increasing conservatism o f the
court, the decreasing overall success rates o f individual litigants could be caused by
increasing rates o f individual litigants being respondents rather than appellants. (The
Supreme Court has a well-established tendency o f reversing decisions from appellate
courts. For this study period, the Supreme Court’s reversal rate is 67% .)
To test the relationship between ideology and the litigation success rate o f
different groups, the study also uses multivariate logit models. Four models are
established, respectively, for individuals, businesses, state and local governments, and the
federal government. Ideology is significant in three o f the four models. Ideology is not
significant in the model for the business group. Litigant group (resources factor) is
significant in the models for the business group and for the state and local government
group. The resources factor is no longer significant in the business model and is reduced
to borderline significance in the state and local government model after the cases
involving the federal government are removed. This evidence proves that the resources
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factor is significant in the business model and, for the most part, the state and local
government model because these two groups lose consistently to the federal government.
A series o f transfer function models are then used to further analyze the
ideological effects on the litigant’s success. The ideology o f each justice is measured on a
scale of 1 (most liberal) to -1 (most conservative). The impact o f ideology on the success
rate of individuals is especially dramatic; each unit increase in the conservatism o f the
court has reduced the success rate o f individuals against state or local governments by
slightly less than four percentage points.
Empirical Research Using Data
Outside of the United States
Several studies have been attempted using data outside o f the United States to
generalize Party Capability Theory. The results are mixed. In general, Party Capability
Theory does not get as much support from using data outside o f the United States as it
does from using domestic data.
Atkins. Atkins (1991) uses data from English Court o f Appeals for 1983-1985.
The data includes both published and unpublished cases. The analysis method o f this
study is different from other studies in that discriminant analysis instead o f logistic
analysis is used. The dependent variable is the case result. This study is the first to use the
lower forum as one of the independent variables. This inquiry also, for the first time,
introduced panel size o f the Court o f Appeal as an indicator o f the importance o f cases.
The study concludes that although governments have higher success rates at litigation

than individuals, the relationships o f governments vs. corporations and corporations vs.
individuals are not clear.
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McCormick. The McCormick (1993) study uses data from the Supreme Court of
Canada during the time period o f 1949 to 1992 to generalize Party Capability Theory to
Canada. The general conclusion from appellant success rate analysis, combined success
rate analysis, and net advantage analysis strongly supports the theoretical prediction that
governments are most successful at litigation, followed by businesses. Individuals are the
most disadvantaged group at litigation. This finding is quite different from the Sheehan et
al. (1992) finding using data o f the U.S. Supreme Court. Sheehan et al. (1992) do not find
support for Party Capability Theory in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Haynie. The Haynie (1994) study uses data from the Philippine Supreme Court
during the time period o f 1961 to 1986. Consistent with Sheehan et al. (1992) and in
contrast to McCormick (1993), Haynie (1994) does not find support for Party Capability
Theory. In fact, logistic regression, net advantage analysis, and combined success rate
analysis all show that individuals have the greatest likelihood o f success at litigation in
the Philippine Supreme Court. Haynie concludes that in developing societies there may
be pressure for courts to support redistributive policies as a means o f enhancing their
legitimacy as a political institution. Such a concern for legitimacy may tend to outweigh
the advantage that the stronger parties would normally receive from superior experiences
and resources.

Summary of Party Capability Theory Research
Prior empirical research o f Party Capability Theory has two branches. One branch
uses U.S. data. This branch has generalized Party Capability Theory to trial courts,
United States Courts o f Appeals, and state supreme courts. No evidence in support o f
Party Capability Theory has been found in the U.S. Supreme Court. Another branch o f
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Party Capability Theory research uses data outside o f the United States. Evidence in
support o f Party Capability Theory is found using data from developed countries, but no
evidence has been found using data from developing countries that supports Party
Capability Theory. No prior research has tried to specifically generalize the Party
Capability Theory to cases involving federal tax issues. Thousands o f litigants seek legal
recourse of federal tax disputes each year in the United States.

1

Whether or not Party

Capability Theory applies to those cases has profound implications for analysis o f
judicial allocation. The study o f Party Capability Theory in the federal tax context is long
overdue.

Pro Se Representation Research
Swank
Swank’s (2005) “Pro Se Phenomenon” analysis examines the rise o f pro se
litigation and the various reasons for this phenomenon.
The right to represent oneself in United States courts dates back to the founding o f
the country. The development o f pro se rights in the United States has been tied to
the rights o f indigents to have access to the courts. The Judiciary Act o f 1789 was
an early codification o f this belief. It granted parties the right to plead and conduct
their own case personally in any court o f the United States. Many states, either
through their constitutions or statutorily, also provide individuals with the right to
proceed pro se. It is unclear, however, if there is a right to self-representation
pursuant to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants the right to have assistance o f counsel; by implication, the
Amendment has served as a basis to hold that criminal defendants can waive that
right and appear pro se. The right has been extended by the Supreme Court to
civil cases.

1A simple examination o f the federal tax cases in the Lexis-N exis database revealed that thousands o f
cases were entered into verdict each year by the U .S. Tax Court, U .S. District Courts, the U.S. Court o f
Appeals, or the U .S. Supreme Court during the time period o f 1940 to 2006.
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This study summarizes numerous research and survey results and cogently shows
the exponential growth of pro se representation in the United States. Reasons for the “Pro
Se Phenomenon” are summarized from various survey results. One o f the reasons is the
high cost o f attorneys and litigation. Other popular reasons include increased literacy
rates, sense o f consumerism, and sense o f individualism; and belief in one’s own abilities.
Sometimes a litigant is advised to appear pro se either because his or her case was
uncontested or was simple enough to handle on their own.
Buxton
Buxton (2002) investigates the traditional problems associated with the
appearance o f pro se litigants and the countermeasures currently in place to assist them.
The pro se party’s unfamiliarity with evidentiary rules often leads to a failure to
meet the burden o f proof. The pro se party’s lack o f knowledge o f legal terminology and
trial tactics typically results in the opposing attorney taking control o f the process. There
are currently a lot of programs aimed at making the pro se parties’ journey easier. While
pro se programs take a variety o f forms, these programs consistently represent the desire
o f the judiciary to educate pro se litigants about the process o f proceeding with a suit.
The general forms o f the programs include provision o f instructional brochures,
videotaped programs, teaching sessions, and internet-based services.
Barclay
Barclay (1996) argues that self-representation could be part o f a sound legal
strategy that forces the court to focus on issues the litigant views as important. Through a
phone interview with 95 civil appellants, the author identifies a salient disjuncture
between the focus o f the legal system and the litigants’ own views o f the issues in their
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disputes. By choosing to self-represent, the courts are forced to deal with those issues that
self-represented litigants choose to place on their dockets.
Ross
Ross (1970) finds that automobile injury claimants represented by attorneys
recover claims more frequently than unrepresented claimants; among those who do
recover, represented claimants recover significantly more than do unrepresented
claimants with comparable cases. Claimants represented by firms recovered considerably
more than claimants represented by solo practitioners.

Summary of Pro Se Representation Research
Although several analytical inquires have been made regarding pro se
representation, there are very few empirical studies. This lack o f research is partly due to
the scarce amount o f pro se representation in the past. The unavailability o f data makes
empirical research especially difficult. With the exponential growth rate o f pro se
representation, empirical research under the current environment is not only important
but also possible.

Relevant Research in the Accounting Arena
As mentioned before, no Party Capability Theory study uses tax cases solely for
sample selection. This section reviews some relevant studies in the accounting area.
Judge Bias Studies
Analytical studies have been completed to report the different chances o f success at
litigation for taxpayers and the IRS. The purpose o f these studies is to evaluate judge bias
instead o f evaluating Party Capability.
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Maule. Maule (1999) analyzes judge bias by looking at two aspects: the
opportunity for bias and the taxpayer prevalence scores o f judges. For issues clearly and
unquestionably established by statute and case law, there is little opportunity for bias. For
cases decided between 1976 and 1997, 60.2% o f them do not provide opportunity for
bias. O f these cases, the Service prevails in 95% o f sampled memorandum decisions and
75% o f the sampled regular decisions. For the cases with bias opportunities, taxpayers
prevailed in 29% o f the sampled memorandum opinions and 48% o f the sampled regular
opinions. Maule ascribes the difference to the much higher percentage o f pro se taxpayer
litigants subject to memorandum opinions. The analysis o f taxpayer prevalence scores o f
judges strongly favors taxpayers and does not favor the IRS.
Maule concludes that the “Tax Court, like the umpires, does not make the
rules...law requires the Court to reject, they ought to direct their criticism to the
Congress.” Actually, this comment sharply points out one o f the strengths o f the Service
as a repeat player: the IRS as a repeat player can influence rules, either by lobbying or by
choosing to settle cases where they expect unfavorable outcomes and to adjudicate those
cases that they regard as most likely to produce favorable results and set precedent.
Geier. Geier (1991) compares U.S. Tax Court cases and U.S. District Courts cases
o f the period from 1965 to 1986. The government won or partially won an average o f
70.5% o f U.S. District Court cases in the years indicated. The percentage o f cases won or
partially won by the government in the Tax Court averaged 90.4% for the same period.
Geier ascribes the 24-point difference to a pro-government trend in the Tax Court. As
mentioned earlier, the U.S. Tax Court is formed under Article I and U.S. District Courts
are formed under Article III. Therefore, U.S. Tax Court judges do not have tenure and
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unreduced salary protection like U.S. District Courts judges. Geier believes that the lack
o f protection o f Tax Court judges contributes to the pro-government trend o f the U.S. Tax
Court.
Empirical Study about
Pro Se Representation
According to Nichols and Price (2004), final tax assessment is significantly less for
taxpayers with professional representation 2 during an IRS office audit, both in dollars and
as a percentage o f the potential deficiency. Here self-selection bias exists because non
randomness arises from individual choices. In order to correct for self-selection bias, this
study adopts Heckman’s correction technique (Heckman 1976,1979).

Summary of Relevant Research
in the Accounting Arena
Research o f judicial decisions in the accounting arena focuses on Tax Court
decisions. Analytical studies about the decisions o f the Tax Court generally argue about
whether Tax Court judges have pro-government bias. One side o f the argument is that
Congress is biased against taxpayers. The other side o f the argument is that Tax Court
judges are biased against taxpayers because o f the lack of Article III protection. No
research has looked at the Tax Court decisions from the point o f view o f Party Capability
Theory. Some studies do notice the influence o f pro se representation, but there is no
systematic research about pro se representation’s influence on court decisions. A study o f
court decisions from the Party Capability Theory point o f view will fill this void.

2Instead o f using tax professionals, N ichols and Price (2004) treat students who were w ell prepared for the
audit issues identified in the IRS audit notice and had a significantly greater level o f knowledge than the
taxpayers as professional representation.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Research Questions
The following research questions are presented in Chapter One as worthy o f
investigation to gain insight into the strength o f tax litigation groups in the United States:
1. Who litigates? This study investigates the litigation activities o f individuals,
businesses, and the federal government in trial courts, Federal Appellate
Courts, and the United States Supreme Court in federal tax issues.
2. What do litigants seek satisfaction in the courts? This study seeks to answer
what kinds o f federal tax issues are litigated by individuals, businesses, and
the federal government.
3. Who is being sued/appealed? This study seeks to answer which group(s) o f
the three groups (individuals, businesses, and the federal government) is(are)
being sued and/or appealed for federal tax issues.
4. Why defendant/appellee is being sued/appealed? This inquiry investigates the
three groups (individuals, businesses, and the federal government) o f
defendants/appellees are being brought to court for what kinds o f federal tax
issues.

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
5. What are the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the United States
government in litigation on federal tax issues?
6

. Do different types o f representation before the court (pro se, solo, and group
representation) have an effect on the judicial success rates o f individuals,
businesses, and the federal government?

Hypotheses
Corresponding to the research questions, the following hypotheses are presented for
empirical investigation.
Hai : Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies
o f using legal recourse.
Ha2: Different categories o f tax issues have unequal frequencies o f being brought to
court.
Ha3: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies
o f being sued or appealed.
Ha4: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government are sued or appealed on
different categories o f tax issues.
Ha5: Different groups o f litigants have unequal success rates at litigation for federal
tax issues, with the United States government being the most successful
entity, businesses being the second, and individuals being the least successful.
Ha6: The three representation types before the courts (pro se, solo, and group
representation) have significant influence on the success rates o f individuals,
businesses, and the federal government in litigation.
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Research Sample
The research sample is obtained from the Lexis-Nexis database. This study divides
cases collected into three categories: trial court cases, Federal Appellate Court cases, and
United States Supreme Court cases. Trial court cases include the cases that are entered by
the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. District Courts, and the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. Federal
Appellate Court cases include cases that are entered by U.S. Courts o f Appeals. The U.S.
Courts of Appeals includes the eleven numbered circuits and additional unnumbered
circuits for the District o f Columbia Circuit and the Federal Circuit. The United States
Supreme Court cases include those entered by the United States Supreme Court.
The first internal revenue code o f the United States is the Internal Revenue Code o f
1939. It codifies various revenue acts that are legislated between 1913 and 1939.
Subsequently, with the growing complexity o f the tax law, the Code was rewritten as the
Internal Revenue Code o f 1954. The Tax Reform Act o f 1986 was so significant and the
scope o f the changes so comprehensive that the tax law was renamed the Internal
Revenue Code o f 1986. The research sample in this study includes only cases that are
entered according to the current Internal Revenue Code (i.e., the Internal Revenue Code
o f 1986).
This study investigates court decisions for the period 1992-2006. For the period
under study, over 20,000 U.S. District Court decisions are entered each year. Among
them, only a few hundred decisions are about federal tax issues. This research finds 5,112
U.S. District Court federal tax issue decisions in total from 1992-2006. A total o f 8,613
Tax Court judgments are found for the period under study. The U.S. Court o f Federal
Claims decides around 500 cases each year. But only around 20 o f those cases are about
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federal tax issues. For years 1992 to 2006, 25 Tax Court cases and 25 U.S. District Court
cases are randomly selected each year. All o f the U.S. Court of Federal Claims federal tax
cases from 1992 to 2006 are chosen. For the period under study, over 30,000 Federal
Appellate Court cases are decided each year. This inquiry finds 2,590 appellate court
federal tax cases from 1992 to 2006. A total o f 50 appellate court federal tax cases are
obtained randomly for each year during the period under study. Around 7,500 cases each
year are presented to the U.S. Supreme Court for writ o f Certiorari but only 80-150 cases
are granted certiorari each year for the period under study. Federal tax issues find very
limited representation before the U.S. Supreme Court. A total o f 30 Supreme Court
federal tax cases are found for period 1992-2006. All o f the 30 Supreme Court federal tax
cases are chosen.
Cases involving litigants that cannot be classified into any o f the four groups
(individuals, businesses, state and local governments, the federal government) are
eliminated. Those cases include litigation involving unions; nonprofit organizations;
private, nonprofit schools; social, charitable, and fraternal organizations; political parties;
and litigants who could not be unambiguously categorized. Cases in which the primary
issue is not a federal tax issue are deleted. When a case is eliminated, another case is
chosen randomly as a substitution.
Examination o f the sample reveals that state or local governments are seldom
involved in federal tax cases.

Out o f the 375 Tax Court cases, no state or local

government litigants are involved. Only six o f the 375 U.S. District Court cases, and one
o f the 267 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases involve state or local government litigants.
For the 750 Federal Appellate Court cases, there are also six cases involving state or local
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governments. Only one out o f the 30 U.S. Supreme Court cases involves state or local
governments. Due to the scarcity o f state or local government litigants in federal tax
cases, these cases are deleted from further analysis.
The final sample includes 375 Tax Court cases, 369 U.S. District Court cases, 266
U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases, 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, and 29 U.S.
Supreme Court cases3.

Research Methods
For the analysis, each plaintiff/appellant and defendant/appellee is classified as
belonging to one o f the four major classes: individuals, businesses, state and local
governments, and the United States government. Sole proprietor is treated as an
individual. If the party listed in the case citation is a specific, named individual, but the
person’s involvement in the suit is due directly to his/her role as an official o f a
government agency or as an officer, partner, or owner o f a business, he/she is coded
according to his/her organizational affiliation and not as an individual. When multiple
parties are plaintiffs, defendants, appellants, or appellees, they are treated as one party,
coded according to the strongest member on their side.

3

Independence captures the intuition o f non-interaction and lack o f information. In m odeling it is
often assumed rather than verified. This study assumes that the verdicts o f trial court cases, Federal
Appellate Court cases, and U .S. Supreme Court cases are independent from each other. There are 18 out o f
the 744 Federal Appellate Court cases that are appealed from the trial court cases sample o f this study. A
total o f seven out o f the 29 U .S. Supreme Court cases are appealed from the Federal Appellate Court cases
sample o f this study. The assumption is that the results w ill not be distorted. So, this inquiry is looking at
marginal association among variables instead o f partial association among variables. The information
conveyed by marginal association can be quite different from that conveyed by partial association.
Whenever possible, variables should be controlled that may affect the association between the variables o f
interest (Agresti 1984). However, this study believes that the cost o f excluding higher forum cases which
are appealed from lower forum cases sample outweigh its benefit, especially for Supreme Court cases
(exclusion o f the seven Supreme Court cases which are from the Federal Appellate Court cases sample cut
Supreme Court cases sample to only 22 observations).
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For the period 1992-2006, this research finds 8,613 Tax Court cases, 5,112 U.S.
District Court cases, and 267 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases deal with federal tax
issues. This study does not use proportional sampling to make the proportion o f
subsamples match the population. In order to adjust for the influence o f unproportional
sampling, the cases from different judicial forums are weighted when performing analysis
for trial court decisions.
Research Question One
This study investigates the frequency o f different groups using litigation to settle
federal tax issues for the three categories o f cases (trial court decisions, Federal Appellate
Court decisions, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
For trial court cases, chi-square test o f goodness o f fit4 is used to test the equal
frequency o f individual, business, and the federal government appearing as plaintiffs. As
this study mentioned earlier, the U.S. Tax Court is an Article I Court while U.S. District
Courts are Article III Courts. The U.S. Court o f Federal Claims deals with monetary
claims against the United States. In order to detect any differences among these three
judicial forums, the trial court cases are divided into cases from the U.S. Tax Court, U.S.
District Courts, and the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit
is run separately for the three different judicial forums. Chi-square test for independence 5

* _ * { n~' Ej ) . For equal frequency test, H0 is that the
e,
values o f the multinomial probabilities P\=Pi= ... Pv (Bowerman and O ’Connell 1997).

4 Chi-square goodness o f fit statistic is defined as:

x ~h

5 Chi-square test for independence is defined as:

%
X

~

^

( n i j ~ E i j ) . H0 is that the two classifications are

2

j
A llC ells

*

statistically independent (Bowerman and O ’Connell 1997).
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is used to detect any relationship between the type o f plaintiff and the judicial forum
used.
For Federal Appellate Court cases and U.S. Supreme Court cases, Chi-square test
o f goodness o f fit is used to test the equal frequency o f individuals, businesses, and the
federal government appearing as appellants.
Research Question Two
To address the tax issues involved in each case, this study codes all the IRC
Sections mentioned in each case. They are then classified into ten categories o f tax issues
according to the classification o f the Internal Revenue Code o f 1986. The ten categories
o f tax issues are income taxes; estate and gift taxes; employment taxes; miscellaneous
excise taxes; alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes; procedure and
administration; financing o f presidential election campaigns; trust fund code; coal
industry health benefits; and group health plan requirements. If one case involves more
than one tax issue, only the major tax issue is coded.
This study separately investigates the subject o f litigants’ adjudication in the three
different categories o f cases. For the trial court decisions, chi-square test o f goodness o f
fit is used to test the equal frequency o f different tax issues being brought to court. Chisquare test for independence is used to further test if there exists any relationship between
the type o f the plaintiff(s) and the tax issue(s) being brought to court. The trial court
decisions are then divided into cases from the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. District Courts, and
the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit is separately run for
the three judicial forums. Chi-square for independence is used to test if there is any
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relationship between the type o f tax issues being brought to court and the judicial forum
used.
For Federal Appellate Court cases, chi-square test o f goodness o f fit is used to test
the equal frequency o f different tax issues being brought to court. Chi-square test for
independence is used to further test if there exists a relationship between the type o f the
appellant(s) and the tax issue(s) being appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court cases sample is
not big enough for a valid chi-square test. No formal test o f Ha2 is done for U.S.
Supreme Court cases. Sample description is provided.
Research Question Three
This inquiry investigates the frequency o f different groups being sued or appealed
in the three categories o f cases. For trial court decisions, chi-square test o f goodness o f fit
is used to test the equal frequency o f individuals, businesses, and the federal government
appearing as defendant. Chi-square test for independence is used to test if there is any
relationship between the type o f defendant and the legal forum chosen.
For Federal Appellate Court and U.S. Supreme Court cases, chi-square test o f
goodness o f fit is used to test the equal frequency o f individuals, businesses, and the
federal government appearing as appellee.
Research Question Four
This study investigates what defendant (appellee) is being sued (appealed) in
three different categories o f tax cases. For trial court decisions, chi-square test for
independence is used to test if there exists any relationship between the type o f defendant
and the tax issue being brought to court. Only the major tax issue in each case is
considered. For Federal Appellate Court cases, chi-square test for independence is used to
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test if there exists any relationship between the type o f appellee and the tax issue being
appealed. The size o f the U.S. Supreme Court cases sample is not sufficient for a valid
chi-square test and only data description is presented. No statistical method is attempted
to formally test Ha4 for U.S. Supreme Court cases.
Research Question Five
The available data does not permit this research endeavor to code the strength o f
the litigants according to their size o f financial resources and frequency o f dealing with
courts. This study follows Wheeler et al. (1987) to make general assumptions o f the
strength o f the different groups o f litigants. As a result, this study assumes that
individuals usually have fewer resources than either businesses or the federal
government. When business and federal government parties confront each other, the
assumption is that the federal government is usually stronger because even when the
financial resources o f the federal government is no greater than those o f the businesses,
the government agencies are more likely to be repeat players. These assumptions are
consistent with Songer and Sheehan (1992), and Songer et al. (1999).
Prior researches have analyzed the relative strength of different groups using trial
courts, Federal Appellate Courts, or the United States Supreme Court data. In order to
make comparisons with prior studies, this inquiry analyzes case results separately for trial
courts, Federal Appellate Courts, and the United States Supreme court.
For trial court, the case result is coded as “ 1” if the plaintiff wins, “0” if the
defendant wins. For other courts, the case result is coded as “ 1” if the appellant wins, “0”
if the appellee wins.
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For trial court, the plaintiff is coded as a win when the plaintiff wins a judgment
or verdict; the defendant is coded in the same manner. In the event o f a partial judgment
for the plaintiff and a partial judgment for the defendant, the party who prevails is coded
as a win. Following Maule (1999), the prevailing party is determined by comparing the
dollar difference between the parties with the dollar difference between the court’s
determination and the amount allowed by the IRS.
For Federal Appellate Courts and the United States Supreme Court, following the
approach o f Wheeler et al. (1987), this study defines winners and losers by looking at
“who won the appeal in its most immediate sense, without attempting to view the appeal
in some larger context.” If the decision o f the trial court is “reversed,” “reversed and
remanded,” “vacated,” or “vacated and remanded,” the appellant is coded as a win. This
study ignores “the possibility that an appellant who sought primarily to postpone the day
o f judgment might have ‘w on’ in terms o f successfully obtaining a profitable delay,
although the legal grounds for its appeal are rejected.”
For the comparison o f the success rates o f the three groups in trial courts, this
study first looks at the success rates o f the three groups in litigation when they are
plaintiffs. Second, this study examines the combined success rates o f the three groups in
litigation as plaintiffs and as defendants. Third, in order to eliminate the influences o f the
different frequencies o f the three groups that appear as plaintiffs vs. defendants, this
study calculates the net advantages o f the three groups. The calculation o f the net
advantage is as defined by Wheeler et al. (1987). That is, net advantage is the difference
between the success rate o f the party at issue when the party is plaintiff/appellant and the
success rate o f the opponent party when the party at issue is defendant/appellee. Fourth,
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to further explore the advantage that the stronger party appears to have, this study follows
the lead o f Wheeler et al. and selects only those cases in which parties in different
categories directly confronted each other. The net advantages o f the three groups using
only direct comparison cases are calculated. Fifth, this study divides the trial court cases
into three groups according to the judicial forum: Cases from the U.S. Tax Court, cases
from U.S. District Courts, and cases from the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. Steps one
through four are repeated separately for the three groups o f trial court cases. Finally, this
study uses logistic regression to formally test hypothesis five. The dependant variable is
dichotomous. It is coded as “ 1” if the plaintiff wins and “0” if the defendant wins. Three
types o f independent variables are developed. The first type includes litigant party
strength variables. The strengths o f plaintiffs and defendants are coded. Litigant strength
variable is coded as “ 1” for individuals, “2” for businesses, and “3” for the federal
government. The second type o f independent variables includes dummy variables for
different types o f tax issues. The types o f tax issues are defined in research question two.
Dummy variables are used for each type o f tax issues. For example, if the case’s major
issue is an income tax issue, the dummy variable for income tax issues is coded “ 1 ”, the
dummy variables for other tax issues are coded zero.

The third type o f independent

variables includes dummy variables for different judicial forums.
For the comparison o f success rates in litigation for the three groups in Federal
Appellate Courts, this study first looks at the success rates o f the three groups in litigation
when they are appellants. Second, this investigation examines the combined success rates
o f the three groups at litigation as appellants and as appellees.

Third, in order to

eliminate the influences o f the different frequencies the three groups appear as appellants
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vs. appellees, this inquiry calculates the net advantages o f the three groups. Fourth, to
further explore the advantage that the stronger party appears to have, this study selects
only those cases in which parties in different categories directly confronted each other.
The net advantage o f the three groups using only direct comparison cases is calculated.
Finally, logistic regression is used to formally test hypothesis five. The dependant
variable is dichotomous (it is coded as “ 1 ” if the appellant wins and “ 0 ” if the appellee
wins). Three types o f independent variables are developed. The first type includes litigant
party strength variables. The strengths o f the appellant and appellee are separately coded.
The second type o f independent variables includes dummy variables for different types o f
tax issues. Pursuant to Atkins (1991), this investigation defines the third type o f
independent variables which includes dummy variables for different types o f lower
forums.
For comparison o f the success rates o f the three groups at the U.S. Supreme
Court, the first four steps o f analysis are the same as the first four steps used for the
Federal Appellate Court cases. Then, this study uses logistic regression to formally test
hypothesis five. The dependant variable is dichotomous. It is coded as “ 1” if the appellant
wins and “0” if the appellee wins. Two types o f independent variables are developed. The
first type includes litigant party strength variables. The strengths o f the appellant and
appellee are separately coded. The second type o f independent variables includes dummy
variables for different types o f tax issues.
Research Question Six
Representation Type. To test whether representation type affects the success of
the three groups at litigation, this inquiry categorizes the representation type into pro se,
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solo, and group representation. It is not always clear whether an attorney mentioned in
the head note is representing the client on his own or whether that attorney is the member
o f a firm. In order to maintain the consistence o f the coding, if only one attorney is
mentioned in the head note, this study assumes the representation type is solo. If two or
more attorneys are mentioned in the head note, this study assumes the representation type
is group representation.
Heckman’s Correction. Selection bias arises whenever there is non-random
sampling. Self-selection bias arises when the non-randomness arises from individual
choices. In this investigation, litigants self-select the kind o f representation type. OLS
procedures that ignore the non-randomness o f the sample may be biased. To correct for
self-selection bias, this study uses the methodology developed by Heckman (1976, 1979).
Consider an observation equation (Equation 1) and a selection equation (Equation
2)

o f the form:

Yu = 0iXu + Uu

(1)

Y2i* =

(2)

6 2 X 2 , + U 2l

Heckman’s correction is comprised o f two stages. The first stage is the estimation
o f a selection equation.
Y 2i* = /32X 2i + U 2j
Y 2j =1
Y 2i

U ~ N ( 0 ,1 )

if Y 2j* > 0

= 0 i f Y 2i* <=0

The selection equation is estimated by maximum likelihood as an independent
probit model. A vector o f the inverse o f Mills ratios (X) is then generated from the
parameter estimates.
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The second stage is the estimation o f the observation equation. Instead o f using
Equation 1, Heckman’s two-stage estimation introduced X into Equation 1 as another
independent variable, thus get Equation 3:
Y li = /31X l i + - £ k = A / + V , i
V ^22

(3)

Pro Se Choice Model. The pro se choice model is developed to control for self
selection bias, which is shown as Equation 4:
Lawyer = Ob + aiTaxIssue + (^Amount + (^Individual + (^Company + et

(4)

Where:
“Lawyer”= j

1
10

if lawyer(s) represented.
if pro se.

“Taxlssue” is a group o f dummy variables that represent the type o f tax issues
involved in the case. Tax issue type is as defined in research question two.
“Amount” is the total o f the dollar amount in dispute.
“Individual” and “Company” are dummy variables for the type o f litigant
involved.
Solo Choice Model. Solo choice model is developed as shown in Equation 5:
Group=/3o + /31Taxlssue + & Amount +

+ $ 3 Individual

+ ^C om pany + e,

(5)

“Group” is a dummy variable coded as “1” if a group represents the litigant and
“0” otherwise.

Application of Heckman’s Correction. This study uses logistic regression to
formally test hypothesis six. Because estimation o f Equation 4 and Equation 5 needs
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specified potential tax deficiency amount and potential penalty amount, cases that do not
provide such information are deleted from the analysis.
For trial court cases, the dependant variable is dichotomous. It is coded as “ 1” if
the plaintiff wins and “0” if the defendant wins. Four types o f independent variables are
developed. The first type includes dummy variables for different tax issues. The second
type includes litigant party strength variables. The coding o f party strength is as described
in research question five. The third type o f independent variables includes dummy
variables for different types o f judicial forums. The fourth type o f independent variables
is dummy variables for the representation type o f the plaintiff and the representation type
o f the defendant. Representation dummy variable is coded as “ 1” if lawyer(s)
representation and “0” otherwise. Heckman’s correction is applied to minimize self
selection bias. Equation 4 is estimated. To further test representation influence on
litigants’ successes at trial, this study then uses only the cases that do not involve pro se
representation and recalculates the above described logistic regression. The definition o f
the fourth type o f independent variables is different from above. Representation dummy
variable is coded as “ 1” if group representation and “0” if solo representation. Heckman’s
correction is applied to minimize self-selection bias and Equation 5 is estimated.
For Federal Appellate Court cases, the dependant variable is coded as “ 1” if
appellant wins and “0” if appellee wins. Four types o f independent variables are
developed. The first type includes dummy variables for different tax issues. The second
type o f independent variables includes litigant party strength variables. The third type
includes dummy variables for different lower forums. The fourth type o f independent
variables includes dummy variables for the representation type o f the appellant and the
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representation type o f the appellee. Representation type is coded “ 1” if lawyer(s)
representation and “0” otherwise. Equation 4 is estimated for Heckman’s correction.
Furthermore, this study uses only the cases that do not involve pro se representation and
rerun pursuant to the described procedure. The definition o f the fifth type o f independent
variables is different from above. Representation type is coded “ 1” if group
representation and “0” if solo representation. Equation 5 is estimated for Heckman’s
correction.
For U.S. Supreme Court cases, the method o f testing hypothesis six is the same as
the method used for federal appellate cases except for the following two changes. First,
no lower forum dummy variable is developed. Second, the sample size prohibits the
application o f Heckman’s correction.

Summary
Affluent Party Capability Theory inquires have been performed in the legal and
sociological fields. However, no research on Party Capability Theory has been attempted
in the accounting/tax arena. This study fills the void by providing such research. Six
questions are presented in Chapter One. This chapter discusses the approaches by which
these questions are investigated. Specifically, the research sample is stipulated, variables
identified, the coding scheme for the variables is presented, and appropriate statistical
tools are discussed. Results o f the analysis are presented in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Introduction
Previous chapters contain: (1) a discussion o f Party Capability Theory and the need
for further research, (2) a review o f prior researches o f Party Capability Theory in the
legal area and a review o f relevant researches in the accounting area, and (3)
development o f the methodology used in this study. This chapter presents the results of
the data analysis and tests o f hypotheses. Summary statistics are presented first, followed
by a discussion o f the results pertaining to each o f the hypothesis presented in Chapter
Three.

Summary of Input Data
A total o f 1,010 trial court cases, 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, and 29 U.S.
Supreme Court cases are used in this study. A summary o f the cases are listed in
Appendix A. The 1,010 trial court cases are comprised o f 375 Tax Court cases, 369 U.S.
District Court cases, and 266 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases. This study randomly
chose 100 o f the 1783 selected cases for validation o f coding precision. One doctoral
student coded half of the 100 chosen cases and another doctoral student coded the other
half. The coding o f the two doctoral students is compared with the coding o f the author.

47
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Pearson correlation analysis shows that the two independent coding sets are highly
correlated (p<0.0001).
There are 178 Tax Court cases, 117 U.S. District Court cases, and 53 U.S. Court of
Federal Claims cases that involve pro se representation. Hence, 348 (34.5%) out o f the
1,010 trial court cases involve pro se litigants, with 122 (16.4%) o f the 744 appellate
court cases that involve pro se litigants. Pro se litigants do not reach the U.S. Supreme
Court level.

Test Results for Research Question One
Individuals, businesses, and various governments entities make demands in the
civil courts to settle their disputes, enforce the performance o f obligations, and direct the
redistribution

o f resources.

However,

only

some

individuals,

businesses,

and

governments use court systems to settle their issues, others choose not to use legal
recourse. Research question one attempts to answer who utilizes legal recourse.
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
Out o f the 375 U.S. Tax Court cases, 319 cases are initiated by individuals, which
is about 85% o f all the Tax Court cases under study. The remaining 56 Tax Court cases
are initiated by businesses. No Tax Court cases are initiated by the U.S. government. Out
of the 369 U.S. District Court cases, 220 cases are initiated by individuals, which is about
60% of all the U.S. District Court cases under study. Businesses and the U.S. government
each initiates about 20% o f the U.S. District Court cases under study. Unlike the U.S. Tax

Court and U.S. District Courts, in which most cases are brought by individuals, more than
half of the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases are initiated by businesses. Businesses
initiate 142, which is about 53% o f all the U.S. Court of Federal Claims cases under
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study. The remaining 124 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases under study are brought to
court by individuals. In sum, 663 out o f the 1,010 trial court cases under study are
initiated by individual litigants, which constitute about 66% o f all trial court cases under
study; 273 (27%) cases are initiated by business litigants; only 74 (7%) cases are initiated
by the U.S. government. As mentioned earlier, this study uses unproportional sampling.
To correct for the influence o f unproportional sampling, the percentage o f each group
appearing in trial court as plaintiff is recalculated after proper weighting. After weighting,
individuals still are the most frequent litigants. They start about 75% o f all the trial court
cases involving only the three groups under study; businesses initiate about 17% o f those
cases; the U.S. government initiates only around 7% o f those cases. The only trial court
forum the U.S. government uses to start litigation is U.S. District Courts. Table 4.1
summarizes who litigates in trial courts.

Table 4.1
Summary o f Plaintiffs in U.S. Trial Courts
Forum
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
District Court
District Court
District Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court

Group
Individual
Business
U.S. Government
Individual
Business
U.S. Government
Individual
Business
U.S. Government

Frequency o f Occurrence
319
56
0
220
75
74
124
142
0

For U.S. Tax Court cases, the chi-square test o f goodness o f fit reveals that
individual and business litigants have a significantly different frequency o f using the U.S.
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Tax Court (p< 0.0001). Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the three groups o f
litigants under investigation have significantly different frequencies when using the U.S.
District Court (p< 0.0001). No significant difference o f using the U.S. Court o f Federal
Claims is found between individuals and businesses (p=0.2697).
For all the 1,010 trial court cases under investigation, with adjustment of
unproportional sampling, chi-square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the three groups o f
litigants under investigation have significantly different frequencies o f suing in trial court
(p<0.0001). Furthermore, chi-square test for independence shows a significant
relationship between litigation groups and trial court forums chosen (p< 0.0001).
The Tax Court's jurisdiction is generally limited to redetermining deficiencies in
income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and certain specified excise taxes that are subject to
deficiency procedures (26 U.S.C. §§6212, 6213, 6214). It has exclusive jurisdiction over
petitions for the redetermination o f tax deficiencies (26 U.S.C. §6213) and over appeals
o f levy determinations as long as it has jurisdiction over the underlying tax liability that
the IRS has alleged (26 U.S.C. §6330(d)(l)(A)). Section 6330(d) presumes that judicial
review o f an assessed tax liability should be sought in the Tax Court and that the taxpayer
could seek review in a U.S. District Court only where the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction
( Voelker v. Nolen, 365 F.3d 580). United States Code §1346(a)(2) establishes that U.S.
District Courts' jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court o f Federal Claims over claims
against the United States that do not exceed $10,000. Whether different jurisdictions o f
the three judicial forums contribute to the significant relationship between litigant groups
and judicial forums chosen is outside the scope o f this study.
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Test Results for Federal
Appellate Court Cases
O f the 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, 465 cases are initiated by individuals,
which is about 63% o f all the Federal Appellate Court cases under study; business
litigants initiate 188 (25%) cases; the U.S. government initiates the remaining 91 (12%)
cases.
Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the three groups o f litigants under
investigation have significantly different frequencies o f using Federal Appellate Courts
(pO.OOOl).
Test Results for U.S. Supreme
Court Cases
O f the 29 U.S. Supreme Court cases under study, 19 cases are initiated by the
U.S. government, which constitute about 66% o f all the U.S. Supreme Court cases under
study; individual and business litigants each start five (17%) cases. Observation o f the
data indicates that the composition o f initiators in trial courts, Federal Appellate Courts,
and the U.S. Supreme court is different.
Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit reveals that the three groups o f litigants under
investigation have significantly different frequencies o f using the U.S. Supreme Court
(p-0.0012).
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Comparison of Trial Court. Federal
Appellate C ourt and U.S.
Supreme Court Cases
As mentioned earlier, observation o f the data indicates that the composition of
initiators in trial courts, Federal Appellate Courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court is
different. Table 4.2 illustrates the composition o f initiators in the three levels o f forums.
Businesses have a relatively even usage o f the three forums. Individuals are the majority
users o f trial courts and Federal Appellate Courts, but are minor users o f the U.S.
Supreme Court. The U.S. government shows a reverse pattern compared with individuals.
The different abilities o f the three groups in securing a writ o f certiorari might contribute
to the increase o f the federal government appellant in the U.S. Supreme Court6.

Table 4.2
Summary o f Initiators in Courts
Court
Trial Court
Federal Appellate Court
The U.S. Supreme Court

Individual
75.29
62.50
17.24

Business
17.42
25.27
17.24

U.S. Government
7.29
12.23
65.52

In order to further investigate the composition o f initiators in different levels o f
court, chi-square test o f goodness o f fit is used for the test o f multinomial distribution.
The compositions o f initiators in different levels o f court are significantly different from
each other (p< 0.0001).

6 Four o f the nine justices must vote to grant a writ o f certiorari. The great majority o f cases brought to the
Supreme Court are denied certiorari (approximately 7,500 petitions are presented each year; between 80
and 150 are granted and only a small proportion o f them are tax cases).
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Conclusion-Research Question One
The first alternative hypothesis presented for investigation in this study is:
Hai: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies
o f using legal recourse.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if chi-square test shows that the
three groups o f litigants under investigation do have significantly different chances o f
starting litigations. Test results for trial court, Federal Appellate Court, and U.S. Supreme
Court cases show that the three groups o f litigants have significantly different frequencies
o f using legal recourse. Individuals initiate the majority o f trial court and Federal
Appellate Court cases under study.

The U.S. government starts most o f the U.S.

Supreme Court cases under study. The alternative hypothesis is therefore not rejected.

Test Results for Research Question Two
In order to investigate what tax issues the opposing parties litigate over, the IRC
Sections mentioned in each case are classified into ten categories o f tax issues according
to their classification within the Internal Revenue Code o f 1986. The ten categories o f tax
issues are income taxes; estate and gift taxes; employment taxes; miscellaneous excise
taxes; alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes; procedure and administration;
financing o f presidential election campaigns; trust fund code; coal industry health
benefits; and group health plan requirements.
T est R esults for T rial C ou rt C ases

In the 375 Tax Court cases, 226 are income tax cases, 124 are procedure and
administration cases, 18 are estate and gift tax cases, five are employment tax cases, and
two are miscellaneous excise tax cases. The major issues brought to the U.S. Tax Court
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are income tax as well as procedure and administration issues. Income tax cases comprise
about 60% o f all Tax Court cases under study; procedure and administration disputes
comprise about 33% o f the cases. For the 369 U.S. District Court cases, 301 are
procedure and administration cases; 47 are income tax cases; 10 are employment tax
cases; five are estate and gift tax cases; five are miscellaneous excise tax cases; and one is
alcohol, tobacco, and other excise tax cases. The major issue brought to U.S. District
Courts is the procedure and administration issue. It constitutes about 82% o f all U.S.
District Court cases under study. Procedure and administration issue is brought to the
U.S. Court o f Federal Claims 131 times (49%) out o f the 266 cases under study. The
remainder consists o f 99 (37%) cases concerning income tax disagreements; 19 cases
concerning employment taxes; 10 cases concerning miscellaneous excise taxes; six cases
about estate and gift taxes; and one case about alcohol, tobacco, and other excise taxes.
For all the 1,010 trial court cases under study, 556 are procedure and administration
cases, 372 are income tax cases, 29 are estate and gift tax cases, 34 are employment tax
cases, 17 are miscellaneous excise tax cases, and two are alcohol, tobacco, and other
excise tax cases. After adjusting for unproportional sampling, the major issues brought to
trial court are procedure and administration, and income tax disputes. Procedure and
administration disputes comprise about 51% o f all the trial court cases under study and
income tax cases around 43%. Table 4.3 summarizes what litigants sue for in trial courts.
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Table 4.3
Summary o f Federal Tax Issues in Trial Courts
Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court

Group
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Business
Business
Business
Business
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Business
Business
Business
Business
Business
U.S. Gov.
U.S. Gov.
U.S. Gov.
U.S. Gov.
U.S. Gov.
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Business
Business
Business
Business
Business

Tax Issue
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
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Frequency
182
17
5
1
114
44
1
1
10
30
4
5
1
180
15
3
2
1
54
2
1
2
2
67
39
6
1
1
77
60
18
9
1
54
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Further, analysis o f the data shows that some IRC Sections tend to be more
frequently contended.7 §§61, 162, 3121, 6330, 6511, 6672, 7421, 7422, 7430, 7433,
7602, and 7609 are the most often disputed sections in trial courts. Section 61 defines
gross income. Section 162 is about deduction o f trade or business expenses. Section 3121
gives definition o f wages, employment, employee, employer and other related concepts
for employment tax. Section 6330 requires notice and opportunity for hearing before
levy. Section 6511 sets time limitations on credit or refund. Section 6672 holds the
responsible person personally liable for failing to collect taxes. Section 7421 prohibits
suits to restrain assessment or collection. Section 7422 stipulates that no suit is allowed
prior to filing claim for refund and sets limits on right o f action for refund. Section 7430
awards costs and certain fees for prevailing parties. Section 7433 is civil damages for
certain unauthorized collection actions. Section 7602 gives the Secretary rights to
examine books and witnesses. Section 7609 stipulates special procedures for third-party
summons. Generally, sections about procedure and administration are most often under
dispute in trial court, especially sections dealing with levies, summons, and damages.
For the 375 Tax Court cases under study, the most often disputed IRC Sections are
§162 (29 times under dispute) and §6330 (21 times). Other frequently argued sections
include §61 (14 times), §7430 (14 times), §152 (12 times), §165 (12 times), §183 (12
times), §6015 (11 times). Section 3121 (five times) is the center o f controversy for all the
employment tax cases o f the Tax Court decisions under study. For the 369 U.S. District
Court cases under study, the most often disputed IRC Sections are §7433 (38 times),
§7609 (28 times), §7421 (26 times), and §7602 (21 times). Section 6330 (19 times),
§6672 (18 times), §7422 (17 times), §6321 (16 times), §6323 (14 times), §7402 (13
7 Appendix B provides a summary o f IRC Sections analyzed in this study.
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times), and §6103 (10 times) are also very often under disputes. U.S. Court o f Federal
Claims cases have more diverse focuses. That is, o f the 266 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims
cases under investigation, §7422 (23 times), §6511 (20 times), §6672 (13 times), §3121
(12 times), and §6532 (10 times) are the sections contended most often. Taking all the
trial court cases together, the most frequently disputed IRC Sections are §6330 (40
times), §7422 (40 times), §7433 (40 times), §162 (38 times), §6672 (32 times), §7421 (30
times), §6511 (29 times), §7609 (28 times), §7430 (26 times), §3121 (22 times), §61 (21
times), and §7602 (21 times). Other often disputed sections include §6103 (19 times),
§6321 (18 times), §165 (17 times), §7402 (17 times), §104 (16 times), §6532 (16 times),
§183 (15 times), §6501 (15 times), §152 (14 times), §6323 (14 times), §6015 (13 times),
§72 (12 times), §170 (12 times), §6320 (12 times), §446 (11 times), §6229 (11 times),
§6402 (11 times), §6653 (11 times), §166 (10 times), §6331 (10 times), and §6651 (10
times). For the 1,010 trial court cases, 34 are employment tax cases, and 22 times the
issue involves §3121. Table 4.4 summarizes the IRC Sections that are brought to trial
courts.
As this study illustrated earlier, around 94% o f the trial court cases are income tax
cases or procedure and administration cases. This inquiry combines all the remaining tax
issues as other tax issues to proceed chi-square test o f goodness o f fit for hypothesis two.
Data are further adjusted to take into consideration unproportional sampling. The chisquare test o f goodness o f fit shows that the frequencies o f different issues being brought
to the trial courts are significantly different (p< 0.0001).
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Table 4.4

IRC Section
§162
§6330
§61
§7430
§152
§165
§183
§6015
§7433
§7609
§7421

o
u

a
0

29
21
14
14
12

§7433
§162
§6672

12
12
11
38
28
26

§7602
§6330
§6672
§7422
§6321

21
19
18
17

§6323
§7402

14
13
10
23
20
13
12
10

§6103
§7422
§6511
§6672
§3121
§6532

IRC Section
§6330
§7422

Frequency

16

Trial Court

District Court

Tax Court

Summary o f IRC Sections Brought to Trial Courts
Frequency
40
40
40
38
32

§7421
§6511
§7609
§7430
§3121
§61
§7602
§6103
§6321
§165

30
29
28
26
22
21

§7402

17

§104
§6532
§183
§6501
§152
§6323
§6015
§72
§170
§6320
§446
§6229
§6402
§6653
§166
§6331
§6651

16
16
15
15
14
14
13
12
12
12
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21
19
18
17

11
11
11
11
10
10
10
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There exists a significant relationship between the type o f plaintiff and the type o f
tax issue being brought to the trial courts (p< 0.0001). As shown in Table 4.5, after
proper weighting, the major tax issues brought to court by individuals and businesses are
procedure and administration disagreements and income tax issues. In contrast, the U.S.
government goes to court over 90% o f the time to settle procedure and administration
issues.

Table 4.5
Summary o f Issues Brought by Different Groups to Trial Courts
Group
Individual
Individual
Individual
Business
Business
Business
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government

Tax Issue
Income Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Other
Income Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Other
Income Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Other

Percentage
44.33
49.23
6.44
52.20
41.67
6.13
2.7
90.54
6.76

Judicial forum is also significantly related to the type o f tax issues being brought to
court (p< 0.0001). As noted previously, the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. District Courts and the
U.S. Court o f Federal Claims have different jurisdiction over federal tax issues. This
might contribute to the types o f tax issues being brought in these different judicial
forums. The Tax Court's jurisdiction is generally limited to redetermining deficiencies in
income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and certain specified excise taxes that are subject to
deficiency procedures (26 U.S.C. §§ 6212, 6213, 6214). Section 6330(d) presumed that
the taxpayer could seek review in a U.S. District Court only where the Tax Court lacks
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jurisdiction ( Voelker v. Nolen, 365 F.3d 580). Consequently, around 60% o f cases being
brought to the Tax Court are income tax disputes while about 82% are procedure and
administration disagreements in U.S. District Courts. United States Code § 1346(a)(2)
establishes that U.S. District Courts'jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court o f Federal
Claims over claims against the United States that do not exceed $10,000. Around half o f
the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases under study are about procedure and
administration.
Test Results for Federal
Appellate Court Cases
Table 4.6 illustrates what issues are litigated in Federal Appellate Courts. For the
total of 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, 379 are procedure and administration cases;
293 are income tax cases; 35 are estate and gift tax cases; 16 are miscellaneous excise tax
cases; 14 are employment tax cases; five are coal industry health benefits cases; and two
are alcohol, tobacco, and other excise tax cases. In sum, over 50% o f the appellants go to
Federal Appellate Courts to settle procedure and administration issues and around 39%
for income tax disputes.
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Table 4.6
Summary o f Federal Tax Issues in Federal Appellate Courts
Group
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Business
Business
Business
Business
Business
Business
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government

Tax Issue
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Coal Industry Health Benefits
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Coal Industry Health Benefits
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Coal Industry Health Benefits

Frequency
166
27
2
4
2
263
1
94
2
6
8
75
3
33
6
6
4
41
1

Closer examination o f the data shows that §162 (24 times), §6672 (24 times), and
§104 (22 times) are most often under dispute. Other contended sections include §7201
(19 times), §7433 (19 times), §7206 (17 times), §7602 (15 times), §7430 (14 times),
§7609 (14 times), §6331 (12 times), §6511 (12 times), §163 (11 times), §6321 (11 times),
§6330 (11 times), §7212 (11 times), and §61 (10 times). There are only 35 estate and gift
tax disputes for all the Federal Appellate Court cases under study. Seven times they
concern retained life estate (§2036) and five times the marital deduction (§2056). For the
14 Federal Appellate Court employment tax cases under study, §3121 (eight times) and
§3401 (four times) are the center o f the disputes.
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Federal Appellate Court cases cover more diverse issues than trial court cases.
Furthermore, the most often disputed sections for Federal Appellate Court and trial court
cases are not quite the same. Section 104 is one o f the three most often disputed sections
in Federal Appellate Courts, but it is not the most often disputed sections in trial courts.
Specifically, §104 offers exemptions from taxes for damages due to personal physical
injuries or physical sickness.
The major arguments in Federal Appellate Courts are procedure and administration
issues (51%) and income tax disputes (39%). After combining all the remaining issues as
other disputes, the chi-square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the frequencies o f
different issues being brought to Federal Appellate Courts are significantly different (p<
0 . 0001).
Chi-square also rejects the independence o f the type of litigant and the issue being
brought to court (p< 0.0001). While the major issues being brought by all three groups o f
litigants under study are income tax and procedure and administration disputes,
businesses bring more income tax cases than procedure and administration cases to court,
while individuals and the U.S. government bring more procedure and administration
cases than income tax cases to court.
Test Results for U.S. Supreme
Court Cases
Table 4.7 summarizes the types o f issues that litigants bring to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Individuals litigate for income taxes and procedure and administration issues. All

the cases brought by businesses are income tax cases. The federal government brings to
the U.S. Supreme Court diverse issues. Due to the limited number o f observations, no
chi-square test is used to formally test Ha2 .
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Table 4.7
Summary o f Federal Tax Issues in the U.S. Supreme Court
Group
Individual
Individual
Business
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government
U.S. Government

Tax Issue
Income Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration

Frequency
2
3
5
4
3
2
4
6

Appellants bring to the U.S. Supreme Court a very broad range o f issues. Even so,
this study detects that §6511 occurs four times, and §104 occurs three times out o f the 29
Supreme Court cases under examination.
Conclusion-Research Question Two
The second alternative hypothesis presented for investigation in this study is:
Ha2: Different categories o f tax issues have unequal frequencies o f being brought to
court.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if the chi-square test shows that
different categories o f tax issues under investigation do have significantly unequal
chances o f being brought to court. Test results for trial court and Federal Appellate Court
cases reveal significantly unequal frequencies o f different categories o f tax issues being
contended. The sample size o f U.S. Supreme Court cases does not permit a valid chisquare analysis. Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is not rejected for trial court and
Federal Appellate Court cases. No conclusion is made for U.S. Supreme Court cases.
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Test Results for Research Question Three
Who is being sued or appealed? For the three groups o f litigants (individuals,
businesses, and the federal government), this study attempts to answer which group(s)
is(are) being sued and/or appealed for federal tax issues.
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
Table 4.8 reveals that the federal government is the predominant defendant in trial
courts. It is the only defendant in the U.S. Tax Court and the U.S. Court o f Federal
Claims and it is the defendant in about 75% o f the U.S. District Court cases under
examination. This result is the opposite o f W anner’s (1974) finding. For trial court cases,
in general, Wanner (1974) concludes that individuals make up about 67% o f the
defendants, organizations around 26%, and governments less than 6%. Chi-square test o f
goodness o f fit affirms that the three groups under study have significantly different
frequencies o f appearing as defendant in trial courts (p<0.0001). Also, the chi-square test
for independence shows that there is a significant relationship between the type o f
defendant and the judicial forum chosen (p<0.0001). As shown in Table 4.7, for federal
tax disputes, individuals or businesses are possible defendants only in U.S. District
Courts.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65

Table 4.8
Summary o f Defendants in U.S. Trial Courts
Forum
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
District Court
District Court
District Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court

Group
Individual
Business
U.S. Government
Individual
Business
U.S. Government
Individual
Business
U.S. Government

Frequency o f Occurrence
0
0
375
42
49
278
0
0
266

Test Results for Federal Appellate Court Cases
The U.S. government is the appellee in 622 out of the 744 Federal Appellate
Court cases under study. Businesses and individuals are appellees for 68 and 54 times,
respectively. Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the three groups under
examinaion have significantly different frequencies o f being appellees in Federal
Appellate Courts (pO.OOOl).
Test Results for U.S. Supreme Court Cases
U.S. Supreme Court appellees show a diverse pattern. That is, individuals,
businesses, and the U.S. government are appellees for 11, eight, and 10 times,
respectively, for the Supreme Court cases under study. The frequencies o f the three
groups appearing as appellee in the U.S. Supreme Court are not significantly different
(p> 0.7855).
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Conclusion-Research Question Three
The third alternative hypothesis presented for investigation is:
Ha3: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies
o f being sued or appealed.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if chi-square test shows that
individuals, businesses, and the federal government have significantly different
frequencies o f being sued or appealed. Test results for trial court cases and Federal
Appellate Court cases show that the three groups under study have significantly different
frequencies o f being sued. The federal government is the major defendant/appellee for
the trial court and Federal Appellate Court cases under study. The alternative hypothesis
is not rejected. However, the alternative hypothesis is rejected for the Supreme Court
cases.

Test Results for Research Question Four
Why is the defendant/appellee being sued/appealed? This study investigates what
defendant (appellee) is being sued (appealed) for in three different categories o f tax cases.
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
The U.S. government is sued in the Tax Court over 60% o f the time for income tax
issues and over 33% o f the time for procedure and administration disputes. Other issues
comprise less than 7% o f the total cases. The U.S. government is sued in the U.S. Court
o f Federal Claims about 49% o f the time for procedure and administration disputes and
around 37% for income tax issues. The remaining 14% is for other controversies. The
major issue brought to U.S. District Courts is procedure and administration (82%).
Individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government are sued in U.S. District Courts over
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88%, 71%, and 82% o f the times, respectively, over procedure and administration issues.
Taking all the trial court cases together, and after proper adjustment for unproportional
sampling, the U.S. government is brought to trial courts about 46% o f the time over
income tax issues, and around 48% o f the time for procedure and administration disputes.
Individuals and businesses are sued in U.S. District Courts only and for procedure and
administration disagreements over 88% and 71% o f the time respectively. Chi-square test
for independence reveals that there exists a significant relationship between the type o f
defendant and the federal tax issue being brought to court (p<0.0001). Table 4.9 displays
issues that defendants are being sued for in the trial courts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

Table 4.9
Summary o f Issues that Defendants Are Being Sued for in Trial Courts
Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Tax Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Dis. Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court
Claims Court

Group
Tax Issue
U.S. Gov. Income Taxes
U.S. Gov. Estate and Gift Taxes
U.S. Gov. Employment Taxes
U.S. Gov. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
U.S. Gov. Procedure and Administration
Individual Income Taxes
Individual Estate and Gift Taxes
Individual Employment Taxes
Individual Procedure and Administration
Business
Income Taxes
Business
Employment Taxes
Business
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Business
U.S. Gov. Income Taxes
U.S. Gov. Estate and Gift Taxes
U.S. Gov. Employment Taxes
U.S. Gov. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
U.S. Gov. Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes
U.S. Gov. Procedure and Administration
U.S. Gov. Income Taxes
U.S. Gov. Estate and Gift Taxes
U.S. Gov. Employment Taxes
U.S. Gov. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
U.S. Gov. Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes
U.S. Gov. Procedure and Administration
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Frequency
226
18
5
2
124
3
1
1
37
7
4
3
35
37
4
5
0
1
229
99
6
19
10
1
131
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Test Results for Federal
Appellate Court Cases
Table 4.10 illustrates what appellees are being sued for in Federal Appellate
Courts. Individuals are being brought to Federal Appellate Courts over 48% o f the time
for procedure and administration issues, and about 41% for income tax disputes.
Businesses are sued in Federal Appellate Courts over 41% o f the time for income tax
issues, and around 37% for procedure and administration disagreements. The U.S.
government is sued in Federal Appellate Courts over half o f the time (53%) for procedure
and administration disputes, and about 39% for income tax issues. In summary, appellees
are sued in Federal Appellate Courts mostly for procedure and administration and income
tax issues. Chi-square tests for independence show a significant relationship between the
type o f appellee and the federal tax issue being brought to appellate courts (p<0.0001).

Table 4.10
Summary o f Issues that Appellees Are Being Sued for in Federal Appellate Courts
Group
Tax Issue
Individual
Income Taxes
Individual
Estate and Gift Taxes
Individual
Procedure and Administration
Business
Income Taxes
Business
Employment Taxes
Business
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Business
Procedure and Administration
Business
Coal Industry Health Benefits
U.S. Government Income Taxes
U.S. Government Estate and Gift Taxes
U.S. Government Employment Taxes
U.S. Government Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
U.S. Government Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes
U.S. Government Procedure and Administration
U.S. Government Coal Industry Health Benefits

Frequency
22
6
26
28
6
5
25
4
243
29
8
11
2
328
1
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Test Results for U.S. Supreme
Court Cases
Table 4.11 summarizes issues that appellees are being sued for in the U.S.
Supreme Court. Appellees are litigated over a wide range of issues. Individuals are sued
five out o f the 11 times on procedure and administration issues and four times on income
tax disputes. Business appellees are in the U.S. Supreme Court four out o f the eight times
for miscellaneous excise tax disputes. The U.S. government is sued seven out o f the 10
times on income tax issues. Due to the limitation o f the sample size, no formal statistical
test is applied to test H a4 for Supreme Court cases.

Table 4.11
Summary o f Issues that Appellees Are Being Sued for in the U.S. Supreme Court
Group
Individual
Individual
Individual
Business
Business
Business
Business
U.S. Government
U.S. Government

Tax Issue
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
Income Taxes
Procedure and Administration

Frequency
4
2
5
1
2
4
1
7
3

Conclusion-Research Question Four
The fourth alternative hypothesis presented for investigation in this study is:
Ha4: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government are sued or appealed on
different categories o f tax issues.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if chi-square test o f independence
shows that there exists a significant relationship between the type o f defendant/appellee
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and the issue under dispute. Test results for trial court and Federal Appellate Court cases
show a significant relationship between the type o f defendant/appellee and the issue
involved. Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is not rejected. Due to limitations on
sample size, this inquiry does not perform a formal test o f H a4 for Supreme Court cases.

Test Results for Research Question
Five and Research Question Six
This study investigates the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the U.S.
government in litigation by looking individually at federal trial courts, Federal Appellate
Courts, and the United States Supreme Court. The available data do not permit this
inquiry to code the strength o f the litigants according to their size o f financial resources
and frequency o f dealing with courts. As a result, this inquiry assumes that individuals
usually have fewer resources than either businesses or the government and, thus, are
weaker. When business and government parties confront each other, the assumption is
that the federal government is usually stronger.
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
Success Rates Analysis. This inquiry first looks at the success rates o f the three
groups in litigation when they are plaintiffs. The results for trial court cases are
summarized in Table 4.12. As plaintiffs, individuals win 16.3% o f cases in the U.S. Tax
Court, 10.5% in U.S. District Courts, and 13.7% in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims.
Businesses win 33.9% o f cases in the U.S. Tax Court, 25.3% in U.S. District Courts, and
31.7% in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. The U.S. government only appears as
plaintiff in U.S. District Courts and it wins 73% o f the cases. Individual and business
plaintiffs have the lowest (highest) chance o f winning a case in U.S. District Courts (the
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U.S. Tax Court). Taking trial court cases together, individuals, businesses, and the U.S.
government win 13.9%, 30.4%, and 73% respectively as plaintiffs. The weighted results
are 14.6%, 30.2%, and 73%.
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Table 4.12
Winning and Losing by Nature o f Party (Trial Courts)

Plaintiff
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
Total

Plaintiff
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
Total

Plaintiff
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
Total

Plaintiff
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
Total

Plaintiff
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
Total

Respondent
Tax Court
Ind.
Bus.
U.S. Gov.
N
Nb
%
N
%
%a
NA NA NA NA 16.3
319
NA NA NA NA 33.9
56
NA NA NA NA NA
NA
NA NA NA NA 18.9
375
District Court
Ind.
Bus.
U.S. Gov.
N
N
N
%
%
%
0
1 28.6
14
9.3
205
50.0
2 NA NA 24.7
73
76.9
39 68.6
35 NA
NA
73.8
42 57.1
49 13.3
278
Claims Court
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
N
N
N
%
%
%
NA NA NA NA 13.7
124
NA NA NA NA 31.7
142
NA NA NA NA NA
NA
NA NA NA NA 23.3
266
Tria Court
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
N
N
N
%
%
%
14 13.6
0
1 28.6
648
50.0
2 NA NA 30.3
271
35 NA
76.9
39 68.6
NA
73.8
42 57.1
49 18.5
919
Trial Court (Weighted)
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
N
%
N
%
%
N
0
1.0 28.6 13.9 14.4 745.5
50.0
2.0 NA NA 30.0 174.0
NA
76.9 38.8 68.6 34.8 NA
73.8 41.8 57.2 48.8 17.4 919.4

Total
%
N
16.3
319
33.9
56
NA
NA
375
18.9
Total
N
%
10.5
220
25.3
75
73.0
74
26.0
369
Total
%
N
124
13.7
142
31.7
NA
NA
23.3
266
Total
%
N
13.9
663
30.4
273
74
73
22.7
1010
Total
N
‘ %
14.6 760.4
30.2 175.9
73.0
73.7
21.6
1010

aPercentage o f cases in which plaintiff won.
b Total cases on which percentage is based.
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As summarized in Table 4.13, the combined success rates o f individuals as
plaintiffs and as defendants are 16.3%, 13%, and 13.7% in the U.S. Tax Court, U.S.
District Courts, and the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims, respectively. The combined
success rates o f businesses are 33.9%, 32.3%, and 31.7% and the combined success rates
o f the U.S. government are 81.1%, 83.8%, and 76.7%, respectively, in the U.S. Tax
Court, U.S. District Courts, and the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. Taking all the trial
court cases together, the combined success rates for individuals, businesses, and the U.S.
government are 14.6%, 32.3%, and 80.9%, respectively. The weighted combined success
rates are 15.2%, 32.9%, and 81.9%.
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Table 4.13
Success Rates by Nature o f Party (Trial Courts)

Type o f Party
Individual
Business

Success Rate
as
Appellant
16.3
33.9

Tax Court
When Respondent,
Opponents
Net
Success Rate
Advantage
=
NA
NA
=
NA
NA

U.S. Gov.

NA

18.9

Individual
Business

10.5
25.3

73.8
57.1

U.S. Gov.

73.0

13.3

Individual
Business

13.7
31.7

NA
NA

U.S. Gov.

NA

23.3

Individual
Business

13.9
30.4

U.S. Gov.

73.0

Individual
Business

14.6
30.2

U.S. Gov.

73.0

Combined Success Rate
as Appellant
and Respondent
16.3
33.9

NA
District Court
=
-63.3
=
-31.8
=
59.7
Claims Court
=
NA
=
NA
=

NA
Trial Court
=
73.8
-59.9
=
57.1
-26.7
=
18.5
54.5
Trial Court (Weighted)
=
73.8
-59.0
=
57.2
-27.0
=
17.4
55.6
=

81.1
13.0
32.3
83.8
13.7
31.7
76.7
14.6
32.3
80.9
15.2
32.9
81.9

The plaintiff success rates and the combined success rates o f different parties in the
U.S. Tax Court and U.S. District Courts do not support the conclusion o f Geier (1991).
Geier (1991) compares U.S. Tax Court and U.S. District Court cases from 1965-1986.
The cases won or partially won by the U.S. government is 24% higher in the U.S. Tax
Court than in U.S. District Courts. Geier ascribes the 24-point difference to the progovernment trend o f the U.S. Tax Court. The U.S. Tax Court is formed under Article I
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and therefore U.S. Tax Court judges do not have tenure and unreduced salary protection
like U.S. District Court judges. This study reaches an opposite conclusion. Individuals
and businesses have both a higher plaintiff success rate and a higher combined successes
rate in the U.S. Tax Court than in U.S. District Courts. The different time frames o f the
two studies might contribute to the conflicting conclusions. The fact that Geier(1991)
ignores the different frequencies o f the U.S. government appearing as plaintiffs and as
defendants in the U.S. Tax Court vs. U.S. District Courts might also contribute to the
opposite results. By combining the cases in which the U.S. government is plaintiff and
the cases in which it is defendant, Geier’s (1991) results ignore that the success rate o f a
litigant as a plaintiff is different from the success rate o f a litigant as a defendant. The
combined success rate o f the U.S. government is 2.7 points higher in U.S. District Courts
(83.8%) than in the U.S. Tax Court (81.1%) for this study. This is misleading because, as
mentioned earlier, individuals and businesses have both higher plaintiff success rates and
higher combined successes rates in the U.S. Tax Court than in U.S. District Courts.
The net advantages for different parties in litigation are shown in Table 4.13. The
net advantages o f individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government in trial courts are
-59.9%, -26.7%, and 54.5% respectively. The weighted net advantages are -59%, -27%,
and 55.6%, respectively. The U.S. government does far better than businesses.
Businesses do considerably better than individuals. Individuals occupy the bottom o f the
order. To further investigate the interactions between specific categories o f parties, cases
in which two parties confront each other directly are selected. Table 4.14 summarizes the
results. The U.S. government not only wins far more often overall, it also has an
advantage vis-a-vis each other type o f litigant. Its net advantage over businesses is
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38.6%, and 62.5% over individuals. Individuals lose against all other types o f parties. The
margin o f disadvantage o f individuals over businesses is 21.4%.

Table 4.14
Net Advantage for Different Combination o f Parties (Trial Courts)
Combination o f Parties
Individual vs. Business
Individual vs. U.S. Gov.
Business vs. U.S. Gov.

Net Advantage
Business by 21.4%
U.S. Gov. by 63.3%
U.S. Gov. by 38.3%

Net Advantage( Weighted)
Business by 21.4%
U.S. Gov. by 62.5%
U.S. Gov. by 38.6%

Logistic Regression Results for H .^ without Considering Representation Types.
At this point, the investigation results for trial court cases suggest that “haves” do tend to
have certain advantages. Although the analysis presented above produces results that are
consistent with Party Capability Theory, the thesis can be only provisionally supported
until the effects o f potential intervening variables are examined. This inquiry further
clarifies the results by using logistic regression to formally test Has. As mentioned earlier,
the major tax issues brought to court by individuals and businesses are procedure and
administration disagreements and income tax issues. In contrast, the U.S. government
goes to court over 90% of the time to settle procedure and administration issues. The U.S.
government is brought to trial courts about 46% o f the time for income tax issues, and
around 48% o f the time for procedure and administration disputes. Individuals and
businesses are sued in U.S. District Courts over 88% and 71% o f the time, respectively,
for procedure and administration disagreements. Thus, tax issue type is included in the
regression and dummy variables are also created for the different legal forums.
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Table 4.15 illustrates the influence o f litigant strength on case outcomes. Overall,
the model performs moderately well. That is, the full model is significant at the 0.001
level and it has explanation power o f 19.1%.9 However, the signs o f the variables are
opposite o f the predicted direction. Contrary to Songer et al. (1999) and Farole (1999),
which report a positive coefficient for plaintiff strength variable and a negative
coefficient for defendant strength variable, this study reports a negative coefficient for
plaintiff strength variable and a positive coefficient for defendant strength variable. The
variable measuring the status o f the defendant’s strength is positively related to the
likelihood o f plaintiff success, and the relationship is significant (p=0.0021). It indicates
that plaintiffs have significantly higher success probabilities when confronting
presumably stronger parties. Although the magnitude is less, the variable measuring the
status o f the plaintiffs strength is negatively related to the likelihood o f plaintiff success,
and the relationship also reaches a significant level (p<0.0001), indicating that, holding
all other variables constant, the presumed stronger plaintiffs have significantly lower
success probabilities. The unexpected results could be due to the conventional
assumption o f party strength. Prior literature generally assumes that the strengths o f the
litigating parties have measurable values. This study follows the norm and assumes that

8 The plaintiff and defendant type interaction is not significant and is deleted from the model. For all the
subsequent models mentioned in this study, plaintiff and defendant type/appellant and appellee type
interaction is ch eck ed and then deleted because the result is not significant.

Year o f decision is also not significant and is deleted from the model. The Pearson residuals vs.
year and deviance residuals vs. year plots indicate no obvious split point o f time. For all the subsequent
m odels in this research, year o f decision is first included as independent variable and then deleted due to
insignificance; the Pearson residuals vs. year and deviance residuals vs. year plots indicate no obvious
division o f time. Thus, this study does not divide the data into multiple time periods.
9 The deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that the model does not fit w ell (p<0.05). The
m odel does fit w ell after inclusion o f representation types as independent variables.
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the strength o f individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government are 1, 2, and 3
respectively. The assumption is not necessarily an approximation o f reality.

Table 4.15
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in Trial Courts

Independent Variable
Intercept
Plaintiff Strength
Defendant Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court

Estimate
0.4865
-1.0439
0.7202
-0.0214
0.2094
0.4224
0.1329

SE
0.8898
0.1647
0.2347
0.2996
0.2946
0.2417
0.2187

Pr > ChiSq
0.5845
<0.0001
0.0021
0.9431
0.4772
0.0805
0.5434

Odds Ratio
0.352
2.055
0.979
1.233
1.526
1.142

Note: Dependent Variable = Verdict. M odel pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square10=0.1910.

To take into consideration that the party strength assumption might not follow
reality, this inquiry uses dummy variables for different litigation parties to reexamine the
data. The results are illustrated in Tables 4.16 and 4.17.11 Holding all other variables
constant, individual plaintiffs have significantly higher chances o f winning a case than
the U.S. government plaintiff (p=0.0012) and business plaintiffs (pO.OOOl). Business
and the U.S. government plaintiffs’ chances o f winning a case do not differ significantly.
The plaintiff has a marginally significantly lower chance o f winning a case if the

10 Pseudo-R-Square is an Aldrich and Nelson's coefficient which serves as an analog to the squared
contingency coefficient, with an interpretation like R-square. Its maximum is less than 1. It may be used in
either dichotomous or multinomial logistic regression. The Max-rescaled R-square adjusts the pseudo Rsquare to the full range o f 0.0 to 1.0. Both values are a rough approximation o f the explanatory power o f
the model (Hosmer & Lem eshow 2000).
11 The deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that the m odels are not good fits (p<0.05).
However, the m odels do fit w ell after inclusion o f representation types as independent variables.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
defendant is an individual or a business than when the defendant is the U.S. government
(0.05<p<0.10); a plaintiffs chance o f winning does not differ significantly when the
defendant is an individual than when the defendant is a business.

Table 4.16
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in Trial Courts
(Individual vs. Government and Business vs. Government)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Individual Plaintiff
Business Plaintiff
Individual Defendant
Business Defendant
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court

Estimate
-0.4362
2.0468
1.0303
-1.3358
-1.0308
-0.0354
0.1936
0.4588
0.1196

SE
0.7111
0.6336
0.6581
0.7020
0.5973
0.3002
0.2991
0.2491
0.2241

Pr > ChiSq
0.5396
0.0012
0.1175
0.0571
0.0844
0.9060
0.5174
0.0655
0.5936

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1922.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Odds Ratio
7.743
2.802
0.263
0.357
0.965
1.214
1.582
1.127
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Table 4.17
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in Trial Courts
(Individual vs. Business)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Business Plaintiff
The U.S. government Plaintiff
Business Defendant
The U.S. government Defendant
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court

Estimate
0.3245
-1.0113
-1.9196
0.2557
1.2848
-0.0363
0.1912
0.4478
0.1169

SE
0.7469
0.1922
0.6295
0.4767
0.6955
0.2995
0.2980
0.2484
0.2239

Pr > ChiSq
0.6639
<0.0001
0.0023
0.5917
0.0647
0.9035
0.5212
0.0714
0.6017

Odds Ratio
0.364
0.147
1.291
3.614
0.964
1.211
1.565
1.124

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1918.

Logistic Regression Results for H„s (after Inclusion of Representation Types)
and Ha<;. The above logistic analysis for trial court cases is contrary to Party Capability
Theory. The results tend to support that individuals have comparative advantages in
litigation over businesses and the U.S. government. Businesses and the U.S. government
have about the same strength in litigation. The results could be due to the omission o f
representation type in the logistic models. This study further introduces representation
type into the logistic models. By applying Heckman’s correction to take care o f self
selection bias, this inquiry also indirectly considers the influence o f amounts in disputes
on case results.
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Table 4.18 reports the comparison o f lawyer vs. pro se representation.12 After
control for the representation type and indirectly control of the amount in dispute, the
signs o f plaintiff and defendant strength variables are still contrary to the expected
direction but are no longer significant. Opposite to the general belief that lawyer
representation holds an advantage compared to pro se representation, the signs o f plaintiff
and defendant representation variables indicate that lawyer representation reduces
litigants’ winning possibilities in comparison with pro se representation. In other words, a
lawyer represented plaintiff has a significantly lower chance o f winning a case than pro
se plaintiff (p>0.0009). Although to an insignificant level, the sign o f defendant
representation type indicates that a defendant is better off pro se than with lawyer
representation.

In addition, plaintiffs using the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims have

significantly higher chances o f winning than plaintiffs using the U.S. Tax Court
(p>0.0375).

12 The Pearson residuals vs. representation types and deviance residuals vs. representation types plots do
not show obvious evidence o f deviation from homogeneity between different representation types. The
above procedure is also run for Federal Appellate Court and U .S. Supreme Court cases with the plots
showing no obvious deviation from homogeneity.
The opponent parties’ representation type interaction, litigant parties’ type and representation type
interactions are all insignificant and therefore are deleted from the model. The above procedure is also run
for Federal Appellate Court and U .S. Supreme Court cases with no significant results.
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Table 4.18
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Plaintiff Strength
Defendant Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Plaintiff (Lawyer Representation)
Defendant (Lawyer Representation)

Estimate
-3.3250
-0.5102
0.5902
-0.0242
-0.0727
0.6302
0.5942
-0.9557
3.5993

SE
5.1298
0.6777
0.6321
0.5204
0.4853
0.3428
0.2856
0.2882
4.2923

Pr > ChiSq
0.5159
0.4515
0.3504
0.9629
0.8810
0.0660
0.0375
0.0009
0.4017

Odds Ratio
0.600
1.804
0.976
0.930
1.878
1.812
0.385
36.571

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1820.

Because party strength assumption does not necessarily resemble reality, plaintiff
and defendant strength variables are substituted by dummy variables for litigant parties
and the model for comparison o f lawyer vs. pro se representation is recalculated. The
results are reported in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. After control for representation types and
indirect control o f amounts in dispute, the plaintiff chance o f winning does not differ
significantly across plaintiff and defendant types. Furthermore, three out o f the four
defendant dummy variables have the expected sign. Again, contrary to general belief, the
lawyer represented plaintiff has a significantly lower chance o f winning than pro se
plaintiff (p<0.01). Although insignificant, a defendant is better off pro se than with
attorney representation.
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Table 4.19
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)
(Trial Courts)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Individual Plaintiff
Business Plaintiff
Individual Defendant
Business Defendant
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Plaintiff (Lawyer Representation)
Defendant (Lawyer Representation)

Estimate
-3.4302
1.462
1.3116
1.1723
-1.4110
-0.1980
-0.1567
0.6762
0.5491
-0.9710
3.3150

SE
4.4248
1.7640
1.6479
2.0167
1.3057
0.5470
0.4991
0.3508
0.2865
0.2893
4.0639

Pr > ChiSq
0.4382
0.4156
0.4261
0.5610
0.2799
0.7174
0.7535
0.0539
0.0553
0.0008
0.4147

Odds Ratio
4.205
3.712
3.229
0.244
0.820
0.855
1.966
1.732
0.379
27.523

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1970.

Table 4.20
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Business)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Business Plaintiff
Government Plaintiff
Business Defendant
Government Defendant
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Plaintiff (Lawyer Representation)
Defendant (Lawyer Representation)

Estimate
0.9251
-0.0626
-1.9657
-2.8517
-1.6221
-0.2934

SE
3.3831
0.7597
1.9074
1.6969
2.1305
0.5386

Pr > ChiSq
0.7845
0.9343
0.3028
0.0928
0.4464
0.5859

Odds Ratio

-0.2372

0.4898

0.6281

0.789

0.5732
0.4762
-0.7261
1.7397

0.3376
0.2776
0.2706
2.6197

0.0896
0.0863
0.0073
0.5066

1.774
1.610
0.484
5.696

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1901.
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0.746
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To further investigate the influence o f representation type on case results,
decisions involving only solo or firm representations are selected for additional analysis.
Logistic regression results are depicted in Table 4.21. Plaintiff and defendant strength
variables still have opposite signs than expected but are at insignificant levels.
Surprisingly, group represented plaintiff has a significantly lower chance o f winning than
solo represented plaintiff (p>0.0005). A plaintiffs chance o f winning is also higher when
confronting a group represented defendant as contrasted to a solo represented defendant.
However, this result is at an insignificant level.

Table 4.21
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Solo vs. Group)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Plaintiff Strength
Defendant Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Plaintiff (Group Representation)
Defendant (Group Representation)

Estimate
0.4736
-0.6366
0.2214
0.5207
0.0410
0.6598
0.5087
-0.8892
0.2291

SE
8.4519
2.1030
0.8715
1.1817
0.4042
0.3844
0.3569
0.2568
0.2996

Pr > ChiSq
0.9553
0.7621
0.7995
0.6595
0.9192
0.0861
0.1541
0.0005
0.4446

Odds Ratio
0.529
1.248
1.683
1.042
1.934
1.663
0.411
1.257

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0 .0001, Max--rescaled R-Square=0. 1447.

Tables 4.22 and 4.23 report solo vs. firm representation results using dummy
variables for various litigant types instead o f litigant strength variables. The results are
consistent with the conclusions using litigant strength variables. Although the plaintiff
type variables still have unexpected signs, they are at insignificant levels. All the
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defendant type variables have expected signs. A plaintiff has a lower chance o f winning
when confronting a stronger defendant than a weaker defendant, but it is at an
insignificant level o f significance. Again, group represented plaintiff does significantly
worse than solo represented plaintiff (p<0.001). A defendant seems to be better off using
solo representation instead o f group representation, although the effect is insignificant.

Table 4.22
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Solo vs. Group, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Individual Plaintiff
Business Plaintiff
Individual Defendant
Business Defendant
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Plaintiff (Group Representation)
Defendant (Group Representation)

Estimate
-5.0841
11.8371
7.9873
6.7065
2.4692
-1.3557
-0.0920
0.7296
0.5319
-0.9252
0.1551

SE
5.7990
7.8009
6.2539
6.1086
5.6469
1.5754
0.4120
0.3888
0.3586
0.2597
0.3046

Pr > ChiSq
0.3790
0.1292
0.2015
0.2723
0.6619
0.3895
0.8233
0.0606
0.1380
0.0004
0.6106

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1682.
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Odds Ratio
>999.999
>999.999
817.690
11.813
0.258
0.912
2.074
1.702
0.396
1.168
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Table 4.23
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Solo vs. Group, Individual vs. Business)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Business Plaintiff
Government Plaintiff
Business Defendant
Government Defendant
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Plaintiff (Group)
Defendant (Group)

Estimate
12.1512
-3.7876
-10.5990
-3.9430
-5.4415
-1.4326
-0.0949
0.6365
0.4832
-0.8687
0.1179

SE
8.1171
2.8003
6.3522
2.1735
4.1659
1.5600
0.4066
0.3792
0.3523
0.2547
0.2987

Pr > ChiSq
0.1344
0.1762
0.0952
0.0697
0.1915
0.3584
0.8154
0.0932
0.1701
0.0006
0.6931

Odds Ratio
0.023
<0.001
0.019
0.004
0.239
0.909
1.890
1.621
0.420
1.125

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1654.

Further Analysis of Pro Se Plaintiffs in Trial Courts. Pro se plaintiffs are
predominantly individuals. Out o f the 318 Tax Court cases with available disputed
amounts, 159 are initiated by pro se litigants. For the 159 cases with pro se plaintiffs, 156
o f the pro se plaintiffs are coded as individuals. For the remaining three cases with pro se
1T

plaintiffs coded as businesses, one case involved a trustee representing a trust , and the
other two cases had individual plaintiffs whose involvement in the suit was directly
related to their roles as an officer or owner o f the business. Thus, the above three cases’
13

It is w ell established that a corporation (including a trust) must a p p e a r th r o u g h a n a tto rn e y . E x c e p t in
extraordinary circumstances, corporations cannot be represented by lay persons (783 F.2d 771, 773; 65
App. D.C. 255; 82 F.2d 861,863).
In all the courts o f the United States the parties may plead and manage their ow n causes
personally, or by the assistance o f such counsel or attorneys at law. The words "the parties," as used in the
statute, mean the parties in interest - the real, beneficial owners o f the claims asserted in the suit. B y
implication, it excludes agents in fact and confines the representation, where the party w hose rights are
actually involved does not appear in person, to attorneys and counselors at law (65 App. D.C. 255).
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plaintiffs are coded according to their organizational affiliation and not as individuals.
This study has collected 153 U.S. District Court cases with available disputed amounts.
Among these decisions, 27 are initiated by pro se individual plaintiffs. For the 166 U.S.
Court o f Federal Claims cases with amounts in dispute, 37 have pro se plaintiffs. A total
o f 35 pro se plaintiffs are coded as individuals. The remaining two are coded as
businesses according to the individual plaintiffs’ organizational affiliation. The above
results are summarized in Table 4.24,
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Table 4.24
Comparison o f Trial Court Cases
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)

Tax Court
District Court

--------------------------------------

No. of
Cases with
Court Pro Se
Plaintiffs

Issues Involved

Income Taxes
Procedure and
Administration

■«3
U

107
49

On
IT)

159
Employment
Taxes

Procedure and
Administration

3

25

126

27
Employment
Taxes

Procedure and
Administration
3
o
u
cCnJ

No. o f Cases with
Lawyer or
Undisclosed
Representation
Plaintiffs

2

27

Income Taxes
129

37
10

Issues Involved

Income Taxes
Procedure and
Administration
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Procedure and
Administration
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes
Procedure and
Administration
Income Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes
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99
42
15
2
1
98
18
4
4
2
j

O

49
112
f
0CL
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For the 159 Tax Court cases with pro se plaintiffs, 107 involve income tax issues,
three are about employment tax issues, and 49 about procedure and administration
concerns. O f the 159 Tax Court cases with lawyer represented plaintiffs or with
plaintiffs’ representation type undisclosed, 99 are about income tax issues, 42 are about
procedure and administration concerns, 15 are about estate and gift taxes, two are about
miscellaneous excise taxes, and one is about employment tax. For the 27 U.S. District
Court cases with pro se plaintiffs, 25 involve procedure and administration concerns and
the remaining two are about employment taxes. Out o f the 126 U.S. District Court cases
with lawyer represented plaintiffs or with plaintiffs’ representation type undisclosed, 98
involve procedure and administration concerns, 18 involve income tax issues, four are
estate and gift tax cases, four are employment tax cases, and two are miscellaneous excise
tax cases. O f the 37 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases with pro se plaintiffs, 27 are
procedure and administration disputes and 10 are income tax cases. For the 129 U.S.
Court o f Federal Claims cases with attorney represented plaintiffs or with plaintiffs’
representation unavailable, 56 are procedure and administration cases, 49 are income tax
cases, 12 are employment tax cases, six are about estate and gift taxes, and six about
miscellaneous excise taxes. In sum, pro se plaintiffs appear in trial courts about 98% of
the time for income tax or procedure and administration issues for the sample under
study.
Pro se plaintiffs in the Tax Court most often sue over §§61, 72, 104, 151, 152,
162, 274, 6330, and 7491; while plaintiffs with lawyer or undisclosed representation in
the Tax Court most often contest §§162, 165, 170, 183, 6653, and 7430. Pro se plaintiffs
in U.S. District Courts most often disagree on §§6330, 7421, and 7422; while plaintiffs
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with attorney or undisclosed representation in U.S. District Courts most often clash on
§§6321, 6322, 6323, 6331, 6672, and 7433. The two most often disputed Sections by pro
se plaintiffs in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims are §§6511 and 7422. Also, these
sections are the most disputed Sections by plaintiffs with lawyer or undisclosed
representation. Therefore, except in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims, the most often
disputed Sections by pro se plaintiffs are usually different from the most often contested
Sections by plaintiffs with attorney or undisclosed representation. Table 4.25 displays the
most often disputed IRC Sections for trial court cases with available disputed amounts.
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Table 4.25
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Trial Court Cases
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs
Court

£o
u
3t
f—

t5
3
o
U
-4-»
o
•c
to
Q

o
U
CO
g
3
u

IRC Section
§104
§274
§7491
§151
§72
§6330
§61
§152
§162
§6330

Times Appearing
as Major Issue
5
6
6
6
9
11
11
12
15
4

§7421

4

§7422

5

§7422

5

§h511

9

Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed
Representation Plaintiffs
IRC Section
Times Appearing
as Major Issue
§170
§6653
§7430

5
7
7

§165

8

§183

11

§162
§6331
§6322
§7433
§6672
§6323
§6321
§6532
§6402
§6511
§3121
§7422
§6672

12
6
7
8
10
11
11
5
5
8
8
8
10
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Table 4.26 displays the amount in dispute for trial court cases. Plaintiffs who
choose pro se usually have a lower amount in dispute compared with plaintiffs who
choose to hire attomey(s) or whose representation information is unavailable. The median
amount in dispute for pro se plaintiffs in the Tax Court is $11,462.56 while it is $100,000
for plaintiffs with lawyer or undisclosed representation. The median amounts in dispute
for plaintiffs with pro se and lawyer or undisclosed representation in U.S. District Courts
are $5,142.10 and $96,123.84, respectively.

The medians are $10,182.03

and

$427,640.67, respectively, in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims.

Table 4.26
Amount in Dispute for Trial Court Cases
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs
Court
Tax
Court
District
Court
Claims
Court

Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed
Representation Plaintiffs
High
Low
Median

High

Low

Median

$17,732,639

$398

$11,462.56

$551,510,819

$298

$100,000

230,000

500

5,142.10

61,649,000

500

96,123.84

2,900,000

571.34

10,182.03

140, 314.41

569.93

427,640.67

In summary, choosing pro se representation is quite common for plaintiffs in the
U.S. Tax Court. For the 318 Tax Court cases with amounts in dispute available, half are
initiated by pro se plaintiffs. Pro se representation is much less popular in U.S. District
Courts and the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. 18% plaintiffs in U.S. District Courts and
22% in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims choose to represent themselves. Pro se plaintiffs
try to settle income tax or procedure and administration issues in trial courts 98% o f the
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time. Trial court cases with pro se plaintiffs have a much lower median amount in dispute
than cases with attorney or undisclosed representation.
Further Analysis of Solo Represented Plaintiffs in Trial Courts. For Tax Court
cases where the amount in dispute is available, 103 are initiated by solo represented
plaintiffs and 53 are initiated by group represented plaintiffs. Individual plaintiffs use
solo representation three times as often as group representation. On the other hand,
business plaintiffs use group representation more often than solo representation. A total
o f 54 U.S. District Court cases are initiated by solo represented plaintiffs and 46 are
initiated by group represented plaintiffs. Individual plaintiffs use solo representation
twice as often as group representation while business and the federal government
plaintiffs use group representation more often than solo representation. A total o f 70 U.S.
Court of Federal Claims cases are initiated by solo represented plaintiffs and 49 by group
represented plaintiffs. Individual plaintiffs use solo representation twice as often as group
representation. Business plaintiffs use group representation almost as often as solo
representation. Specifically, in trial courts, individual plaintiffs tend to choose solo over
group representation while business and the federal government plaintiffs tend to choose
group over solo representation.
This research does not find a distinct difference between solo and group
represented plaintiffs in regard to what kind o f issue they brought into the trial courts. In
the Tax Court, solo represented plaintiffs most often sue over §§162, 165, 183, 6653, and
7430 while group represented plaintiffs most often sue over §§162 and 183. In U.S.
District Courts, the most often disputed Sections by solo represented plaintiffs are
§§6321 and 7433 while they are §§6321, 6322, 6323, and 6672 for group represented
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plaintiffs. Solo represented plaintiffs in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims most often
disagree on §§6511, 6672, and 7422. Group represented plaintiffs bring to the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims a wide range o f issues and they do not focus on any specific IRC
Section. The above results are summarized in Table 4.27 and 4.28.
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Table 4.27
Comparison o f Trial Court Cases (Solo vs. Group Representation)

Court

Tax
Court

District
Court

Claims
Court

No. o f Cases
with Solo
Represented
Plaintiffs

103 in Total.
90 by
Individuals;
13 by
Businesses.

54 in Total.
29 by
Individuals;
15 by
Businesses;
10 by
Government.

70 in Total,
31 by
Individuals;
39 by
Businesses.

No. o f Cases
with Group
Represented
Plaintiffs

Issues Involved

Income Taxes
Procedure and
Administration
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes
Procedure and
Administration
Income Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes
Procedure and
Administration

42

Income Taxes

22

Estate and Gift
Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes

61
29
11
1

53 in Total.
31 by
Individuals;
22 by
Businesses.

Issues Involved

Income Taxes
Procedure and
Administration
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes

35
13
4

1

1

6
4
1
1

46 in Total;
13 by
Individuals;
19 by
Businesses;
14 by
Government.

Income Taxes

35

5
5
3

Procedure and
Administration
Income Taxes
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes

49 in Total;
15 by
Individuals;
34 by
Businesses.

Procedure and
Administration
Employment
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes
Estate and Gift
Taxes
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8
2

1

25
15
5
3
1
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Table 4.28
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Trial Court Cases
(Solo vs. Group Representation)
Cases with Group Represented Plaintiffs
IRC Section

§162

4
4

§6672
§6321
§6322

5
5
5

§6323

7

District
Court

5
6
7
8
8

No. o f Times Appearing
as Major Issue

§6321

5

§7433

5

Claims
Court

Tax Court

Cases with Solo Represented
Plaintiffs
Court IRC
No. o f Times
Section
Appearing
as Major Issue
§7430
§6653
§183
§1(.2
§165

§6511
§7422
§6672

4
No IRC Section Is Mentioned More Than 3
5
Times
6

Table 4.29 displays the high, low, and median amount in disputes for solo and
group represented plaintiffs. Group represented plaintiffs have a median amount in
dispute about two times larger than solo represented plaintiffs.
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Table 4.29
Amount in Dispute for Trial Court Cases
(Solo vs. Group Representation)

Court
Tax
Court
District
Court
Claims
Court

Cases with Solo Represented
Cases with Group Represented
Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
Low
High
Low
Median
High
Median
$23,213,702

$644

$70,097.35

$551,510,819

$1,545

$301,425.17

25,478,773

1,000

78,036.36

61,649,000

2,000

218,015.50

63,792,209

2,352.32

463,010.27

200,328,350

569.93

1,446,176

Whenever the choices are o f solo or group representation, individuals tend to
choose solo representation while businesses and the federal government tend to choose
group representation. Even though there are no distinct differences between solo and
group represented plaintiffs in regard to what kind o f issue they bring to trial courts, these
two groups o f plaintiffs focus on different IRC Sections. Solo represented plaintiffs have
a much lower median amount in dispute compared with group represented plaintiffs.
Conclusion for Trial Court Cases-Research
Questions Five and Six
The fifth and sixth alternative hypotheses presented for investigation in this study
are:
Ha5: Different groups o f litigants have unequal success rates at litigation for federal
tax issues, with the United States government being the most successful
entity, businesses being the second, and individuals being the least successful.
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Ha6: The three representation types before the courts (pro se, solo, and group
representation) have significant influence on the success rates o f individuals,
businesses, and the federal government in litigation.
Logistic regression results do not support HU. Without control for representation
types, the results indicate that the individual plaintiff has a significant higher chance o f
winning than business or the U.S. government as plaintiff. Business and the U.S.
government plaintiffs do not differ significantly in chances o f winning. Defendant types
do not have significant influence on case results. After control for representation types,
plaintiff and defendant types both are not significantly correlated with case results.
Contrary to general belief, holding all other conditions constant, pro se plaintiffs
perform significantly better than lawyer represented plaintiffs; solo represented plaintiffs
significantly outperform firm represented plaintiffs. Defendant representation types do
not significantly contribute to case results. Overall, HU is not rejected.
Test Results for Federal
Appellate Court Cases
Success Rates Analysis. The beginning point o f the analysis is to examine the
appellant success rate and overall success rate for each o f the three categories o f litigants.
The results are displayed in Tables 4.30 and 4.31. There are wide disparities in the
relative success of the different classes o f appellants in the courts o f appeals, and those
differences are quite consistent with the expectations o f Party Capabilities Theory. The
federal government is successful in 60.4% o f its appeals and has an overall rate of

success (combined success rate as appellant and as appellee) o f 79.7%. Individuals and
businesses are successful in their appeals for 16.1%, and 23.4%, respectively. The overall
success rates for individuals and businesses are 17.9%, and 32.4%, respectively. In total,
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the United States government is more than twice as successful as individuals and
businesses.

Table 4.30
Winning and Losing by Nature o f Party (Appellate Courts)

Appellant
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
Total

Individual
%
N
0
1
71.4
7
67.4 46
66.7
54

Respondent
Business
% N
28.6 14
11.1
9
53.3 45
42.6 68

U.S.
%
15.8
22.1
NA
17.5

Gov.
N
450
172
NA
622

Total
%
N
16.1 465
23.4 188
60.4
91
23.4 744

Table 4.31
Success Rates by Nature o f Party (Appellate Courts)

Type o f Party
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.

Success Rate
as Appellant
16.1
23.4
60.4

When Respondent,
Opponents'
Success Rate
66.7
42.6
17.5

= Net Advantage
=
-50.6
=
-19.2
=
42.9

Combined Success Rate
as Appellant
and Respondent
17.9
32.4
79.7

As mentioned earlier, the net advantage index may be a better indicator o f
litigation success than the plaintiff success rate or overall success rate. It is unaffected by
the relative frequency that a given class o f litigant appears as an appellant rather than as
an appellee. Net advantage for each class o f litigant is displayed in Table 4.31. The
results reinforce the picture suggested by the plaintiff success rate and overall success
rate. Only the federal government enjoys a positive net advantage o f 42.9%. Businesses
follow the federal government and have a negative net advantage o f 19.2%. Individuals
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suffer a steep negative net advantage o f 50.6%. Direct comparisons o f litigation parties
using only cases in which the two parties under comparison directly confront each other
affirm the above results. The direct comparison results are displayed in Table 4.32.
Individuals suffer tremendous negative net advantages in comparison with either
businesses (-42.8%) or the federal government (-51.6%). The U.S. government enjoys a
strong positive net advantage compared with individuals (51.6%) and businesses
(31.2%).

Table 4.32
Net Advantage for Different Combination o f Parties (Appellate Courts)
Combination o f Parties
Individual vs. Business
Individual vs. U.S. Gov.
Business vs. U.S. Gov.

Net Advantage
Business by 42.8%
U.S. Gov. by 51.6%
U.S. Gov. by 31.2%

Logistic Regression Results for Has without Considering Representation Types.
To provide more systematic analysis, this study uses the logistic regression model. The
results are reported in Table 4.33. The dependant variable is appellant success, coded as 1
if the appellant wins and 0 if the appellee wins. Overall, the model performs well. The
full model is significant at the 0.0001 level. Most o f the independent variables have a
statistically significant relationship with appellant success. However, the signs o f the
party strength variables are not in the predicted direction.

Appellant strength is

significantly negatively related with appellant success (p>0.0135), and appellee strength
is significantly positively related with appellant success (PO.OOOl). The logistic model
actually suggests that the presumed weaker party significantly outperforms the presumed
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stronger party. Income tax and procedure and administrative issues have a strong positive
association with plaintiff successes compared with other issues. Different types o f lower
forums do not influence case results significantly.

Table 4.33
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in Appellate Courts

Independent Variable
Intercept
Appellant Strength
Appellee Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court

Estimate
-1.2615
-0.4346
0.8241
0.8101
0.7877
0.4225
0.0668

SE
0.8536
0.1759
0.2092
0.2971
0.2955
0.2175
0.4266

Pr > ChiSq
0.1394
0.0135
<0.0001
0.0064
0.0077
0.0521
0.8755

Odds Ratio
0.648
2.280
2.248
2.198
1.526
1.069

N ote- Dependent Variable = Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1740.

As this study previously mentioned, party strength assumption is arbitrary and
might mislead test results. Test results, after using party dummy variables to substitute
party strength variables, are displayed in Tables 4.34 and 4.35. Individual appellants
significantly outperform the federal government appellants (p>0.0304) and individual
appellees significantly outperform the federal government appellees (p>0.0026). Business
and individual appellants’ success probabilities do not differ significantly. However,
business appellees significantly underperform individual appellees (p>0.0288). Business
and the federal government litigants comparison does not show significant results, either
as an appellant or as an appellee. Compared with other disputes, income tax or procedure
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and administration issues give the appellant a significantly better opportunity o f winning
(p<0.01). Lower forum type is not a significant factor in the appellant’s success pattern.

Table 4.34
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in Appellate Courts
(Individual vs. Government and Business vs. Government)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Individual Appellant
Business Appellant
Individual Appellee
Business Appellee
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court

Estimate
-0.2854
1.0453
0.6555
-1.5590
-0.6328
0.8096
0.8114
0.3977
0.0485

SE
0.5316
0.4829
0.4787
0.5177
0.4548
0.2993
0.2995
0.2252
0.4287

Pr > ChiSq
0.5914
0.0304
0.1709
0.0026
0.1642
0.0068
0.0067
0.0774
0.9100

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1746.
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Odds Ratio
2.844
1.926
0.210
0.531
2.247
2.251
1.488
1.050
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Table 4.35
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in Appellate Courts
(Individual vs. Business)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Business Appellant
The U.S. government Appellant
Business Appellee
The U.S. government Appellee
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court

Estimate
-0.7486
-0.3891
-1.0149
0.8647
1.5127
0.8031
0.8054
0.3947
0.0479

SE
0.6049
0.2246
0.4817
0.3957
0.5162
0.2988
0.2989
0.2247
0.4284

Pr > ChiSq
0.2159
0.0832
0.0351
0.0288
0.0034
0.0072
0.0071
0.0790
0.9109

Odds Ratio
0.678
0.362
2.374
4.539
2.233
2.238
1.484
1.049

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1745.

Logistic Regression Results for il-,s (after Inclusion of Representation Types)
and H afi.The above analysis does not account for representation influence on appellant
success. As displayed in Table 4.36, further clarification o f the results by adding
representation type into the model shows a different conclusion. The party strength
variables still have the unexpected sign. However, only the appellee strength variable is
significant (p>0.0039). The presumed weaker appellees significantly outperform the
presumed stronger appellees. Compared with other issues, except procedure and
administration disputes, income tax issues are associated with significantly higher
appellants’ success probabilities (p>0.0277). Despite o f the unexpected signs, appellant
and appellee representation types (pro se vs. lawyer) do not significantly correlate with
case results.
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Table 4.36
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Appellate Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Appellant Strength
Appellee Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Appellant (Lawyer Representation)
Appellee (Lawyer Representation)

Estimate
-5.9914
-0.1510
1.1060
1.2432
0.8034
0.5448
0.5144
-0.2616
3.3231

SE
7.4327
0.4650
0.3833
0.5648
0.5900
0.3625
0.8406
0.5894
7.1988

Pr > ChiSq
0.4202
0.7453
0.0039
0.0277
0.1732
0.1328
0.5406
0.6571
0.6444

Odds Ratio
0.860
3.022
3.467
2.233
1.724
1.673
0.770
27.745

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2482.

Tables 4.37 and 4.38 display logistic regression results after substituting party
strength variables with party dummy variables. First, the three parties under investigation
do not have significantly different success probabilities as appellants. However,
individual appellees significantly outperform business and the federal government
appellees (p<0.05).

But no significant difference is found between business and the

federal government appellees. Overall, two out o f the eight party dummy variables have
the expected signs. Appellant and appellee representation types (pro se vs. lawyer) are
not significantly correlated with appellants’ success probabilities, even though they have
unexpected signs.
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Table 4.37
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
( Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)
(Appellate Courts)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Individual Appellant
Business Appellant
Individual Appellee
Business Appellee
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Appellant (Lawyer Representation)
Appellee (Lawyer Representation)

Estimate
-3.9524
0.9787
1.0378
-1.8820
0.0757
1.1294
0.7155
0.4128
0.4490
-0.2527
3.4207

SE
7.3014
1.1059
0.8987
0.9066
0.9184
0.6705
0.6757
0.3817
0.8564
0.5882
7.1988

Pr > ChiSq
0.5883
0.3762
0.2482
0.0379
0.9343
0.0921
0.2896
0.2795
0.6001
0.6674
0.6347

Odds Ratio
2.661
2.823
0.152
1.079
3.094
2.045
1.511
1.567
0.777
30.592

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0 .0001, Max--rescaled R-Square=0..2592.

Table 4.38
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Appellate Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Business)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Business Appellant
Government Appellant
Business Appellee
Government Appellee
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Appellant (Lawyer Representation)
Appellee (Lawyer Representation)

Estimate
-5.8486
0.0528
-0.9996
1.9907
1.9025
1.1370

SE
11.8617
0.8066
1.1104
0.7661
0.9096
0.6719

Pr > ChiSq
0.6220
0.9478
0.3680
0.0094
0.0365
0.0906

Odds Ratio

0.7157

0.6767

0.2903

2.046

0.4194
0.4554
-0.2633
4.4036

0.3829
0.8581
0.5916
11.7935

0.2734
0.5956
0.6563
0.7089

1.521
1.577
0.769
81.748

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2594.
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1.054
0.368
7.321
6.703
3.117
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Cases involve only solo or group representations are selected for comparison of
solo vs. firm representation influence on case results. According to Table 4.39, party
strength variables have signs that are opposite o f their expected signs. Appellee strength
is positively associated with appellants success possibilities (p>0.0411). The stronger the
appellee is, then, the higher chance that the appellant wins the case. Even though the
effect is not statistically significant, group represented appellants have higher chances of
winning than solo represented appellants. On the other hand, group represented appellees
underperform solo represented appellees (p>0.0891). Issues involved and forums used do
not contribute significantly to case results.

Table 4.39
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Appellate Courts: Solo vs. Group)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Appellant Strength
Appellee Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Appellant (Group Representation)
Appellee (Group Representation)

Estimate
-3.7891
-0.8323
1.4905
1.5615
1.7406
0.6410
0.3802
0.2208
0.6919

SE
3.3656
0.9072
0.7297
0.9861
1.4526
0.3836
0.8585
0.3900
0.4069

Pr > ChiSq
0.2602
0.3589
0.0411
0.1133
0.2308
0.0947
0.6579
0.5714
0.0891

Odds Ratio
0.435
4.439
4.766
5.700
1.898
1.463
1.247
1.998

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2695.

Tables 4.40 and 4.41 report test results after substituting party strength variables
with party dummy variables. Three out o f the eight party dummy variables have expected
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signs. None o f the party dummy variables is significantly associated with case results.
For appellants, group representation is positively associated with appellants possibilities
o f success, but on an insignificant level. On the other hand, appellees are better off with
solo rather than group representation, but it is only marginally significant (0.05<p<0.10).
Consistent with the test results using party strength variables, issues involved and forums
used do not significantly influence case results.

Table 4.40
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Solo vs. Group, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)
(Appellate Courts)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Individual Appellant
Business Appellant
Individual Appellee
Business Appellee
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Appellant (Group Representation)
Appellee (Group Representation)

Estimate
-0.3401
2.3965
1.4120
4.8413
5.9055
3.5994
3.3517
0.6380
0.3990
0.2165
0.7367

SE
1.4908
2.1343
1.2310
5.4232
5.0180
1.9600
2.1638
0.4127
0.8896
0.3964
0.4117

Pr > ChiSq
0.8196
0.2615
0.2514
0.3720
0.2393
0.0663
0.1214
0.1221
0.6537
0.5850
0.0735

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0 .0001, Max--rescaled R-Square=0,.2813.
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Odds Ratio
10.985
4.104
126.637
367.039
36.575
28.550
1.893
1.490
1.242
2.089
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Table 4.41
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Appellate Courts: Solo vs. Group, Individual vs., Business)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Business Appellant
Government Appellant
Business Appellee
Government Appellee
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
District Court
Claims Court
Appellant (Group)
Appellee (Group)

Estimate
3.7595
-0.5472
-1.7716
1.4101
-2.7178
2.6750
2.4523
0.4344
0.2775
0.1768
0.6757

SE
6.7546
1.0728
1.9255
0.7737
5.1048
1.6958
1.8805
0.3926
0.8556
0.3817
0.4072

Pr > ChiSq
0.5778
0.6100
0.3575
0.0684
0.5944
0.1147
0.1922
0.2685
0.7457
0.6432
0.0971

Odds Ratio
0.579
0.170
4.096
0.066
14.512
11.615
1.544
1.320
1.193
1.965

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2745.

Further Analysis of Pro Se Appellants in Federal Appellate Courts. Although
pro se plaintiffs significantly outperform lawyer represented plaintiffs in trial courts, pro
se appellants do not enjoy the same advantage in Federal Appellate Courts. This inquiry
further analyzes pro se appellants in Federal Appellate Courts and compares it with trial
courts results.
Table 4.42 includes Federal Appellate Court cases that disclose the amount in
dispute. This study collected a total o f 286 Federal Appellate Court cases with amount in
dispute. Only 13% (38 cases) o f them are initiated by pro se appellants. As mentioned
earlier, 223 (35%) o f the 637 trial court cases with available amounts in dispute are
started by pro se plaintiffs. Thus, pro se is not as popular a choice for appellants in
Federal Appellate Courts as it is for plaintiffs in trial courts.
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In trial courts, pro se plaintiffs try to settle income tax or procedure and
administration issues 98% o f the time and pro se plaintiffs have a much lower median
amount in dispute than cases with attorney or undisclosed representation plaintiffs.
According to Tables 4.42 and 4.43, pro se appellants appeal in Federal Appellate Courts
100% o f the time for income tax or procedure and administration issues. The median
amount in dispute for pro se appellants is only 9% o f the amount for other appellants.
As shows in Table 4.44, the most often disputed Section for pro se appellants is
§6213, while other appellants most often disagree upon §§104, 6323, 6653, and 6672.
Recall that, except in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims, pro se plaintiffs focus on
different IRC Sections compared with other plaintiffs in trial courts.
Even though pro se is not as popular among appellants in Federal Appellate
Courts as it is among plaintiffs in trial courts, the characteristics o f pro se appellants are
consistent with those o f pro se plaintiffs. However, pro se appellants do not enjoy the
same success in Federal Appellate Courts as pro se plaintiffs in trial courts.
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Table 4.42
Comparison o f Federal Appellate Court Cases
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
No. o f Cases
with Pro Se
Plaintiffs

Issues Involved

Procedure and
Administration
38 in Total.
All by
Individuals.

Income Taxes

No. o f Cases with
Lawyer or
Undisclosed
Representation
Plaintiffs

Issues Involved

21

17

248 in Total.
142 by Individuals;
62 by Businesses; 44
by the Government.

Income Taxes
Procedure and
Administration
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes

97
122
16
7
6

Table 4.43
Amount in Dispute for Federal Appellate Court Cases
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs
High

Low

Median

4,676,578

1,548

13,357.45

Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation
Plaintiffs
High
Low
Median
85,000,000

772
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Table 4.44
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Federal Appellate Court Cases
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs
IRC
Section

§6213

Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation
Plaintiffs
IRC Section
No. o f Times Appearing
as Major Issue

No. o f Times
Appearing
as Major Issue
3

§6653
§6323
§6672
§104

7
8
14
16

Further Analysis of Solo Represented Appellants in Federal Appellate
Courts. Solo represented plaintiffs significantly outperform group represented plaintiffs
in trial courts. However, the same result is not found for solo represented appellants in
Federal Appellate Courts. This research further analyzes solo represented appellants and
compares the results with solo represented plaintiffs in trial courts.
Individual appellants use solo representation more often than group representation
while business and the federal government appellants use group representation more
often than solo representation. Group represented appellants bring many more estate and
gift tax cases to court than solo represented appellants. Solo and group represented
appellants all focus on §§104 and 6672. Solo represented appellants also focus on
§§6015, 6321, and 6653 while group represented appellants focus on §§2036 and 6323.
The median amount in dispute for solo represented appellants is only 30% o f that amount
compared to group represented appellants.
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As mentioned before, in trial courts, individuals plaintiffs tend to choose solo
representation while businesses and the federal government tend to choose group
representation. Solo and group represented plaintiffs focus on different IRC Sections.
Solo represented plaintiffs have a much lower median amount in dispute compared with
group represented plaintiffs. In Federal Appellate Courts, individual appellants tend to
choose solo representation while businesses and the federal government tend to choose
group representation. Solo and group represented appellants generally have different tax
issues. The median amount in dispute for solo represented appellants is 70% lower than
that of group represented appellants. Thus, the general characteristics o f solo represented
plaintiffs in trial courts are consistent with the general characteristics o f solo represented
appellants in Federal Appellate Courts. Consequently, it is the judicial forum, not the
different characteristics o f solo represented plaintiffs, that makes them significantly
outperform group represented plaintiffs in trial courts. The above results are summarized
in Tables 4.45, 4.46, and 4.47.
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Table 4.45
Comparison o f Federal Appellate Court Cases (Solo vs. Group Representation)
No. of Cases
with Pro Se
Plaintiffs

Issues Involved

113 in Total.
84 by
Individuals;
22 by
Businesses;
7 by the
Government.

No. o f Cases with
Lawyer or
Undisclosed
Representation
Plaintiffs

Procedure and
Administration

67

Income Taxes

41

Estate and Gift
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes
Employment
Taxes

2
2

Issues Involved

Income Taxes
135 in Total.
58 by Individuals;
40 by Businesses;
37 by the
Government.

1

Procedure and
Administration
Estate and Gift
Taxes
Employment
Taxes
Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes

56
55
14
6
4

Table 4.46
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Federal Appellate Court Cases
(Solo vs. Group Representation)
Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation
Plaintiffs
IRC Section
No. o f Times Appearing
as Major Issue

Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs
IRC
Section
§6015
§6321
§6653
fcO(»72
§104

No. of Times
Appearing
as Major Issue
4
4
4
4
5

§6323
§2036
§6672

5
6
10

§104

11
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Table 4.47
Amount in Dispute for Federal Appellate Court Cases
(Solo vs. Group Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs
High

Low

Median

85,000,000

1,791

88,768.7

Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation
Plaintiffs
High
Low
Median
80,000,000

772

300,000

Conclusion for Appellate Court Cases-Research
Questions Five and Six
Without accounting for representation types, individual appellants significantly
outperform the federal government appellants, and individual appellees significantly
outperform the federal government appellees. Business and individual appellants’ success
probabilities do not differ significantly. However, individual appellees significantly
outperform business appellees. A comparison o f business and the federal government
litigants does not show significant results, either as an appellant or as an appellee. After
taking into consideration representation types (pro se vs. lawyer), the three parties under
investigation do not show significantly different success probabilities as appellant.
Individual appellees significantly outperform both business and the federal government
appellees. Logistic analysis using cases that involve only solo or group representations
shows that the three litigant parties do not differ significantly either as an appellant or as
an appellee. However, individuals seem to have a limited advantage over businesses and
the federal government in appellate courts; businesses and the federal government have
about the same power. The results do not support Ha5 -
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Representation type does not contribute significantly to case results in appellate
courts. Litigants seem to be better off via pro se than lawyer representation, but the effect
is not significant. For lawyer represented litigants, group represented appellants
outperform solo represented appellants and group represented appellees underperform
solo represented appellees, but at an insignificant level. Ha6 is rejected for appellate court
cases.
Test Results for U.S. Supreme
Court Cases
Table 4.48 presents appellant success rates for the three categories o f litigants in
the U.S. Supreme Court. Individual appellants are less successful than businesses, which
are less successful than the U.S. government (appellant success rate is 20%, 40%, and
78.9% for individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government, respectively). The combined
success rates in Table 4.49 resemble the picture (combined success rate is 18.8%, 30.8%,
75.9% for individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government, respectively). Overall, the
federal government is twice as successful as businesses in the U.S. Supreme Court, which
are in turn twice as successful as individuals.

Table 4.48
Winning and Losing by Nature o f Party (the U.S. Supreme Court)

Appellant
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.
Total

Individual
N
%
NA
NA
NA
NA
11
81.8
11
81.8

Respondent
Business
U.S. Gov.
N
N
%
%
N A NA
20
5
40
5
NA NA
NA
75
NA
8
30
75
10
8
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Total
%
20
40
78.9
62.1

N
5
5
19
29
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Table 4.49 shows the net advantage for each category o f litigant. The net
advantage measure might be a better indicator o f litigation success than the raw rates
because it is unaffected by the relative frequency with which various classes o f litigants
appear as an appellant rather than an appellee. If there is a propensity to affirm (or
reverse) in the U.S. Supreme Court, this propensity does not affect the net advantage
index. The net advantage confirms that the presumed stronger party, most notably the
federal government, has greater success compared to individual or business litigants.
Only the federal government has a positive net advantage (48.9%), followed by
businesses (-35%), whereas the score for individuals is -61.8%.

Table 4.49
Success Rates by Nature o f Party (the U.S. Supreme Court)

Type o f Party
Individual
Business
U.S. Gov.

Success Rate
as Appellant
20.0
40.0
78.9

When Respondent,
Opponents'
Success Rate
81.8
75.0
30.0

Net Advantage
-61.8
-35.0
48.9

Combined Success Rate
as Appellant
and Respondent
18.8
30.8
75.9

Cases in which different categories o f litigants directly face one another are then
chosen. Table 4.50 shows the net advantages o f various pairings o f litigants. In every
matchup, the presumed stronger party enjoys a net advantage. The federal government
enjoys a net advantage o f 62.8% over individuals and 35% over businesses. Individuals
versus businesses net advantage is not calculated due to lack o f data.
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Table 4.50
Net Advantage for Different Combination o f Parties (the U.S. Supreme Court)
Combination o f Parties
Individual vs. Business
Individual vs. U.S. Gov.
Business vs. U.S. Gov.

Net Advantage
NA
U.S. Gov. by 61.8%
U.S. Gov. by 35%

Although the analysis o f bivariate relationships presented above produced results
that are consistent with the thesis that litigant status and strength are significantly related
to rates o f appellants successes, nevertheless, this thesis can only be provisionally
supported until the effects o f potential influential variables are examined. Table 4.51
reports the logistic regression results after accounting for tax issues. The full model is
only marginally significant (p>0.0555). Although insignificant, appellant and appellee
strength variables have signs that are different than those expected. That is, the presumed
stronger litigant parties have lower chances o f winning a case than the presumed weaker
litigant parties, but the effect is below the conventional significance level. The federal
tax issues involved do not significantly influence case results. Due to data limitations,
further analysis using party dummy variables instead o f party strength variables is not
attempted for Supreme Court cases.
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Table 4.51
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in the U.S. Supreme Court

Independent Variable
Intercept
Appellant Strength
Appellee Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue

Estimate
2.9483
-1.4981
0.4766
-1.5909
-0.4088

SE
5.5819
1.3102
1.0830
1.3846
1.3746

Pr > ChiSq
0.5974
0.2529
0.6599
0.2506
0.7662

Odds Ratio
0.224
1.611
0.204
0.664

Note: Dependent Variable = Verdict. M odel p>0.0555, Max-rescaled R -Square=0.3711.

Table 4.52 displays logistic regression results by adding representation type (solo
vs. group) into the model. The full model is not significant. Party strength variables still
have unexpected signs and are not significant at a conventional level. Issues involved are
not significantly correlated with case results either. Group represented litigants seem to
underperform solo represented litigants, either as an appellant or as an appellee, although
at an insignificant level.
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Table 4.52
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(the U.S. Supreme Court: Solo vs. Group)

Independent Variable
Intercept
Appellant Strength
Appellee Strength
Income Tax Issue
Procedure and Administration Issue
Appellant (Group Representation)
Appellee (Group Representation)

Estimate
3.4792
-1.5525
0.3075
-2.0608
-0.4820
-0.6089
0.8619

SE
5.6257
1.3098
1.1063
1.4833
1.4043
2.0243
2.0124

Pr > ChiSq
0.5363
0.2359
0.7810
0.1647
0.7314
0.7636
0.6684

Odds Ratio
0.212
1.360
0.127
0.618
0.544
2.368

Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p> 0.1762, Max--rescaled R-Square=0 .3958.

Although the Sixth Amendment offers litigants the right to self-represent, the
Supreme Court cases collected for this study do not involve pro se representation. This
study observes a decreased rate o f pro se representation when the judicial level ascends
from the trial court. As mentioned earlier, for trial court cases, around 34.5% o f cases
involve pro se litigants. The number decreases to 16.4% for the appellate court cases, and
to 0% for the Supreme Court cases.
Conclusion for Supreme Court Cases-Research
Questions Five and Six
Notwithstanding that the appellant success rate, combined success rate, and net
advantage all show that the federal government is the most successful party in the U.S.
Supreme Court, followed by businesses, and individuals are the weakest in litigation,
which are in support o f Party Capability Theory, logistic regression shows opposite
results. Without considering representation types, the presumed stronger litigant parties
have a lower chance of winning a case than the presumed weaker litigant parties, but the
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effect is below the conventional significance level. The same results are found after
taking into consideration representation types (solo vs. group). Ha5 is not supported for
Supreme Court cases.
Representation type does not contribute significantly to case results in the U.S.
Supreme Court. Litigants seem to be better off solo than having group representation,
either as an appellant or as an appellee, but the effect is not significant. Ha6 is rejected for
Supreme Court cases.

Comparison with Prior Studies
Prior to the current study, the work that analyzes research questions one through
four is Wanner (1974). As discussed in Chapter Two, Wanner (1974) uses trial court
records o f 1965-1970. Wanner concludes that, for trial court cases in general,
organizations make up almost half o f the plaintiffs, individuals approximately 42%, and
government only constitutes about 9% o f the plaintiffs; individuals make up the majority
o f defendants (67%), organizations follow (26%), and the government is only the
defendant less than 6% o f the time. In contrast, the current study concludes that for
federal tax cases in trial courts, individuals are the majority plaintiff (75.29%), businesses
and the federal government only constitute 17.42%, and 7.29% o f the plaintiffs,
respectively; the federal government is the only defendant in the U.S. Tax Court and the
U.S. Court o f Federal Claims and it is the defendant in about 75% o f the U.S. District
Court cases under study. Thus, the most frequent plaintiffs for trial court cases in general

are organizations and in trial court federal tax disputes are individuals. The majority
defendants for trial court cases in general are individuals and for trial court federal tax
disagreement is the federal government. Wanner (1974) finds individuals bring different

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

kinds o f disputes to the judicial system than do organizations and governments. This is
consistent with the current study’s result that there is a significant relationship between
the type o f plaintiff and the type o f tax issue being brought to trial courts. Wanner (1974)
finds that all categories o f defendants most often appear in three types o f suits while the
current study concludes a significant relationship between the type o f defendant and the
issue involved.
For the three types o f success rate analysis (appellate success rate, combined
success rate, and net advantage), the current study reaches more dramatic conclusions
than previous researches. According to Table 4.53, the government has the highest
appellate success rate, combined success rate and net advantage in the current study. Its
net advantage in previous studies ranges from 11.8% to 32.3%, while it is 42.9% in the
current study. Businesses and individuals are far less successful in the current study than
in previous studies. Businesses’ (Individuals’) net advantage ranges from -2.8% to 3.1%
(-12.6% to -1.5%) in prior studies and it is -19.2% (-50.6%) in the current study. The
results seem to indicate that the federal government enjoys a bigger advantage in federal
tax cases than cases in general in appellate courts.
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Table 4.53
Comparison o f Various Studies: Success Rates

Success Rate
as Appellant
Combined
Success Rate
Net
Advantage

Wheeler et al. (1987),
State Supreme Court Cases
City & Businesses Individuals
State
Gov.
48.2%
41.6%
38.5%

Success Rate
as Appellant
Combined
Success Rate
Net
Advantage

Songer et al. (1999),
U.S. Courts o f Appeals Cases
Businesses Individuals
U.S.
Gov.
51.3%

30.8%

26.1%

60.2%

50.2%

48.1%

70%

48.2%

35.1%

11.8%

3.1%

-1.5%

25.6%

-2.8%

-12.6%

Farole (1999),
State Supreme Court Cases
41.1%
68.7%
45.2%

Current Study,
U.S. Courts o f Appeals Cases
23.4
16.1
60.4

65.2%

49.1%

43.1%

79.7

32.4

17.9

32.3%

-2.4%

-12.5%

42.9

-19.2

-50.6

Comparison o f logistic regression results with prior studies shows opposite
conclusions. As displayed in Table 4.54, prior studies find positive evidence in support of
Party Capability Theory. The current study finds evidence that is contrary to Party
Capability Theory.
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Table 4.54
Comparison o f Various Studies: Logistic Regression
Independent
Variable

Appellant
Respondent

Songer
et
al.
(1999), Cases of
U.S. Courts o f
Appeals
Estimate
0.33**
-0.10**

* Significant at 0.05

Farole (1999),
State Supreme
Court Cases

Current Study (Before Control
o f Representation
Effects),
Cases o f U.S. Courts o f Appeals

Estimate
0.248***
-0.033

Estimate
-0.4346*
0.8241***

** Significant at 0.01

***Significant at 0.001

Although the success rate analysis does not contradict Party Capability Theory and
is consistent with previous studies, logistic analysis in the current study finds opposite
results compared to prior studies. That is, Patty Capability Theory does not appear to
apply to federal tax cases. The presumed stronger party does win more often than the
presumed weaker party, but it is for reasons other than party strength. One possible
explanation might be: The presumed stronger party can absorb moderate losses and is
less likely to file a frivolous law suit. On the other hand, the presumed weaker party has
too much at stake on one case to play odds. Consequently, the presumed weaker party
files many more frivolous suits than the presumed stronger party. This makes the success
rate o f the weaker party much lower than the stronger party. But once the weaker party
does file a reasonable case, it actually outperforms the presumed stronger parties in
federal tax disputes.
Only Wheeler et al. (1987) considers representation effects on case results. Due to
the scarcity o f pro se cases, that study was unable to investigate the pro se representation
influence on the success rate at litigation o f the party at issue. The study does conclude
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that, with few exceptions, the weaker appellant, when represented by a law firm against
the stronger respondent’s solo practitioner, does far better than when the reverse occurs.
The current study does find that appellants are better off using group representation
instead o f solo representation, although at an insignificant level. However, the current
study also concludes that appellees with solo representation outperform appellees with
group representation, and it reaches a marginal significance level.

Summary
The purpose o f this chapter is to present the results o f the data analysis and tests o f
hypotheses. For trial courts and Federal Appellate Courts, individuals initiate the majority
o f the cases under study. The federal government is the major defendant/appellee. For
the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. government initiates most o f the cases under study. No
significantly different frequencies are found for the three groups under study appearing as
appellee before the U.S. Supreme Court. Procedure and administration disputes and
income tax issues are the two major reasons litigants go to trial and appellate courts. On
the other hand, appellants bring to the U.S. Supreme Court a very broad range o f issues.
Even though success rate analysis shows that the presumed stronger party does win
more often in court, logistic regression results do not support Party Capability Theory.
After controlling for representation types, plaintiff/appellant category is not significantly
correlated with case results. However, individual appellees significantly outperform both
business and the federal government appellees in Federal Appellate Courts. In trial

courts, pro se plaintiffs perform significantly better than attorney represented plaintiffs;
solo represented plaintiffs significantly outperform group represented plaintiffs. Group
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represented appellees underperform solo represented appellees in Federal Appellate
Courts at a marginally significant level.
Chapter Five includes a summary and discussion o f the results o f this research
effort. Implications and limitations o f the study are disclosed and recommendations for
further research are presented.
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CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose o f this chapter is to summarize the findings o f this research inquiry on
Party Capability Theory. The primary research objective is to investigate different
litigants’ strength in court on federal tax issues. Each step toward meeting this objective
is outlined in the chapter summaries that follow. Next, conclusions relative to the tests of
hypotheses are discussed. Implications and limitations o f the study are disclosed and
recommendations for further research are presented.

Summary of Previous Chapters
As discussed in Chapter One, understanding who wins in court is an essential
component o f a full appreciation o f the authoritative allocation o f values in society. Party
Capability Theory hypothesizes that “repeat players” fare better in courts and are better
able to influence legal change than “one shotters.” It also points out that legal services
accentuate the RP advantage. The theory becomes most visible and is widely cited in the
law and society field. However, it has not been utilized in accounting academic research,
and understanding judicial reallocation in federal taxation area has considerable

importance. Most prior Party Capability Theory studies have ignored legal representation,
especially pro se representation and its influence. The growing importance o f pro se
representation in federal tax cases mandates evidence to address this research gap.
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Chapter Two includes a review o f relevant prior studies. While the approaches in
Party Capability Theory studies vary significantly, classification o f litigants into groups
and making general assumptions o f the strength o f each group has been widely used.
Since Wheeler et al. (1987), net advantage analysis has become an essential component
o f Party Capability Theory study. Logistic regression is commonly used to control for
other influential factors in litigation. Prior empirical analysis o f Party Capability Theory
provides evidence that: (1) The presumed stronger parties do enjoy certain advantages in
U.S. trial courts, U.S. Court o f Appeals, and state supreme courts in the United States;
and

(2) Party Capability Theory does not apply to the U.S. Supreme Court. Party

Capability Theory has not been generalized to federal tax cases. Prior research on pro se
representation has been merely analytical. The general conclusion is that the pro se
party’s unfamiliarity with rules often leads to his/her failure in court. However, no
empirical research on pro se representation has been attempted, and further consideration
o f the topic is warranted.
The methodology used in this study is developed and outlined in Chapter Three.
This study is the first empirical analysis o f Party Capability Theory for federal tax cases,
and is the first to consider pro se representation influence on case results. The research
sample for the study consists o f 1,010 trial court cases, 744 appellate court cases, and 29
U.S. Supreme Court cases rendered from 1992 through 2006. Appellate success rate,
combined success rate, and net advantage analysis are used. To further control for other
influential variables, logistic regression is selected as the most appropriate statistical tool.
Chapter Four presents the analysis o f research results. Success rate analysis
indicates that the presumed stronger party does win more often in court. However,
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logistic regression yields different results. The following section presents conclusions for
each of the study’s six research questions.

Summary of Conclusions
The following six research questions are presented in this study for investigation:
1. Who litigates?
2. What do litigants seek satisfaction in the courts?
3. Who is being sued/appealed?
4. Why is the defendant/appellee being sued/appealed?
5. What are the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the United States
government in litigation on federal tax issues?
6. Do different types o f representation before the court (pro se, solo, and group
representation) have an effect on the judicial success rates o f individuals,
businesses, and the federal government?
Chi-square tests o f goodness o f fit indicate the three groups o f litigants have
significantly different frequencies o f being plaintiff/appellant or defendant/appellee.
Individuals initiate the majority o f trial court and Federal Appellate Court cases under
study. The U.S. government initiates most o f the U.S. Supreme court cases under study.
The federal government is the major defendant/appellee for the trial court and Federal
Appellate Court cases. No significantly different frequencies are found for the three
groups under study appearing as appellee in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Procedure and administration disputes and income tax issues are the two major
reasons that litigants go to trial and the appellate process. Appellants bring to the U.S.
Supreme Court a very broad range o f issues. Test results for trial court and Federal
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cases
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defendant/appellee and the issue involved.
While success rate analysis shows that the presumed stronger party does win more
often in court, logistic regression results do not support Party Capability Theory. For trial
court cases, after control for representation types, litigant category is not significantly
correlated with case results; contrary to expectation, pro se plaintiffs perform
significantly better than lawyer represented plaintiffs; solo represented plaintiffs
significantly outperform group represented plaintiffs; defendant representation type does
not significantly contribute to judicial results.
For appellate court cases, after accounting for representation types, the three parties
under investigation do not show significantly different success probabilities as plaintiff;
however, individual appellees significantly outperform both business and federal
government appellees; litigants seem to be better off as pro se than with attorney
representation, but the effect is not significant; group represented appellants outperform
solo represented appellants to an insignificant level; on the other hand, group represented
appellees underperform solo represented appellees at a marginally significant level.
For U.S. Supreme Court cases, after accounting for representation effect, the
presumed stronger litigant parties have a lower chance of winning a case than the
presumed weaker litigant parties, but the effect is below the conventional significance
level; litigants seem to do better solo than with group representation, either as appellant
or as appellee, but the effect is not significant.
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Chapter Five includes a summary and discussion o f the results o f this research
effort. Implications and limitations o f the study are disclosed and recommendations for
further research are presented.
Although success rate analysis in this study produces consistent results with prior
studies, logistic regression results o f the current study are in contrast to prior inquires.
Therefore, Party Capability Theory cannot be generalized to federal tax cases.

Implications
Notwithstanding that a number o f studies have shown advantages for stronger
parties in litigation, there is some question as to whether it applies specifically to federal
tax cases. Based on an examination o f litigant success in recent years at different levels o f
tax jurisprudence, this study does not find support for Party Capability Theory in federal
tax cases. In fact, the judicial system seems to tilt to the weaker parties. Stability is
assured when society at large agrees on the rules. When a large proportion o f the
population is discontent with the federal tax system, security is threatened. To limit
opposition, the judicial system has to sufficiently ensure the acceptance o f the social
order. By favoring the “have nots” in decisions, courts can in fact boost the public belief
in the federal tax system.
The findings o f this study have practical implications for those who are considering
going to court or are in the middle o f federal tax litigation disputes. The results provide a
useful foundation for addressing the issue o f when a litigant should represent
himself/herself or hire a lawyer or group o f lawyers. Since hiring professionals can be
costly, a rational litigant would do a cost benefit analysis and make the decision to hire a
lawyer or lawyers only if the expected savings from professional representation would be
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greater than the cost o f representation. This paper provides empirical evidence that
professional representation does not result in a higher success possibility in federal tax
cases. For plaintiffs using trial courts, pro se performs significantly better than lawyer
representation; solo representation significantly outperforms group representation. For
appellees in Federal Appellate Courts, solo representation performs marginally
significantly better than group representation.

Limitations
This research is based on court decisions between 1992 and 2006. Logistic
regression functions are developed to test the strength o f various litigants. The potential
effect o f factors not included in the sample on the model is unknown. Specifically, three
categories o f factors are not reflected in the model: (1) How soundly justified is a
particular law suit? Litigants filing frivolous lawsuits do not have a chance to win
whether they are lawyer represented or pro se. Coding cases into strong or weak should
improve the results. However, subjectivity o f the coder will negatively influence the
results. This inquiry chooses not to code case strength. (2) Judges ideologies are
interwoven with case results. Previous studies note that judges appointed by Democratic
presidents are more likely to support liberal decisions than judges appointed by
Republicans (Goldman 1975; Gottschall 1986). Unfortunately, the current study does not
have the necessary information to gauge judges ideologies. (3) Only the major federal tax
issue involved in a case is coded. How issues other than the major issue influence a case
result is not shown. However, including minor issues into the logistic model will distort
the effect o f the major issues on case results. This study chooses not to include minor
issues into the model.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
This study is also limited to the extent that representation type is not fully
disclosed in court records. Ideal classification o f representation types would be: pro se,
solo, and firm representation.

Sole practitioners should be classified as solo

representation and law firm should be classified as firm representation. The limited
information from the case heading does not allow clear classification o f representation
type into solo or firm representation. This study thus adopts an alternative coding
strategy. Instead o f classifying as solo or firm representation, this study classifies as solo
or group representation. This coding strategy eliminates subjective factors in coding
representation types, but it also potentially decreases the explanatory power o f
representation types.
Application o f the logistic regression model may be limited due to the subjective
nature o f the dependent variable. This study codes a case result as plaintiff/appellant wins
if the plaintiff/appellant only partially wins the verdict, as long as the winning amount
exceeds 50 percent o f the amount under dispute. How this coding strategy influences the
results is unknown.
The results o f this investigation are based on data from the United States. Other
countries have different tax systems, further study is needed to generalize the results to an
international level.

Suggestions for Future Research
The limitations noted above suggest possible extensions for other studies. An easy
to use, and relatively objective case strength coding system can be developed. The
introduction of case strength variable into the model will decrease noise caused by
frivolous law suits, and a judge’s ideology factor could be controlled by utilizing a
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stratified sample selection. By sorting out cases decided by different judges, then
randomly selecting a certain amount o f cases decided by each judge, direct testing o f
judge effects is possible. The limitation o f this method is that the sample is not
representative o f the population because the cases included in the sample have to be
decided by only one judge.
The dependent variable coding becomes subjective in a partial verdict. Future
research could consider only cases won completely by one litigating party should solve
this problem. Comparison o f party distribution and issues involved in the biased sample
with the population could provide interesting insight as to who completely wins more
often in court and on what type o f issue.
The tax system varies significantly across countries. The maturity level,
complexity, and economic background o f a tax system can all contribute to a tax case
results. The United States has a very mature and complex tax system. This system is
based on a highly developed economy. Data from a developing country with a young,
simple tax system, like China, might produce totally different results.

Summary
This study provides evidence that Party Capability Theory does not apply to
federal tax cases. The presumed weaker party seems to have a higher success probability
in court. The general belief that pro se litigants often are in a disadvantaged position in
court does not apply to federal tax cases. On the contrary, in trial courts, plaintiffs are

significantly better in representing themselves rather than seeking professional
representation.
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The study is limited in that it is only based on domestic data. Further, the
dependent variable in the model is subject to a degree of subjectivity. Nevertheless,
findings of this study should be o f value to those who are litigants in federal tax
controversies.
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APPENDIX B

I.R.C. SECTIONS USED IN THE ANALYSIS

Sec. 61. Gross income defined.
(a) General definition. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et
seq.], gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not
limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar
items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge o f indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share o f partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect o f a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
***
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Sec. 72. Annuities; certain proceeds o f endowment and life insurance contracts.
(a) General rule for annuities. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter [26 USCS §§
1 et seq.], gross income includes any amount received as an annuity (whether for a period
certain or during one or more lives) under an annuity, endowment, or life insurance
contract.
(b) Exclusion ratio.
(1) In general. Gross income does not include that part o f any amount received as an
annuity under an annuity, endowment, or life insurance contract which bears the same
ratio to such amount as the investment in the contract (as o f the annuity starting date)
bears to the expected return under the contract (as o f such date).
(2) Exclusion limited to investment. The portion o f any amount received as an annuity
which is excluded from gross income under paragraph (1) shall not exceed the
unrecovered investment in the contract immediately before the receipt o f such amount.
***
(c) Definitions.
(1)
Investment in the contract. For purposes o f subsection (b), the investment in the
contract as o f the annuity starting date is—
(A) the aggregate amount o f premiums or other consideration paid for the contract,
minus
(B) the aggregate amount received under the contract before such date, to the extent
that such amount was excludable from gross income under this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et
seq.] or prior income tax laws.
***
(d) Special rules for qualified employer retirement plans.
(1) Simplified method o f taxing annuity payments.
(A)
In general. In the case o f any amount received as an annuity under a qualified
employer retirement plan—
(i) subsection (b) shall not apply, and
(ii) the investment in the contract shall be recovered as provided in this paragraph.
***
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Sec. 104. Compensation for injuries or sickness.
(a) In general. Except in the case o f amounts attributable to (and not in excess of)
deductions allowed under section 213 [26 USCS § 213] (relating to medical, etc.,
expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include—
(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal
injuries or sickness;
(2) the amount o f any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit
or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account o f personal
physical injuries or physical sickness;
(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance (or through an arrangement
having the effect o f accident or health insurance) for personal injuries or sickness (other
than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to
contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income o f the
employee, or (B) are paid by the employer);
(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or
sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces o f any country or in the Coast
and Geodetic Survey or the Public Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable
under the provisions o f section 808 o f the Foreign Service Act o f 1980 [22 USCS §
4048]; and
(5) amounts received by an individual as disability income attributable to injuries
incurred as a direct result o f a terroristic or military action (as defined in section
692(c)(2) [26 USCS § 692(c)(2)]).
* * *
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Sec. 151. Allowance o f deductions for personal exemptions [Caution: See prospective
amendment note below.].
(a) Allowance o f deductions. In the case o f an individual, the exemptions provided by
this section shall be allowed as deductions in computing taxable income.
(b) Taxpayer and spouse. An exemption o f the exemption amount for the taxpayer; and
an additional exemption o f the exemption amount for the spouse o f the taxpayer if a joint
return is not made by the taxpayer and his spouse, and if the spouse, for the calendar year
in which the taxable year o f the taxpayer begins, has no gross income and is not the
dependent o f another taxpayer.
(c) Additional exemption for dependents. An exemption o f the exemption amount for
each individual who is a dependent (as defined in section 152 [26 USCS § 152]) o f the
taxpayer for the taxable year.
(d) Exemption amount * * *
(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the term 'exemption
amount' means $ 2,000.
(2) Exemption amount disallowed in case o f certain dependents. In the case o f an
individual with respect to whom a deduction under this section is allowable to another
taxpayer for a taxable year beginning in the calendar year in which the individual's
taxable year begins, the exemption amount applicable to such individual for such
individual's taxable year shall be zero.
(3) Phaseout.
(A) In general. In the case o f any taxpayer whose adjusted gross income for the
taxable year exceeds the threshold amount, the exemption amount shall be reduced by the
applicable percentage.
(B) Applicable percentage. For purposes o f subparagraph (A), the term 'applicable
percentage' means 2 percentage points for each $ 2,500 (or fraction thereof) by which the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the taxable year exceeds the threshold amount. In
the case o f a married individual filing a separate return, the preceding sentence shall be
applied by substituting '$ 1,250' for '$ 2,500'. In no event shall the applicable percentage
exceed 100 percent.
***
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Sec. 152. Dependent defined.
(a) In general. For purposes o f this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], the term "dependent"
means—
(1) a qualifying child, or
(2) a qualifying relative.
(b) Exceptions. For purposes o f this section
al) Dependents ineligible. If an individual is a dependent o f a taxpayer for any taxable
year of such taxpayer beginning in a calendar year, such individual shall be treated as
having no dependents for any taxable year o f such individual beginning in such calendar
year.
(2) Married dependents. An individual shall not be treated as a dependent o f a taxpayer
under subsection (a) if such individual has made a joint return with the individual's
spouse under section 6013 [26 USCS § 6013] for the taxable year beginning in the
calendar year in which the taxable year o f the taxpayer begins.
(3) Citizens or nationals o f other countries.
(A) In general. The term "dependent" does not include an individual who is not a
citizen or national o f the United States unless such individual is a resident o f the United
States or a country contiguous to the United States.
***
(c) Qualifying child. For purposes o f this section—
(1) In general. The term "qualifying child" means, with respect to any taxpayer for any
taxable year, an individual—
(A) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2),
(B) who has the same principal place o f abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half
o f such taxable year,
(C) who meets the age requirements o f paragraph (3), and
(D) who has not provided over one-half o f such individual's own support for the
calendar year in which the taxable year o f the taxpayer begins.
(2) Relationship. For purposes o f paragraph (1)(A), an individual bears a relationship to
the taxpayer described in this paragraph if such individual is—
(A) a child o f the taxpayer or a descendant o f such a child, or
(B) a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister o f the taxpayer or a descendant o f any
such relative.
(3) Age requirements.
(A)
In general. For purposes o f paragraph (1)(C), an individual meets the
requirements o f this paragraph if such individual—
(i) has not attained the age o f 19 as o f the close o f the calendar year in which the
taxable year o f the taxpayer begins, or
(ii) is a student who has not attained the age o f 24 as o f the close o f such calendar
year.
***
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Sec. 162. Trade or business expenses.
(a) In general. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including—
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other than
amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home
in the pursuit o f a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or
possession, for purposes o f the trade or business, o f property to which the taxpayer has
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
For purposes o f the preceding sentence, the place o f residence o f a Member o f Congress
(including any Delegate and Resident Commissioner) within the State, congressional
district, or possession which he represents in Congress shall be considered his home, but
amounts expended by such Members within each taxable year for living expenses shall
not be deductible for income tax purposes in excess o f $ 3,000. For purposes of
paragraph (2), the taxpayer shall not be treated as being temporarily away from home
during any period o f employment if such period exceeds 1 year. The preceding sentence
shall not apply to any Federal employee during any period for which such employee is
certified by the Attorney General (or the designee thereof) as traveling on behalf o f the
United States in temporary duty status to investigate or prosecute, or provide support
services for the investigation or prosecution of, a Federal crime.
* %*
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Sec. 163. Interest [Caution: See prospective amendment note below.].
(a) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within
the taxable year on indebtedness.
(b) Installment purchases where interest charge is not separately stated.
(1) General rule. If personal property or educational services are purchased under a
contract—
(A) which provides that payment o f part or all o f the purchase price is to be made in
installments, and
(B) in which carrying charges are separately stated but the interest charge cannot be
ascertained,
then the payments made during the taxable year under the contract shall be treated for
purposes o f this section as if they included interest equal to 6 percent o f the average
unpaid balance under the contract during the taxable year. For purposes o f the preceding
sentence, the average unpaid balance is the sum o f the unpaid balance outstanding on the
first day o f each month beginning during the taxable year, divided by 12. For purposes o f
this paragraph, the term "educational services" means any service (including lodging)
which is purchased from an educational organization described in section
170(b)(l)(A)(ii) [26 USCS § 170(b)(l)(A)(ii)] and which is provided for a student o f
such organization.
(2) Limitation. In the case of any contract to which paragraph (1) applies, the amount
treated as interest for any taxable year shall not exceed the aggregate carrying charges
which are properly attributable to such taxable year.
(c) Redeemable ground rents. For purposes o f this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], any
annual or periodic rental under a redeemable ground rent (excluding amounts in
redemption thereof) shall be treated as interest on an indebtedness secured by a mortgage.
(d) Limitation on investment interest.
(1) In general. In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount allowed as
a deduction under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for investment interest for any
taxable year shall not exceed the net investment income o f the taxpayer for the taxable
year.
(2) Carryforward o f disallowed interest. The amount not allowed as a deduction for any
taxable year by reason o f paragraph (1) shall be treated as investment interest paid or
accrued by the taxpayer in the succeeding taxable year.
(3) Investment interest. For purposes o f this subsection—
(A)
In general. The term "investment interest" means any interest allowable as a
deduction under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] (determined without regard to
paragraph (1)) which is paid or accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to property
held for investment.
***
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Sec. 165. Losses.
(a) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the
taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(b) Amount o f deduction. For purposes o f subsection (a), the basis for determining the
amount o f the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011
[26 USCS § 1011] for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition o f property.
(c) Limitation on losses o f individuals. In the case o f an individual, the deduction under
subsection (a) shall be limited to
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with
a trade or business; and
(3) except as provided in subsection (h), losses o f property not connected with a trade
or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
(d) Wagering losses. Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the
extent o f the gains from such transactions.
(e) Theft losses. For purposes o f subsection (a), any loss arising from theft shall be
treated as sustained during the taxable year in which the taxpayer discovers such loss.
(f) Capital losses. Losses from sales or exchanges o f capital assets shall be allowed only
to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212 [26 USCS §§ 1211 and 1212].
(g) Worthless securities.
(1)
General rule. If any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless during the
taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall, for purposes o f this subtitle [26 USCS §§
1 et seq.], be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day o f the taxable
year, o f a capital asset.
***
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Sec. 166. Bad debts.
(a) General rule.
(1) Wholly worthless debts. There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which
becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(2) Partially worthless debts. When satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in part, the
Secretary may allow such debt, in an amount not in excess o f the part charged off within
the taxable year, as a deduction.
(b) Amount o f deduction. For purposes o f subsection (a), the basis for determining the
amount o f the deduction for any bad debt shall be the adjusted basis provided in section
1011 [26 USCS § 1011] for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition o f
property.
(c) Repealed.
(d) Nonbusiness debts.
(1) General rule. In the case o f a taxpayer other than a coiporation—
(A) subsection (a) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt; and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable year, the loss
resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange, during the
taxable year, o f a capital asset held for not more than 1 year.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes o f paragraph (1), the term "nonbusiness
debt" means a debt other than—
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or
business o f the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness o f which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade
or business.
(e) Worthless securities. This section shall not apply to a debt which is evidenced by a
security as defined in section 165(g)(2)(C) [26 USCS § 165(g)(2)(c)].
***
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Sec. 170. Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts [Caution: See prospective amendment
notes below.].
(a) Allowance of deduction.
(1) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as
defined in subsection (c)) payment o f which is made within the taxable year. A charitable
contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.
***
(c) Charitable contribution defined. For purposes o f this section, the term "charitable
contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of—
(1) A State, a possession o f the United States, or any political subdivision o f any o f the
foregoing, or the United States or the District o f Columbia, but only if the contribution or
gift is made for exclusively public purposes.
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation—
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law o f the United States, any State, the District o f Columbia, or any possession o f the
United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part o f its activities involve the provision o f athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention o f cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part o f the net earnings o f which inures to the benefit o f any private
shareholder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) [26 USCS §
501(c)(3)] by reason o f attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf o f (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall be
deductible by reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the United States or
any o f its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B). Rules
similar to the rules of section 501(j) [26 USCS § 501(j)] shall apply for purposes o f this
paragraph.
***
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Sec. 183. Activities not engaged in for profit.
(a) General rule. In the case o f an activity engaged in by an individual or an S
corporation, if such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduction attributable to such
activity shall be allowed under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] except as provided in
this section.
(b) Deductions allowable. In the case o f an activity not engaged in for profit to which
subsection (a) applies, there shall be allowed—
(1) the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.]
for the taxable year without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit,
and
(2) a deduction equal to the amount o f the deductions which would be allowable under
this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for the taxable year only if such activity were
engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived from such
activity for the taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable by reason o f paragraph (1).
(c) Activity not engaged in for profit defined. For purposes o f this section, the term
"activity not engaged in for profit" means any activity other than one with respect to
which deductions are allowable for the taxable year under section 162 [26 USCS § 162]
or under paragraph (1) or (2) o f section 212 [26 USCS § 212].
(d) Presumption. If the gross income derived from an activity for 3 or more o f the taxable
years in the period o f 5 consecutive taxable years which ends with the taxable year
exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity (determined without regard to
whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit), then, unless the Secretary
establishes to the contrary, such activity shall be presumed for purposes o f this chapter
[26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for such taxable year to be an activity engaged in for profit. In the
case o f an activity which consists in major part o f the breeding, training, showing, or
racing o f horses, the preceding sentence shall be applied by substituting "2" for "3" and
"7" for "5".
***
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Sec. 274. Disallowance o f certain entertainment, etc., expenses.
(a) Entertainment, amusement, or recreation.
(1) In general. No deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et
seq.] shall be allowed for any ite m (A) Activity. W ith respect to an activity which is o f a type generally considered to
constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, unless the taxpayer establishes that
the item was directly related to, or, in the case o f an item directly preceding or following
a substantial and bona fide business discussion (including business meetings at a
convention or otherwise), that such item was associated with, the active conduct o f the
taxpayer's trade or business, or
(B) Facility. W ith respect to a facility used in connection with an activity referred to
in subparagraph (A).
In the case o f an item described in subparagraph (A), the deduction shall in no event
exceed the portion o f such item which meets the requirements o f subparagraph (A).
(2) Special rules. For purposes o f applying paragraph (1)~
(A) Dues or fees to any social, athletic, or sporting club or organization shall be
treated as items with respect to facilities.
(B) An activity described in section 212 [26 USCS § 212] shall be treated as a trade
or business.
(C) In the case o f a club, paragraph (1)(B) shall apply unless the taxpayer establishes
that the facility was used primarily for the furtherance o f the taxpayer's trade or business
and that the item was directly related to the active conduct of such trade or business.
(3) Denial o f deduction for club dues. Notwithstanding the preceding provisions o f this
subsection, no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for
amounts paid or incurred for membership in any club organized for business, pleasure,
recreation, or other social purpose.
(b) Gifts.
(1) Limitation. No deduction shall be allowed under section 162 or section 212 [26
USCS § 162 or 212] for any expense for gifts made directly or indirectly to any
individual to the extent that such expense, when added to prior expenses o f the taxpayer
for gifts made to such individual during the same taxable year, exceeds $ 25. For
purposes o f this section, the term "gift" means any item excludable from gross income o f
the recipient under section 102 [26 USCS § 102] which is not excludable from his gross
income under any other provision o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], but such term
does not include—
(A) an item having a cost to the taxpayer not in excess of $ 4.00 on which the name o f
the taxpayer is clearly and permanently imprinted and which is one o f a number o f
identical items distributed generally by the taxpayer, or
(B) a sign, display rack, or other promotional material to be used on the business
premises o f the recipient.
***
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Sec. 446. General rule for methods o f accounting.
(a) General rule. Taxable income shall be computed under the method o f accounting on
the basis o f which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.
(b) Exceptions. If no method o f accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if
the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation o f taxable income shall
be made under such method as, in the opinion o f the Secretary, does clearly reflect
income.
(c) Permissible methods. Subject to the provisions o f subsections (a) and (b), a taxpayer
may compute taxable income under any o f the following methods o f accounting—
(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) an accrual method;
(3) any other method permitted by this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.]; or
(4) any combination o f the foregoing methods permitted under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary.
(d) Taxpayer engaged in more than one business. A taxpayer engaged in more than one
trade or business may, in computing taxable income, use a different method o f
accounting for each trade or business.
(e) Requirement respecting change o f accounting method. Except as otherwise expressly
provided in this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], a taxpayer who changes the method o f
accounting on the basis o f which he regularly computes his income in keeping his books
shall, before computing his taxable income under the new method, secure the consent o f
the Secretary.
(f) Failure to request change o f method o f accounting. If the taxpayer does not file with
the Secretary a request to change the method o f accounting, the absence o f the consent o f
the Secretary to a change in the method o f accounting shall not be taken into account—
(1) to prevent the imposition o f any penalty, or the addition o f any amount to tax, under
this title, or
(2) to diminish the amount o f such penalty or addition to tax.
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Sec. 2036. Transfers with retained life estate.
(a) General rule. The value o f the gross estate shall include the value o f all property to the
extent o f any interest therein o f which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
(except in case o f a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any
period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not
in fact end before his death—
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
(b) Voting rights.
(1) In general. For purposes o f subsection (a)(1), the retention o f the right to vote
(directly or indirectly) shares o f stock o f a controlled corporation shall be considered to
be a retention o f the enjoyment o f transferred property.
(2) Controlled corporation. For purposes o f paragraph (1), a corporation shall be treated
as a controlled corporation if, at any time after the transfer o f the property and during the
3-year period ending on the date o f the decedent's death, the decedent owned (with the
application o f section 318 [26 USCS § 318]), or had the right (either alone or in
conjunction with any person) to vote, stock possessing at least 20 percent o f the total
combined voting power o f all classes o f stock.
(3) Coordination with section 2035. For purposes o f applying section 2035 [26 USCS §
2035] with respect to paragraph (1), the relinquishment or cessation o f voting rights shall
be treated as a transfer o f property made by the decedent.
(c) Limitation on application o f general rule. This section shall not apply to a transfer
made before March 4,1931; nor to a transfer made after March 3, 1931, and before June
7,1932, unless the property transferred would have been includible in the decedent's
gross estate by reason o f the amendatory language o f the joint resolution o f March 3,
1931 (46 Stat. 15161.
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Sec. 2056. Bequests, etc., to surviving spouse.
(a) Allowance o f marital deduction. For purposes o f the tax imposed by section 2001 [26
USCS § 2001], the value o f the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsection (b),
be determined by deducting from the value o f the gross estate an amount equal to the
value o f any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his
surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the
value o f the gross estate.
(b) Limitation in the case o f life estate or other terminable interest.
(1) General rule. Where, on the lapse o f time, on the occurrence o f an event or
contingency, or on the failure o f an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to
the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this
section with respect to such interest—
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other than
such surviving spouse (or the estate o f such spouse); and
(B) if by reason o f such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or
enjoy any part o f such property after such termination or failure o f the interest so passing
to the surviving spouse;
and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest (even if such deduction
is not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B))—
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to directions of
the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee o f a trust.
For purposes o f this paragraph, an interest shall not be considered as an interest which
will terminate or fail merely because it is the ownership o f a bond, note, or similar
contractual obligation, the discharge o f which would not have the effect o f an annuity for
life or for a term.
(2) Interest in unidentified assets. Where the assets (included in the decedent's gross
estate) out o f which, or the proceeds o f which, an interest passing to the surviving spouse
may be satisfied include a particular asset or assets with respect to which no deduction
would be allowed if such asset or assets passed from the decedent to such spouse, then
the value o f such interest passing to such spouse shall, for purposes o f subsection (a), be
reduced by the aggregate value o f such particular assets.
(3) Interest o f spouse conditional on survival for limited period. For purposes o f this
subsection, an interest passing to the surviving spouse shall not be considered as an
interest which will terminate or fail on the death o f such spouse if—
(A) such death will cause a termination or failure o f such interest only if it occurs
within a period not exceeding 6 months after the decedent's death, or only if it occurs as a
result o f a common disaster resulting in the death o f the decedent and the surviving
spouse, or only if it occurs in the case o f either such event; and
(B) such termination or failure does not in fact occur.
***
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Sec. 3121. Definitions.
(a) Wages. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3101 et seq.], the term "wages"
means all remuneration for employment, including the cash value o f all remuneration
(including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not
include—
(1) in the case o f the taxes imposed by sections 3101(a) and 3111(a) [26 USCS §§
3 101(a) and 3111(a)] that part o f the remuneration which, after remuneration (other than
remuneration referred to in the succeeding paragraphs o f this subsection) equal to the
contribution and benefit base (as determined under section 230 o f the Social Security Act
[42 USCS § 430]) with respect to employment has been paid to an individual by an
employer during the calendar year with respect to which such contribution and benefit
base is effective, is paid to such individual by such employer during such calendar year.
If an employer (hereinafter referred to as successor employer) during any calendar year
acquires substantially all the property used in a trade or business o f another employer
(hereinafter referred to as a predecessor), or used in a separate unit o f a trade or business
o f a predecessor, and immediately after the acquisition employs in his trade or business
an individual who immediately prior to the acquisition was employed in the trade or
business o f such predecessor, then, for the purpose o f determining whether the successor
employer has paid remuneration (other than remuneration referred to in the succeeding
paragraphs o f this subsection) with respect to employment equal to the contribution and
benefit base (as determined under section 230 o f the Social Security Act [42 USCS §
430]) such contribution and benefit base to such individual during such calendar year,
any remuneration (other than remuneration referred to in the succeeding paragraphs o f
this subsection) with respect to employment paid (or considered under this paragraph as
having been paid) to such individual by such predecessor during such calendar year and
prior to such acquisition shall be considered as having been paid by such successor
employer;
***
(b) Employment. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3101 et seq.], the term
"employment" means any service, o f whatever nature, performed (A) by an employee for
the person employing him, irrespective o f the citizenship or residence o f either, (i) within
the United States, or (ii) on or in connection with an American vessel or American
aircraft under a contract o f service which is entered into within the United States or
during the performance o f which and while the employee is employed on the vessel or
aircraft it touches at a port in the United States, if the employee is employed on and in
connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States, or (B) outside the
United States by a citizen or resident o f the United States as an employee for an
American employer (as defined in subsection (h)), or (C) if it is service, regardless o f
where or by whom performed, which is designated as employment or recognized as
equivalent to employment under an agreement entered into under section 233 o f the
Social Security Act [42 USCS § 433]; except that such term shall not include—
* * *
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Sec. 3401. Definitions.
(a) Wages. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term "wages"
means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed
by an employee for his employer, including the cash value o f all remuneration (including
benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include
remuneration paid—
(1) for active service performed in a month for which such employee is entitled to the
benefits o f section 112 [26 USCS § 112] (relating to certain combat zone compensation
o f members o f the Armed Forces o f the United States) to the extent remuneration for
such service is excludable from gross income under such section; or
(2) for agricultural labor (as defined in section 3121(g) [26 USCS § 3121(g)]) unless
the remuneration paid for such labor is wages (as defined in section 3121(a) [26 USCS §
3121(a)]); or
(3) for domestic service in a private home, local college club, or local chapter o f a
college fraternity or sorority; or
(4) for service not in the course o f the employer's trade or business performed in any
calendar quarter by an employee, unless the cash remuneration paid for such service is $
50 or more and such service is performed by an individual who is regularly employed by
such employer to perform such service. For purposes o f this paragraph, an individual
shall be deemed to be regularly employed by an employer during a calendar quarter only
if~
***
(b) Payroll period. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term
"payroll period" means a period for which a payment o f wages is ordinarily made to the
employee by his employer, and the term "miscellaneous payroll period" means a payroll
period other than a daily, weekly, biweekly, semimonthly, monthly, quarterly,
semiannual, or annual payroll period.
(c) Employee. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term
"employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official o f the United States, a State,
or any political subdivision thereof, or the District o f Columbia, or any agency or
instrumentality o f any one or more o f the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes
an officer of a corporation.
(d) Employer. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term
"employer" means the person for whom an individual performs or performed any service,
o f whatever nature, as the employee o f such person, except that—
***
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Sec. 6015. R elief from joint and several liability on joint return.
(a) In general. Notwithstanding section 6013(d)(3) [26 USCS § 6013(d)(3)]—
( 1 ) an individual who has made a joint return may elect to seek relief under the
procedures prescribed under subsection (b); and
(2 ) if such individual is eligible to elect the application o f subsection (c), such
individual may, in addition to any election under paragraph ( 1 ), elect to limit such
individual's liability for any deficiency with respect to such joint return in the manner
prescribed under subsection (c).
Any determination under this section shall be made without regard to community
property laws.
(b) Procedures for relief from liability applicable to all joint filers.
(1) In general. Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if—
(A) a joint return has been made for a taxable year;
(B) on such return there is an understatement o f tax attributable to erroneous items of
one individual filing the joint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that in signing the return he
or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such understatement;
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
other individual liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such
understatement; and
(E) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary may prescribe) the
benefits o f this subsection not later than the date which is 2 years after the date the
Secretary has begun collection activities with respect to the individual making the
election,
then the other individual shall be relieved o f liability for tax (including interest,
penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is
attributable to such understatement.
(2) Apportionment o f relief. If an individual who, but for paragraph (1)(C), would be
relieved o f liability under paragraph ( 1 ), establishes that in signing the return such
individual did not know, and had no reason to know, the extent o f such understatement,
then such individual shall be relieved o f liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and
other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent that such liability is attributable to the
portion o f such understatement o f which such individual did not know and had no reason
to know.
***
(f) Equitable relief. Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if—
( 1 ) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion o f either); and
(2 ) relief is not available to such individual under subsection (b) or (c),
the Secretary may relieve such individual o f such liability.
***
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Sec. 6103. Confidentiality and disclosure o f returns and return information.
(a) General rule. Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as
authorized by this title—
(1) no officer or employee o f the United States,
(2) no officer or employee o f any State, any local law enforcement agency receiving
information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support enforcement agency, or
any local agency administering a program listed in subsection (1)(7)(D) who has or had
access to returns or return information under this section or section 6104(c) [26 USCS §
6104(c)], and
(3) no other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to returns or
return information under subsection (e)(l)(D)(iii), paragraph (6 ), (12), (16), (19), or (20)
o f subsection (1), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) o f subsection (m), or subsection (n),
shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any manner in
connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise or under the
provisions o f this section. For purposes o f this subsection, the term "officer or employee"
includes a former officer or employee.
(b) Definitions. For purposes o f this section—
(1) Return. The term "return" means any tax or information return, declaration o f
estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided for or permitted under, the
provisions o f this title which is filed with the Secretary by, on behalf of, or with respect
to any person, and any amendment or supplement thereto, including supporting
schedules, attachments, or lists which are supplemental to, or part of, the return so filed.
(2) Return information. The term "return information" means—
(A)
a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount o f his income, payments,
receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax
withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return
was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any
other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the
Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination o f the existence, or
possible existence, o f liability (or the amount thereof) o f any person under this title for
any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense,
* * *

(3) Taxpayer return information. The term "taxpayer return information" means return
information as defined in paragraph (2) which is filed with, or furnished to, the Secretary
by or on behalf o f the taxpayer to whom such return information relates.
***
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Sec. 6213. Restrictions applicable to deficiencies; petition to Tax Court [Caution: See
prospective amendment note below.].
(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on assessment. Within 90 days, or 150 days if
the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice o f deficiency
authorized in section 6212 [26 USCS § 6212] is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday,
or a legal holiday in the District o f Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a
petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination o f the deficiency. Except as otherwise
provided in section 6851, 6852, or 6861 [26 USCS § 6851, 6852, or 6861] no assessment
o f a deficiency in respect o f any tax imposed by subtitle A or B [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq. or
2001 et seq.], chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44 [26 USCS §§ 4911 et seq., 4940 et seq., 4971 et
seq., or 4981 et seq.] and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made,
begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the
expiration o f such 90-day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if a petition has
been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision o f the Tax Court has become final.
Notwithstanding the provisions o f section 7421(a) [26 USCS § 7421(a)], the making o f
such assessment or the beginning o f such proceeding or levy during the time such
prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including the
Tax Court, and a refund may be ordered by such court o f any amount collected within the
period during which the Secretary is prohibited from collecting by levy or through a
proceeding in court under the provisions o f this subsection. The Tax Court shall have no
jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund under this subsection
unless a timely petition for a redetermination o f the deficiency has been filed and then
only in respect o f the deficiency that is the subject o f such petition. Any petition filed
with the Tax Court on or before the last date specified for filing such petition by the
Secretary in the notice o f deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.
(b) Exceptions to restrictions on assessment.
(1) Assessments arising out o f mathematical or clerical errors.
***
(2) Abatement o f assessment o f mathematical or clerical errors.
(A) Request for abatement. Notwithstanding section 6404(b) [26 USCS § 6404(b)], a
taxpayer may file with the Secretary within 60 days after notice is sent under paragraph
( 1 ) a request for an abatement o f any assessment specified in such notice, and upon
receipt of such request, the Secretary shall abate the assessment. Any reassessment o f the
tax with respect to which an abatement is made under this subparagraph shall be subject
to the deficiency procedures prescribed by this subchapter [26 USCS §§ 6211 et seq.].
(B) Stay o f collection. In the case o f any assessment referred to in paragraph (1),
notwithstanding paragraph ( 1 ), no levy or proceeding in court for the collection o f such
assessment shall be made, begun, or prosecuted during the period in which such
assessment may be abated under this paragraph.
(3) Assessments arising out o f tentative carryback or refund adjustments.
***
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Sec. 6229. Period o f limitations for making assessments.
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the period for assessing
any tax imposed by subtitle A [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] with respect to any person which is
attributable to any partnership item (or affected item) for a partnership taxable year shall
not expire before the date which is 3 years after the later o f ( 1 ) the date on which the partnership return for such taxable year was filed, or
(2 ) the last day for filing such return for such year (determined without regard to
extensions).
(b) Extension by agreement.
(1) In general. The period described in subsection (a) (including an extension period
under this subsection) may be extended—
(A) with respect to any partner, by an agreement entered into by the Secretary and
such partner, and
(B) with respect to all partners, by an agreement entered into by the Secretary and the
tax matters partner (or any other person authorized by the partnership in writing to enter
into such an agreement), before the expiration o f such period.
(2) Special rule with respect to debtors in title 11 cases. Notwithstanding any other law
or rule o f law, if an agreement is entered into under paragraph (1)(B) and the agreement
is signed by a person who would be the tax matters partner but for the fact that, at the
time that the agreement is executed, the person is a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding
under title 11 o f the United States Code, such agreement shall be binding on all partners
in the partnership unless the Secretary has been notified o f the bankruptcy proceeding in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
(3) Coordination with section 6501(c)(4). Any agreement under section 6501(c)(4) [26
USCS § 6501(c)(4)] shall apply with respect to the period described in subsection (a)
only if the agreement expressly provides that such agreement applies to tax attributable to
partnership items.
(c) Special rule in case o f fraud, etc.
* * *
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Sec. 6320. Notice and opportunity for hearing upon filing o f notice o f lien.
(a) Requirement o f notice.
(1) In general. The Secretary shall notify in writing the person described in section
6321 [26 USCS § 6321] o f the filing o f a notice o f lien under section 6323 [26 USCS §
6323],
(2) Time and method for notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be—
(A) given in person;
(B) left at the dwelling or usual place o f business o f such person; or
(C) sent by certified or registered mail to such person's last known address,
not more than 5 business days after the day o f the filing o f the notice o f lien.
(3) Information included with notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall
include in simple and nontechnical terms—
(A) the amount o f unpaid tax;
(B) the right o f the person to request a hearing during the 30-day period beginning on
the day after the 5-day period described in paragraph (2);
(C) the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer with respect to such lien and
the procedures relating to such appeals; and
(D) the provisions o f this title and procedures relating to the release o f liens on
property.
(b) Right to fair hearing.
(1) In general. If the person requests a hearing in writing under subsection (a)(3)(B) and
states the grounds for the requested hearing, such hearing shall be held by the Internal
Revenue Service Office o f Appeals.
(2) One hearing per period. A person shall be entitled to only one hearing under this
section with respect to the taxable period to which the unpaid tax specified in subsection
(a)(3)(A) relates.
(3) Impartial officer. The hearing under this subsection shall be conducted by an officer
or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in
subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under this section or section 6330 [26 USCS
§ 6330]. A taxpayer may waive the requirement o f this paragraph.
(4) Coordination with section 6330. To the extent practicable, a hearing under this
section shall be held in conjunction with a hearing under section 6330 [26 USCS § 6330],
(c) Conduct o f hearing; review; suspensions. For purposes o f this section, subsections (c),
(d) (other than paragraph (2)(B) thereof), (e), and (g) o f section 6330 [26 USCS § 6330]
shall apply.
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Sec. 6321. Lien for taxes.
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty,
together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor o f the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person.
Sec. 6322. Period o f lien.
Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321 [26
USCS § 6321] shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the
liability for the amount so assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out o f
such liability) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason o f lapse o f time.
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Sec. 6323. Validity and priority against certain persons.
(a) Purchasers, holders o f security interests, mechanic's lienors, and judgment lien
creditors. The lien imposed by section 6321 [26 USCS § 6321] shall not be valid as
against any purchaser, holder o f a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien
creditor until notice thereof which meets the requirements o f subsection (f) has been filed
by the Secretary.
(b) Protection for certain interests even though notice filed. Even though notice o f a lien
imposed by section 6321 [26 USCS § 6321] has been filed, such lien shall not be valid—
(1) Securities. W ith respect to a security (as defined in subsection (h)(4))—
(A) as against a purchaser o f such security who at the time o f purchase did not have
actual notice or knowledge o f the existence o f such lien; and
(B) as against a holder o f a security interest in such security who, at the time such
interest came into existence, did not have actual notice or knowledge o f the existence of
such lien.
(2) Motor vehicles. With respect to a motor vehicle (as defined in subsection (h)(3)), as
against a purchaser o f such motor vehicle, if—
(A) at the time o f the purchase such purchaser did not have actual notice or
knowledge o f the existence o f such lien, and
(B) before the purchaser obtains such notice or knowledge, he has acquired
possession o f such motor vehicle and has not thereafter relinquished possession o f such
motor vehicle to the seller or his agent.
(3) Personal property purchased at retail. With respect to tangible personal property
purchased at retail, as against a purchaser in the ordinary course o f the seller's trade or
business, unless at the time o f such purchase such purchaser intends such purchase to (or
knows such purchase will) hinder, evade, or defeat the collection o f any tax under this
title.
* * *

(c) Protection for certain commercial transactions financing agreements, etc.
(1)
In general. To the extent provided in this subsection, even though notice o f a lien
imposed by section 6321 [26 USCS § 6321] has been filed, such lien shall not be valid
with respect to a security interest which came into existence after tax lien filing but
which—
(A) is in qualified property covered by the terms o f a written agreement entered into
before tax lien filing and constituting—
(i) a commercial transactions financing agreement,
(ii) a real property construction or improvement financing agreement, or
(iii) an obligatory disbursement agreement, and
(B) is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as o f the time o f tax
lien filing, out o f an unsecured obligation.
* * *
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Sec. 6330. Notice and opportunity for hearing before levy
(a) Requirement o f notice before levy.
(1) In general. No levy may be made on any property or right to property o f any person
unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing o f their right to a hearing under
this section before such levy is made. Such notice shall be required only once for the
taxable period to which the unpaid tax specified in paragraph (3)(A) relates.
(2) Time and method for notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be—
(A) given in person;
(B) left at the dwelling or usual place o f business o f such person; or
(C) sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to such person's last
known address;
not less than 30 days before the day o f the first levy with respect to the amount o f the
unpaid tax for the taxable period.
(3) Information included with notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall
include in simple and nontechnical terms—
(A) the amount o f unpaid tax;
(B) the right o f the person to request a hearing during the 30-day period under
paragraph (2 ); and
(C) the proposed action by the Secretary and the rights o f the person with respect to
such action, including a brief statement which sets forth—
(i) the provisions o f this title relating to levy and sale of property;
(ii) the procedures applicable to the levy and sale o f property under this title;
(iii) the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer with respect to such levy
and sale and the procedures relating to such appeals;
(iv) the alternatives available to taxpayers which could prevent levy on property
(including installment agreements under section 6159) [26 USCS § 6159]; and
(v) the provisions o f this title and procedures relating to redemption o f property and
release o f liens on property.
(b) Right to fair hearing.
(1) In general. If the person requests a hearing in writing under subsection (a)(3)(B) and
states the grounds for the requested hearing, such hearing shall be held by the Internal
Revenue Service Office o f Appeals.
(2) One hearing per period. A person shall be entitled to only one hearing under this
section with respect to the taxable period to which the unpaid tax specified in subsection
(a)(3)(A) relates.
(3) Impartial officer. The hearing under this subsection shall be conducted by an officer
or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in
subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under this section or section 6320 [26 USCS
§ 6320]. A taxpayer may waive the requirement o f this paragraph.
* * *
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Sec. 6331. Levy and distraint.
(a) Authority o f Secretary. If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to
collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses o f the
levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt
under section 6334 [26 USCS § 6334]) belonging to such person or on which there is a
lien provided in this chapter [26 USCS §§ 6301 et seq.] for the payment o f such tax. Levy
may be made upon the accrued salary or wages o f any officer, employee, or elected
official, o f the United States, the District o f Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality
o f the United States or the District o f Columbia, by serving a notice o f levy on the
employer (as defined in section 3401(d) [26 USCS § 3401(d)]) o f such officer, employee,
or elected official. If the Secretary makes a finding that the collection o f such tax is in
jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment o f such tax may be made by the
Secretary and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection thereof by levy shall be
lawful without regard to the 1 0 -day period provided in this section.
(b) Seizure and sale o f property. The term "levy" as used in this title includes the power
o f distraint and seizure by any means. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a
levy shall extend only to property possessed and obligations existing at the time thereof.
In any case in which the Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may
seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or
intangible).
(c) Successive seizures. Whenever any property or right to property upon which levy has
been made by virtue of subsection (a) is not sufficient to satisfy the claim o f the United
States for which levy is made, the Secretary may, thereafter, and as often as may be
necessary, proceed to levy in like manner upon any other property liable to levy o f the
person against whom such claim exists, until the amount due from him, together with all
expenses, is fully paid.
(d) Requirement o f notice before levy.
(1) In general. Levy may be made under subsection (a) upon the salary or wages or
other property o f any person with respect to any unpaid tax only after the Secretary has
notified such person in writing o f his intention to make such levy.
(2) 30-day requirement. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be—
(A) given in person,
(B) left at the dwelling or usual place o f business o f such person, or
(C) sent by certified or registered mail to such person's last known address,
no less than 30 days before the day o f the levy.
(3) Jeopardy. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a levy if the Secretary has made a finding
under the last sentence o f subsection (a) that the collection o f tax is in jeopardy.
* * *
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Sec. 6402. Authority to make credits or refunds [Caution: See prospective amendment
note below.]
(a) General rule. In the case o f any overpayment, the Secretary, within the applicable
period o f limitations, may credit the amount o f such overpayment, including any interest
allowed thereon, against any liability in respect o f an internal revenue tax on the part o f
the person who made the overpayment and shall, subject to subsections (c), (d), and (e),
refund any balance to such person.
(b) Credits against estimated tax. The Secretary is authorized to prescribe regulations
providing for the crediting against the estimated income tax for any taxable year o f the
amount determined by the taxpayer or the Secretary to be an overpayment o f the income
tax for a preceding taxable year.
(c) Offset o f past-due support against overpayments. The amount o f any overpayment to
be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount o f any
past-due support (as defined in section 464(c) o f the Social Security Act [42 USCS §
664]) owed by that person o f which the Secretary has been notified by a State in
accordance with section 464 o f the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 664]. The Secretary
shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State collecting
such support and notify the person making the overpayment that so much o f the
overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support has been paid
to the State. A reduction under this subsection shall be applied first to satisfy any pastdue support which has been assigned to the State under section 402(a)(26) or 471(a)(17)
o f the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 602(a)(26) or 671(a)(17)], and shall be applied to
satisfy any other past-due support after any other reductions allowed by law (but before a
credit against future liability for an internal revenue tax) have been made. This subsection
shall be applied to an overpayment prior to its being credited to a person's future liability
for an internal revenue tax.
(d) Collection o f debts owed to Federal agencies.
(1) In general. Upon receiving notice from any Federal agency that a named person
owes a past-due legally enforceable debt (other than past-due support subject to the
provisions o f subsection (c)) to such agency, the Secretary shall—
(A) reduce the amount o f any overpayment payable to such person by the amount o f
such debt;
(B) pay the amount by which such overpayment is reduced under subparagraph (A) to
such agency; and
(C) notify the person making such overpayment that such overpayment has been
reduced by an amount necessary to satisfy such debt.
***
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Sec. 6501. Limitations on assessment and collection.
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount o f any tax
imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed (whether or
not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) or, if the tax is payable by stamp,
at any time after such tax became due and before the expiration o f 3 years after the date
on which any part o f such tax was paid, and no proceeding in court without assessment
for the collection o f such tax shall be begun after the expiration o f such period. For
purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 6501 et seq.], the term "return" means the return
required to be filed by the taxpayer (and does not include a return o f any person from
whom the taxpayer has received an item o f income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit).
(b) Time return deemed filed.
(1) Early return. For purposes o f this section, a return o f tax imposed by this title,
except tax imposed by chapter 3, 21, or 24 [26 USCS §§ 1441 et seq., 3101 et seq., or
3401 et seq.], filed before the last day prescribed by law or by regulations promulgated
pursuant to law for the filing thereof, shall be considered as filed on such last day.
(2) Return o f certain employment taxes and tax imposed by chapter 3. For purposes o f
this section, if a return o f tax imposed by chapter 3, 21, or 24 [26 USCS §§ 1441 et seq.,
3101 et seq., or 3401 et seq.] for any period ending with or within a calendar year is filed
before April 15 o f the succeeding calendar year, such return shall be considered filed on
April 15 o f such calendar year.
(3) Return executed by Secretary. Notwithstanding the provisions o f paragraph (2) o f
section 6020(b) [26 USCS § 6020(b)], the execution o f a return by the Secretary pursuant
to the authority conferred by such section shall not start the running o f the period o f
limitations on assessment and collection.
(4) Return o f excise taxes. For purposes o f this section, the filing o f a return for a
specified period on which an entry has been made with respect to a tax imposed under a
provision of subtitle D [26 USCS §§ 4001 et seq.] (including a return on which an entry
has been made showing no liability for such tax for such period) shall constitute the filing
o f a return o f all amounts o f such tax which, if properly paid, would be required to be
reported on such return for such period.
(c) Exceptions.
(1)
False return. In the case o f a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax,
the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection o f such tax may be begun
without assessment, at any time.
***
(4) Extension by agreement.
(A) In general. Where, before the expiration o f the time prescribed in this section for
the assessment o f any tax imposed by this title, except the estate tax provided in chapter
11 [26 USCS §§ 2001 et seq.], both the Secretary and the taxpayer have consented in
writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any time prior to the
expiration o f the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by
subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration o f the period previously
agreed upon.
***
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Sec. 6511. Limitations on credit or refund [Caution: See prospective amendment note
below.].
(a) Period of limitation on filing claim. Claim for credit or refund o f an overpayment o f
any tax imposed by this title in respect o f which tax the taxpayer is required to file a
return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2
years from the time the tax was paid, whichever o f such periods expires the later, or if no
return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. Claim for
credit or refund o f an overpayment o f any tax imposed by this title which is required to
be paid by means o f a stamp shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time
the tax was paid.
(b) Limitation on allowance o f credits and refunds.
(1) Filing of claim within prescribed period. No credit or refund shall be allowed or
made after the expiration o f the period o f limitation prescribed in subsection (a) for the
filing o f a claim for credit or refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the
taxpayer within such period.
(2) Limit on amount o f credit or refund.
(A) Limit where claim filed within 3-year period. If the claim was filed by the
taxpayer during the 3-year period prescribed in subsection (a), the amount o f the credit or
refund shall not exceed the portion o f the tax paid within the period, immediately
preceding the filing o f the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period o f any extension o f time
for filing the return. If the tax was required to be paid by means o f a stamp, the amount o f
the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion o f the tax paid within the 3 years
immediately preceding the filing o f the claim.
(B) Limit where claim not filed within 3-year period. If the claim was not filed within
such 3-year period, the amount o f the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion o f the
tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing o f the claim.
(C) Limit if no claim filed. If no claim was filed, the credit or refund shall not exceed
the amount which would be allowable under subparagraph (A) or (B), as the case may be,
if claim was filed on the date the credit or refund is allowed.
(c) Special rules applicable in case o f extension o f time by agreement. If an agreement
under the provisions o f section 6501(c)(4) [26 USCS § 6501(c)(4)] extending the period
for assessment o f a tax imposed by this title is made within the period prescribed in
subsection (a) for the filing o f a claim for credit or refund—
(1) Time for filing claim. The period for filing claim for credit or refund or for making
credit or refund if no claim is filed, provided in subsections (a) and (b)( 1 ), shall not
expire prior to 6 months after the expiration o f the period within which an assessment
may be made pursuant to the agreement or any extension thereof under section
6501(c)(4) [26 USCS § 6501(c)(4)],
***
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Sec. 6532. Periods o f limitation on suits.
(a) Suits by taxpayers for refund.
(1) General rule. No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) [26 USCS § 7422(a)] for
the recovery o f any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the
expiration o f 6 months from the date o f filing the claim required under such section
unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration
o f 2 years from the date o f mailing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to
the taxpayer o f a notice o f the disallowance o f the part o f the claim to which the suit or
proceeding relates.
(2) Extension o f time. The 2-year period prescribed in paragraph (1) shall be extended
for such period as may be agreed upon in writing between the taxpayer and the Secretary.
(3) Waiver o f notice o f disallowance. If any person files a written waiver o f the
requirement that he be mailed a notice o f disallowance, the 2 -year period prescribed in
paragraph ( 1 ) shall begin on the date such waiver is filed.
(4) Reconsideration after mailing o f notice. Any consideration, reconsideration, or
action by the Secretary with respect to such claim following the mailing o f a notice by
certified mail or registered mail o f disallowance shall not operate to extend the period
within which suit may be begun.
(5) Cross reference. For substitution o f 120-day period for the 6 -month period
contained in paragraph (1) in a title 11 case, see section 505(a)(2) o f title 11 o f the United
States Code.
(b) Suits by United States for recovery o f erroneous refunds. Recovery o f an erroneous
refund by suit under section 7405 [26 USCS § 7405] shall be allowed only if such suit is
begun within 2 years after the making o f such refund, except that such suit may be
brought at any time within 5 years from the making o f the refund if it appears that any
part o f the refund was induced by fraud or misrepresentation o f a material fact.
(c) Suits by persons other than taxpayers.
(1) General rule. Except as provided by paragraph (2), no suit or proceeding under
section 7426 [26 USCS § 7426] shall be begun after the expiration o f 9 months from the
date o f the levy or agreement giving rise to such action.
(2) Period when claim is filed. If a request is made for the return o f property described
in section 6343(b) [26 USCS § 6343(b)], the 9-month period prescribed in paragraph (1)
shall be extended for a period o f 1 2 months from the date o f filing o f such request or for a
period o f 6 months from the date o f mailing by registered or certified mail by the
Secretary to the person making such request o f a notice o f disallowance o f the part o f the
request to which the action relates, whichever is shorter.
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Sec. 6651. Failure to file tax return or to pay tax.
(a) Addition to the tax. In case o f failure—
(1) to file any return required under authority o f subchapter A o f chapter 61 [26 USCS
§§ 6001 et seq.] (other than part III thereof [26 USCS §§ 6031 et seq.]), subchapter A o f
chapter 51 [26 USCS §§ 5001 et seq.] (relating to distilled spirits, wines, and beer), or o f
subchapter A o f chapter 52 [26 USCS §§ 5701 et seq.] (relating to tobacco, cigars,
cigarettes, and cigarette papers and tubes), or o f subchapter A o f chapter 53 [26 USCS §§
5801 et seq.] (relating to machine guns and certain other firearms), on the date prescribed
therefor (determined with regard to any extension o f time for filing), unless it is shown
that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be
added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent o f the amount
o f such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for
each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not
exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate;
(2 ) to pay the amount shown as tax on any return specified in paragraph ( 1 ) on or
before the date prescribed for payment o f such tax (determined with regard to any
extension o f time for payment), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable
cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount shown as tax on
such return 0.5 percent o f the amount o f such tax if the failure is for not more than 1
month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during
which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate; or
(3) to pay any amount in respect o f any tax required to be shown on a return specified
in paragraph ( 1 ) which is not so shown (including an assessment made pursuant to
section 6213(b) [26 USCS § 6213(b)]) within 21 calendar days from the date o f notice
and demand therefor ( 1 0 business days if the amount for which such notice and demand
is made equals or exceeds $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ), unless it is shown that such failure is due to
reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount o f tax
stated in such notice and demand 0.5 percent o f the amount o f such tax if the failure is for
not more than 1 month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or
fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the
aggregate.
In the case o f a failure to file a return o f tax imposed by chapter 1 [26 USCS §§ 1 et
seq.] within 60 days o f the date prescribed for filing o f such return (determined with
regard to any extensions o f time for filing), unless it is shown that such failure is due to
reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, the addition to tax under paragraph ( 1 )
shall not be less than the lesser o f $ 1 0 0 or 1 0 0 percent o f the amount required to be
shown as tax on such return.
***
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Sec. 6653. Failure to pay stamp tax.
Any person (as defined in section 6671(b) [26 USCS § 6671(b)]) w h o ( 1 ) willfully fails to pay any tax imposed by this title which is payable by stamp,
coupons, tickets, books, or other devices or methods prescribed by this title or by
regulations under the authority o f this title, or
(2 ) willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment
thereof,
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable for a penalty o f 50 percent
o f the total amount o f the underpayment o f the tax.
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Sec. 6672. Failure to collect and pay over tax, or attempt to evade or defeat tax.
(a) General rule. Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any
tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for
and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax
or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a
penalty equal to the total amount o f the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for
and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 [26 USCS § 6653] or part
II o f subchapter A o f chapter 6 8 [26 USCS §§ 6662 et seq.] for any offense to which this
section is applicable.
(b) Preliminary notice requirement.
(1) In general. No penalty shall be imposed under subsection (a) unless the Secretary
notifies the taxpayer in writing by mail to an address as determined under section 6212(b)
[26 USCS § 6212(b)] or in person that the taxpayer shall be subject to an assessment o f
such penalty.
(2) Timing o f notice. The mailing o f the notice described in paragraph (1) (or, in the
case o f such a notice delivered in person, such delivery) shall precede any notice and
demand o f any penalty under subsection (a) by at least 60 days.
(3) Statute o f limitations. If a notice described in paragraph (1) with respect to any
penalty is mailed or delivered in person before the expiration o f the period provided by
section 6501 [26 USCS § 6501] for the assessment o f such penalty (determined without
regard to this paragraph), the period provided by such section for the assessment o f such
penalty shall not expire before the later o f (A) the date 90 days after the date on which such notice was mailed or delivered in
person, or
(B) if there is a timely protest o f the proposed assessment, the date 30 days after the
Secretary makes a final administrative determination with respect to such protest.
(4) Exception for jeopardy. This subsection shall not apply if the Secretary finds that
the collection o f the penalty is in jeopardy.
***
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Sec. 7201. Attempt to evade or defeat tax.
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by
this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
guilty o f a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ($
500.000 in the case o f a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both,
together with the costs o f prosecution.
Sec. 7206. Fraud and false statements.
Any person who—
(1) Declaration under penalties o f peijury. Willfully makes and subscribes any return,
statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it
is made under the penalties o f peijury, and which he does not believe to be true and
correct as to every material matter; or
(2) Aid or assistance. Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the
preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the
internal revenue laws, o f a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent
or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the
knowledge or consent o f the person authorized or required to present such return,
affidavit, claim, or document; or
(3) Fraudulent bonds, permits, and entries. Simulates or falsely or fraudulently executes
or signs any bond, permit, entry, or other document required by the provisions o f the
internal revenue laws, or by any regulation made in pursuance thereof, or procures the
same to be falsely or fraudulently executed, or advises, aids in, or connives at such
execution thereof; or
(4) Removal or concealment with intent to defraud. Removes, deposits, or conceals, or
is concerned in removing, depositing, or concealing, any goods or commodities for or in
respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, or any property upon which levy is
authorized by section 6331 [26 USCS § 6331], with intent to evade or defeat the
assessment or collection o f any tax imposed by this title; or
(5) Compromises and closing agreements. In connection with any compromise under
section 7122 [26 USCS § 7122], or offer o f such compromise, or in connection with any
closing agreement under section 7121 [26 USCS § 7121], or offer to enter into any such
agreement, willfully—
(A) Concealment o f property. Conceals from any officer or employee o f the United
States any property belonging to the estate o f a taxpayer or other person liable in respect
o f the tax, or
(B) Withholding, falsifying, and destroying records. Receives, withholds, destroys,
mutilates, or falsifies any book, document, or record, or makes any false statement,
relating to the estate or financial condition o f the taxpayer or other person liable in
respect o f the tax;
shall be guilty o f a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $
100.000 ($ 500,000 in the case o f a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or
both, together with the costs o f prosecution.
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Sec. 7212. Attempts to interfere with administration o f Internal Revenue laws.
(a) Corrupt or forcible interference. Whoever corruptly or by force or threats o f force
(including any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede
any officer or employee o f the United States acting in an official capacity under this title,
or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats o f force (including any threatening
letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the
due administration o f this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $
5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, except that if the offense is
committed only by threats o f force, the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more
than $ 3,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. The term "threats o f force", as
used in this subsection, means threats o f bodily harm to the officer or employee o f the
United States or to a member o f his family.
(b) Forcible rescue o f seized property. Any person who forcibly rescues or causes to be
rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title, or shall attempt or
endeavor so to do, shall, excepting in cases otherwise provided for, for every such
offense, be fined not more than $ 500, or not more than double the value o f the property
so rescued, whichever is the greater, or be imprisoned not more than 2 years.
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Sec. 7402. Jurisdiction o f district courts.
(a) To issue orders, processes, and judgments. The district courts o f the United States at
the instance o f the United States shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil
actions, writs and orders o f injunction, and o f ne exeat republica, orders appointing
receivers, and such other orders and processes, and to render such judgments and decrees
as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement o f the internal revenue laws. The
remedies hereby provided are in addition to and not exclusive o f any and all other
remedies o f the United States in such courts or otherwise to enforce such laws.
(b) To enforce summons. If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to
appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court o f the
United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production
o f books, papers, or other data.
(c) For damages to United States officers or employees. Any officer or employee o f the
United States acting under authority o f this title, or any person acting under or by
authority o f any such officer or employee, receiving any injury to his person or property
in the discharge o f his duty shall be entitled to maintain an action for damages therefor, in
the district court o f the United States, in the district wherein the party doing the injury
may reside or shall be found.
(d) Repealed.
(e) To quiet title. The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction o f any action
brought by the United States to quiet title to property if the title claimed by the United
States to such property was derived from enforcement o f a lien under this title.
(f) General jurisdiction. For general jurisdiction o f the district courts o f the United States
in civil actions involving internal revenue, see section 1340 o f title 28 o f the United
States Code.
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Sec. 7421. Prohibition o f suits to restrain assessment or collection.
(a) Tax. Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6225(b),
6246(b), 6330(e)(1), 633 l(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and
7436 [26 USCS §§ 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6225(b), 6246(b), 6330(e)(1),
633 l(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and 7436], no suit for the
purpose o f restraining the assessment or collection o f any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.
(b) Liability o f transferee or fiduciary. No suit shall be maintained in any court for the
purpose o f restraining the assessment or collection (pursuant to the provisions o f chapter
71 [26 USCS §§ 6901 et seq.]) of~
( 1 ) the amount o f the liability, at law or in equity, o f a transferee o f property o f a
taxpayer in respect o f any internal revenue tax, or
(2) the amount o f the liability o f a fiduciary under section 3713(b) o f title 31, United
States Code in respect o f any such tax.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217
Sec. 7422. Civil actions for refund.
(a) No suit prior to filing claim for refund. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery o f any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or o f any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or o f any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary,
according to the provisions o f law in that regard, and the regulations o f the Secretary
established in pursuance thereof.
(b) Protest or duress. Such suit or proceeding may be maintained whether or not such tax,
penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
(c) Suits against collection officer a bar. A suit against any officer or employee o f the
United States (or former officer or employee) or his personal representative for the
recovery o f any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or o f any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority,
or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected shall
be treated as if the United States had been a party to such suit in applying the doctrine o f
res judicata in all suits in respect o f any internal revenue tax, and in all proceedings in the
Tax Court and on review o f decisions o f the Tax Court.
(d) Credit treated as payment. The credit o f an overpayment o f any tax in satisfaction o f
any tax liability shall, for the purpose o f any suit for refund o f such tax liability so
satisfied, be deemed to be a payment in respect o f such tax liability at the time such credit
is allowed.
***
(f) Limitation on right o f action for refund.
(1) General rule. A suit or proceeding referred to in subsection (a) may be maintained
only against the United States and not against any officer or employee o f the United
States (or former officer or employee) or his personal representative. Such suit or
proceeding may be maintained against the United States notwithstanding the provisions
o f section 2502 o f title 28 o f the United States Code (relating to aliens' privilege to sue)
and notwithstanding the provisions o f section 1502 o f such title 28 (relating to certain
treaty cases).
(2) Misjoinder and change o f venue. If a suit or proceeding brought in a United States
district court against an officer or employee o f the United States (or former officer or
employee) or his personal representative is improperly brought solely by virtue o f
paragraph ( 1 ), the court shall order, upon such terms as are just, that the pleadings be
amended to substitute the United States as a party for such officer or employee as o f the
time such action commenced, upon proper service o f process on the United States. Such
suit or proceeding shall upon request by the United States be transferred to the district or
division where it should have been brought if such action initially had been brought
against the United States.
***
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Sec. 7430. Awarding o f costs and certain fees.
(a) In general. In any administrative or court proceeding which is brought by or against
the United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund o f any tax,
interest, or penalty under this title, the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment or a
settlement for—
( 1 ) reasonable administrative costs incurred in connection with such administrative
proceeding within the Internal Revenue Service, and
(2 ) reasonable litigation costs incurred in connection with such court proceeding.
(b) Limitations.
(1) Requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. A judgment for reasonable
litigation costs shall not be awarded under subsection (a) in any court proceeding unless
the court determines that the prevailing party has exhausted the administrative remedies
available to such party within the Internal Revenue Service. Any failure to agree to an
extension o f the time for the assessment o f any tax shall not be taken into account for
purposes o f determining whether the prevailing party meets the requirements o f the
preceding sentence.
(2) Only costs allocable to the United States. An award under subsection (a) shall be
made only for reasonable litigation and administrative costs which are allocable to the
United States and not to any other party.
(3) Costs denied where party prevailing protracts proceedings. No award for reasonable
litigation and administrative costs may be made under subsection (a) with respect to any
portion o f the administrative or court proceeding during which the prevailing party has
unreasonably protracted such proceeding.
(4) Period for applying to IRS for administrative costs. An award may be made under
subsection (a) by the Internal Revenue Service for reasonable administrative costs only if
the prevailing party files an application with the Internal Revenue Service for such costs
before the 91st day after the date on which the final decision o f the Internal Revenue
Service as to the determination o f the tax, interest, or penalty is mailed to such party.
(c) Definitions. For purposes o f this section—
(1) Reasonable litigation costs. The term "reasonable litigation costs" includes—
(A) reasonable court costs, and
(B) based upon prevailing market rates for the kind or quality o f services furnished—
(i) the reasonable expenses o f expert witnesses in connection with a court
proceeding, except that no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess o f the
highest rate o f compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United States,
(ii) the reasonable cost o f any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project
which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation o f the party's case, and
***
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Sec. 7433. Civil damages for certain unauthorized collection actions.
(a) In general. If, in connection with any collection o f Federal tax with respect to a
taxpayer, any officer or employee o f the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or
intentionally, or by reason o f negligence, disregards any provision o f this title, or any
regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for
damages against the United States in a district court o f the United States. Except as
provided in section 7432 [26 USCS § 7432], such civil action shall be the exclusive
remedy for recovering damages resulting from such actions.
(b) Damages. In any action brought under subsection (a) or petition filed under
subsection (e), upon a finding o f liability on the part o f the defendant, the defendant shall
be liable to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the lesser o f $ 1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ($ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 , in the
case o f negligence) or the sum o f ( 1 ) actual, direct economic damages sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result o f
the reckless or intentional or negligent actions o f the officer or employee, and
(2 ) the costs o f the action.
(c) Payment authority. Claims pursuant to this section shall be payable out o f funds
appropriated under section 1304 o f title 31, United States Code.
(d) Limitations.
(1) Requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. A judgment for damages
shall not be awarded under subsection (b) unless the court determines that the plaintiff
has exhausted the administrative remedies available to such plaintiff within the Internal
Revenue Service.
(2) Mitigation o f damages. The amount o f damages awarded under subsection (b)(1)
shall be reduced by the amount o f such damages which could have reasonably been
mitigated by the plaintiff.
(3) Period for bringing action. Notwithstanding any other provision o f law, an action to
enforce liability created under this section may be brought without regard to the amount
in controversy and may be brought only within 2 years after the date the right o f action
accrues.
(e) Actions for violations o f certain bankruptcy procedures.
(1) In general. If, in connection with any collection o f Federal tax with respect to a
taxpayer, any officer or employee o f the Internal Revenue Service willfully violates any
provision o f section 362 (relating to automatic stay) or 524 (relating to effect o f
discharge) o f title 11, United States Code (or any successor provision), or any regulation
promulgated under such provision, such taxpayer may petition the bankruptcy court to
recover damages against the United States.
***
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Sec. 7491. Burden of proof.
(a) Burden shifts where taxpayer produces credible evidence.
(1) General rule. If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence
with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability o f the taxpayer for
any tax imposed by subtitle A or B [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq. or 2001 et seq.], the Secretary
shall have the burden o f proof with respect to such issue.
(2) Limitations. Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to an issue only if—
(A) the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under this title to substantiate
any item;
(B) the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this title and has
cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information,
documents, meetings, and interviews; and
(C) in the case o f a partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is described in
section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) [26 USCS § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii)].
Subparagraph (C) shall not apply to any qualified revocable trust (as defined in section
645(b)(1) [26 USCS § 645(b)(1)]) with respect to liability for tax for any taxable year
ending after the date o f the decedent's death and before the applicable date (as defined in
section 645(b)(2) [26 USCS § 645(b)(2)]).
(3) Coordination. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any issue if any other provision o f
this title provides for a specific burden o f proof with respect to such issue.
(b) Use o f statistical information on unrelated taxpayers. In the case o f an individual
taxpayer, the Secretary shall have the burden o f proof in any court proceeding with
respect to any item o f income which was reconstructed by the Secretary solely through
the use o f statistical information on unrelated taxpayers.
(c) Penalties. Notwithstanding any other provision o f this title, the Secretary shall have
the burden of production in any court proceeding with respect to the liability o f any
individual for any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount imposed by this title.
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Sec. 7602. Examination o f books and witnesses.
(a) Authority to summon, etc. For the purpose o f ascertaining the correctness o f any
return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability o f any
person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity o f any transferee or
fiduciary o f any person in respect o f any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such
liability, the Secretary is authorized—
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or
employee o f such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care o f books o f
account containing entries relating to the business o f the person liable for tax or required
to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before
the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books,
papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony o f the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or
material to such inquiry.
(b) Purpose may include inquiry into offense. The purposes for which the Secretary may
take any action described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) o f subsection (a) include the
purpose o f inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement
o f the internal revenue laws.
(c) Notice o f contact o f third parties.
(1) General notice. An officer or employee o f the Internal Revenue Service may not
contact any person other than the taxpayer with respect to the determination or collection
o f the tax liability o f such taxpayer without providing reasonable notice in advance to the
taxpayer that contacts with persons other than the taxpayer may be made.
(2) Notice o f specific contacts. The Secretary shall periodically provide to a taxpayer a
record o f persons contacted during such period by the Secretary with respect to the
determination or collection o f the tax liability o f such taxpayer. Such record shall also be
provided upon request o f the taxpayer.
(3) Exceptions. This subsection shall not apply—
(A) to any contact which the taxpayer has authorized;
(B) if the Secretary determines for good cause shown that such notice would
jeopardize collection of any tax or such notice may involve reprisal against any person; or
(C) with respect to any pending criminal investigation.
(d) No administrative summons when there is Justice Department referral.
(1) Limitation o f authority. No summons may be issued under this title, and the
Secretary may not begin any action under section 7604 [26 USCS § 7604] to enforce any
summons, with respect to any person if a Justice Department referral is in effect with
respect to such person.
***
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Sec. 7609. Special procedures for third-party summonses.
(a) Notice.
(1) In general. If any summons to which this section applies requires the giving o f
testimony on or relating to, the production o f any portion o f records made or kept on or
relating to, or the production o f any computer software source code (as defined in
7612(d)(2) [26 USCS § 7612(d)(2)]) with respect to, any person (other than the person
summoned) who is identified in the summons, then notice o f the summons shall be given
to any person so identified within 3 days o f the day on which such service is made, but no
later than the 23rd day before the day fixed in the summons as the day upon which such
records are to be examined. Such notice shall be accompanied by a copy o f the summons
which has been served and shall contain an explanation o f the right under subsection
(b)(2 ) to bring a proceeding to quash the summons.
***
(b) Right to intervene; right to proceeding to quash.
(1) Intervention. Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is
entitled to notice o f a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to intervene in
any proceeding with respect to the enforcement o f such summons under section 7604 [26
USCS § 7604],
(2) Proceeding to quash.
(A) In general. Notwithstanding any other law or rule o f law, any person who is
entitled to notice o f a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a
proceeding to quash such summons not later than the 2 0 th day after the day such notice is
given in the manner provided in subsection (a)(2). In any such proceeding, the Secretary
may seek to compel compliance with the summons.
(B) Requirement o f notice to person summoned and to Secretary. If any person begins
a proceeding under subparagraph (A) with respect to any summons, not later than the
close o f the 20-day period referred to in subparagraph (A) such person shall mail by
registered or certified mail a copy o f the petition to the person summoned and to such
office as the Secretary may direct in the notice referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(C) Intervention; etc. Notwithstanding any other law or rule o f law, the person
summoned shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding under subparagraph (A).
Such person shall be bound by the decision in such proceeding (whether or not the person
intervenes in such proceeding).
(c) Summons to which section applies.
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2), this section shall apply to any
summons issued under paragraph (2) o f section 7602(a) [26 USCS § 7602(a)] or under
section 6420(e)(2), 6421(g)(2), 6427(j)(2), or 7612 [26 USCS § 6420(e)(2), 6421(g)(2),
6427Q(2), or 7612],
***
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